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1 . 1  Overview 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the following conjunctions of reason in 
English: because, since, and for .  The sentences in ( 1 )  exemplify that 
these conjunctions introduce a clause that represents a reason : 
( 1 )  a. He is  called Mitch, because his name i s  Mitchell .  
b .  I 'm  forever on  a diet, since I put on  weight easily. 
c .  He had a great desire to have a home of his own for he 
had always l ived with my grand mother. 
(COBUILD4 [ italics are mine] ) 
Superficially, these conjunctions seem to be synonymous . Some 
dictionaries indeed give paraphrase relations of since and for with because . 
Take the following dictionary definitions as examples : 
(2) a. 
b. 
smce : conjunction because 
for: conjunction dated or l iterally because 
(CIDE) 
As shown in (2), the meaning of since and for are defined as because in 
CIDE. 
However, there are a number of differences between them, of which I 
s imply point out three here as a first step to our argument (while details will 
be discussed later on) .  First, as  is well known, because has a causal use as 
in (3a) and an inferential use as in (3b) (e.g. Jespersen ( 1 949), Rutherford 
( 1 970),  Schourup and Waida ( 1 988), Sweetser ( 1 990), Hirose ( 1 99 1 ,  1 992, 
1 998 ,  1 999), Nakau ( 1 994), among many others), while since and/or, though 
the definitions vary, are said to have only an inferential use (e.g. Kanbayashi 
( 1 9 88) ,  Sweetser ( 1 990), Nakau ( 1 994), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c)) . 1 
(3)  a .  The ground is wet because it has rained. 
b. It has rained, because the ground is  wet. 
The situation described in the because-clause in (3a) ,  that it has rained, i s  
understood as  the cause of  the ground being wet, whi le that in  (3b ) ,  that the 
ground is wet, is understood as providing the premise from which to draw the 
conclusion that it must have rained.2 
Second, while inferential because-clauses may not be m 
sentence-initial position as in ( 4a), since-clauses, even if they provide the 
premise for inference, may be in such a position, as in ( 4b ) : 
( 4)  a .  * Because the ground is wet, i t  has rained. 
(Hirose ( 1 99 1  :27)) 
b .  S ince he isn't  here, he has (evidently) gone home. 
2 
(Sweetser ( 1 990 :78)) 
Third, /or-clauses, unlike because- and since-clauses, cannot be m 
sentence-initial position, as shown in ( 5 ) :  
( 5 )  * For he  was unhappy, he  asked to  be  transferred. 
(Quirk et al .  ( 1 985 :922)) 
(cf. He asked to be transferred, for he was unhappy. )  
Thus, a l l  of these three conj unctions invite reasons of some kind, but their 
syntactic and semantic behaviors are different. We need a grammatical 
system that can comprehensively account for both similarities and 
differences between them. 
The aims of this thesis are (i) to give an integrated account of these 
conjunctions within the framework of construction grammar (e.g. Fillmore et 
al . ( 1 988) ,  Goldberg ( 1 995 ,  2005) ,  Hirose ( 1 999), among many others), and 
( i i) to show the validity of the proposed analysis .  
1 .2 Organization 
This thesis is  composed roughly of three parts . "Roughly," because 
the three parts are so intimately related that I cannot draw clear l ines ( i .e . ,  the 
parts that I mention here are j ust groupings of convenience; not discrete ones) .  
The first part, which corresponds to chapters 2 and 3, is an overview of 
previous studies and the framework of construction grammar, within which I 
present proposals in chapters that follow. 
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Chapter 2 reviews how these conjunctions have been treated in the 
l iterature and points out problems with their analyses . Specifically, I 
overview (i) Talmy' s ( 1 978b) Gestalt psychological view of subordination, 
(i i) Chafe ' s  ( 1 984) observation of the relation between clause position, i .e .  
sentence-initial or  sentence-final, and boundedness, i .e .  the presence or 
absence of a comma intonation, (iii) Sweetser' s ( 1 990) analysis of pragmatic 
ambiguity in because and s ince, (iv) Nakau' s  ( 1 994) view of because and 
s ince as either a propositional element or a marker of modality, and (v) 
Hirose ' s  ( 1 998,  1 999) construction grammar approach to the because-clause 
subject construction (e.g. just because he 's a linguist doesn 't mean he spea ks  
many languages) . 
Chapter 3 overviews construction grammar theory, since my proposal 
to be presented in chapter 4 and the descriptive analyses that follow (chapters 
5 -7)  are dependent largely upon the theory. Various approaches have been 
proposed under the name of construction grammar (cf. Croft and Cruse 
(2004)), of which I introduce in chapter 3 Fillmore and Kay ' s  Construction 
Grammar, Goldberg' s construction grammar, and Croft' s Radical 
Construction Grammar, making clear their similarities and differences . 
After i l lustrating basic concepts of construction grammars, I introduce an 
important notion that is used in the theory : inheritance l inks (cf. Goldberg 
( 1 995 ), Hirose ( 1 998,  1 999), Kanetani (2006b )) .  Inheritance l inks, which 
capture how existing constructions are related, play a particularly important 
role  in my thesis .  
The second part, which comprises only chapter 4 ,  makes the main 
proposal in the thesis : I postulate and examine in detail constructions in 
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which conjunctions because, s ince, and for are used . They will be called 
causal constructions and reasoning constructions . The former express a 
causal relation between the two situations described, and the latter the 
speaker' s reasoning process . These meanings pair with certain syntactic 
forms to realize the form-meaning correspondences .  As  I shal l discuss in 
chapter 4, there are two types of causal constructions and four types of 
reasoning constructions . I wil l  point out that although they are independent 
constructions, they are related in some sense.  It  is the notion of inheritance 
l inks that helps capture the relations . By postulating the constructions and 
describing their relations, I wi l l  claim that both similarities and differences 
between the conjunctions, such as those observed in section 1.1 and other 
syntactic and semantic behaviors to be discussed later on, are best accounted 
for not by focusing only on the conjunctions themselves but by considering 
what constructions the conjunctions are used in . 
The third part, which consists of chapters 5 through 7, is a descriptive 
appl ication of the analysis proposed in chapter 4, i . e . ,  these chapters offer 
support for the proposal made in chapter 4 .  Chapter 5 examines the 
focalizability of because and since . Despite the widely accepted view that 
because-clauses can be focalized by focusing adverbs whereas since-clauses 
cannot, there are many cases in which certain focusing adverbs focalize 
since-clauses, as exemplified in (6): 
( 6) Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only 
natural, particularly s ince a sari does not have to be washed as 
frequently as a dress . . . . (BNC3 [ italics are mine] ) 
5 
Chapter 5 explains the focal izabil ity of because - and since-clauses in terms 
of (i) the types of constructions that these conjunctions participate in and (ii) 
the types of focusing adverbs used. 
Chapter 6 investigates a certain metalinguistic use of because, which is 
exemplified by a sentence like (7) :  
(7) The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable 
private collection in the world .  Reputed, because no one 
outside of invited guests was permitted to see it. 
(Hirose ( 1 992 : 82)) 
In the second sentence, the speaker explains why he used the word reputed in 
the preceding context. This construction is marked in the following two 
senses : (i) the main clause is only a word or phrase used in the preceding 
context, 4 although the conjunction because canonically connects two clauses, 
as in ( 1 a), repeated as (8), and (i i) as we shall see in chapter 6, the use of the 
sentence in (7) is more restricted than the use of the corresponding canonical 
sentence as in (9) : 
(8)  He is called Mitch, because his name is Mitchel l .  (= ( l a))  
(9)  I say "reputed," because no one outside of invited guests was 
permitted to see it .  
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In order to explain both general ities and specificities of constructions of 
metalinguistic reasons like (7), chapter 6 compares them with other 
constructions in which because is used. 
Thus, chapters 5 and 6 provide support for the analysis presented in 
chapter 4 applying it to the related phenomena in English. The argument in 
chapter 7 supports the proposed analysis from a different perspective . 
Chapter 7 compares because constructions in English and kara constructions 
in Japanese. Like because, the Japanese conjunction (or conjunctive 
particle) kara has causal and inferential uses (e.g. Takeuchi ( 1999), 
Higashiizumi (2006)) : 
( 1 0) a .  
b .  
Taro wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara 
Taro Top Hanako Ace love because 
modottekita 
came.back5 
' Taro came back because he loved Hanako. '  
Taro 
Taro 
wa modottekita 
Top came.back 
aishiteiru no daroo 
love Nomi I.guess 
kara, Hanako o 
because Hanako Ace 
'Taro loved Hanako, because he came back. ' 
(Higashiizumi (2006 : l l 7f.))  
The s ituation described in the kara-clause in ( 1 Oa), Taro ga Hanako o 
aishite-iru (koto ) ' (that) Taro loves Hanako, '  expresses the cause of Taro' s  
7 
coming back, while that in ( 1  Ob), Taro ga modottekita (koto ) ' (that) Taro 
came back, ' is understood as providing the premise from which to draw the 
conclusion that Taro loved Hanako. Pointing out similarities between 
Japanese kara constructions and English because constructions, I will show 
that the analysis to be proposed in chapter 4 is valid not only 
language-specifically but also cross-l inguistically. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with summaries of the claims m 
chapters 4 through 7 .  
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Notes to Chapter 1 
1 .  One may be skeptical about this view of since and for, given 
sentences l ike (ia, b) in which the since- and/or-clauses seem to represent the 
cause of the situations expressed in the main clauses, but I argue for this view 
in chapter 4 (detai ls shal l be discussed there) . 
( i)  a .  S ince John wasn' t  there, we decided to leave a note for 
him. 
b .  John came back, for h e  loved her. 
(Sweetser ( 1 990 :78)) 
2 .  The word "situation" i s  used as a cover term for both event and 
state of affairs (cf. Lyons ( 1 977 :483 )) .  
3 .  BNC=British National Corpus [ www.natcorp.ox.ac .uk/] 
4 .  The term "main clause" may not be proper to refer to the 
expression reputed, because such a simple word or phrase is not technically a 
clause .  In this thesis, I simply use the term to refer to the syntactic position 
equivalent to the main clause .  
5. The abbreviations used m the glosses of the examples are as 
follows : Acc=accusative case marker, Nomi=nominalizer, and Top=topic 
marker. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Previous Studies* 
In the previous chapter, I have stated the goal of the thesi s :  To  give 
an integrated account of because, s ince, and for, and to show its validity. 
Before presenting my own analysis of these conjunctions, it i s  necessary 
and helpful to see how they have been treated in previous studies . In this 
chapter, I review (i) Talmy' s ( l  978b) Gestalt psychological view of 
subordination (section 2.2), (ii) Chafe's  ( 1 9 84) observation of the relation 
between clause position, i . e .  sentence-initial or sentence-final, and 
boundedness, i . e .  the presence or absence of a comma intonation (section 
2 .3),  (i i i) Sweetser' s ( 1 990) analysis of pragmatic ambiguity in because ­
and since-clauses (section 2 .4),  ( iv) Nakau ' s  ( 1 994) view of because and 
s ince as either a propositional element or a marker of modality (section 2 .5), 
and (v) Hirose ' s  ( 1 998, 1 999) construction grammar approach to the 
because-clause subj ect construction (e.g.  just because he 's a l ingu ist 
doesn 't mean he speaks many languages) (section 2 .6). 
Although I speak of "conjunctions of reason," the works that I review 
in thi s  chapter are mostly concerned with the conjunction because . As I 
see it, a great amount of researches have been carried out about because, 
whereas not so much attention has been paid to s ince and /or. Of the five 
1 0  
works under rev iew, only Sweetser ( 1 990) and Nakau ( 1 994) describe s ince 
in some detail ,  comparing it with because (which will be of a great help in 
presenting my proposal in chapter 4 ) . 1 As far as my knowledge goes , 
there is  no in-depth research about/or , and so in the course of observing the 
previous studies in this chapter, I refer to for in the context of their 
analyses . 
2.2 Talmy (1 978b) 
Talmy ( l 978b) points out the importance and relevance of the Gestalt 
psychological categories, Figure and Ground, in cognitive semantics (for 
those Gestalt psychological categories, see for example, Koffka 
( 1 93 5 :Ch . 5 )) .  Talmy attempts to  account for subordination in terms of  
their distinctions (cf. Talmy ( 1 978a, 2000), Ohori ( 1 99 1 ,  1 992)) . Used in 
cognitive semantics, Figure and Ground objects are defined as follows : 
( 1 )  a .  The Figure object is a moving or co nceptually movable 
point whose path or site is conceived as a variable, the 
particular value of which is the salient issue. 
b. The Ground object is a reference-point, having a 
stationary setting within a reference-frame, with respect 
to which the Figure ' s  path or s ite receives 
characterization. 
(Talmy ( 1 978b :627)) 
Using the Figure-Ground distinction can account for contrasts l ike the one 
1 1  
below: 
(2) a. The bike is near the house. 
b. ?? The house is near the bike .2 
(Talmy ( l 978b:628)) 
The two sentences above represent the same logical relation, i .e .  the 
quantity of distance between the two objects . However, Talmy observes 
that these two sentences do not convey the same "meaning" (cf. Ohori 
( 1 992)) .  In (2a),  the house is used as a reference-point by which to 
characterize the location of the bike . That is ,  the house is construed as the 
Ground object. In (2b ), the relations are completely inverted, i . e . ,  the bike 
is used as a reference-point by which the house 's location is characterized. 
Given the definition of Figure and Ground objects as in ( 1 a, b ) , we may 
account for the anomaly of sentence (2b) as follows . While sentence (2a) 
follows the general tendency or principle of our construal, sentence (2b) 
does not :  The bike, which is (potential ly) a moving object, is more readi ly 
construed as the Figure than the house, which is a static object . That is ,  
the assignment of the F igure and Ground objects in sentence (2b) is  
unnatural .  
Based on  the observation that the Figure-Ground distinction plays an 
important role in cognitive semantics, Talmy further argues that the same 
distinction is  observed not only in the relation between two objects , e.g. the 
bike and the house in (2a, b ), but also in the relations between two events . 
According to Talmy, the Figure and Ground objects that are defined in 
1 2  
terms of the relative location of objects in space, i .e .  ( 1 a, b ), are extended to 
the relative location of events in time. Observe the following examples : 
(3 ) a. The explosion took place during the performance. 
b .  The performance went on for three hours . 
(Talmy ( l  978b :632)) 
In (3a), the event of explosion is considered as the F igure obj ect with 
respect to the reference point set in the temporal reference-frame, during 
the performance . Likewise, in (3 b ), the performance i s  construed as the 
Figure obj ect, and the temporal expression for three hours as the Ground 
obj ect. That is, the temporal adverbials introduced by during and for are 
reference-points, with respect to which the events of explosion and 
performance going on receive their characterizations, respectively . 
Interestingly, j ust as with the relations between two obj ects, e .g .  (2a, 
b ), there exist favored patterns of Figure-Ground assignments to events . 
To see this, compare the following examples : 
(4) a. He exploded after he touched the button. 
b .  He touched the button before he exploded. 
(Talmy ( l  978b :632f.))  
In ( 4a), the Ground interpretation is  assigned to the event of touching the 
button ;  the F igure interpretation to the event of explosion. The 
Figure-Ground assignment in sentence ( 4b) is completely opposite. Talmy 
1 3  
says ,  "since either asymmetric relation in an ' inverse-pair' equal ly well 
specifies the same relational information, the advantage to a language in 
having lexification for both [e.g. a fter and before] is precisely that either of 
the related events can be specified as functioning as the Figure (p .63 3  ). " 
That is, s ince Engl ish has both before and a fter to specify temporal relations 
between the two events expressed, either the event of explosion or the event 
of button-touching can be construed as the Figure obj ect. Nevertheless, 
Talmy observes that sentence ( 4b) sounds unnatural although it is  
"conceptually synonymous" with sentence ( 4a).3 This unnaturalness, 
Talmy argues, stems from the Figure and Ground obj ects being very near ( if 
not the same as) the notions of assertion and presupposition. That is, 
sentences ( 4a, b)  convey the same logical meaning, but the event of 
explosion should be asserted, or more readily construed as the Figure obj ect . 
Thus, Talmy observes that even if sentence ( 4b) is grammatical, it sounds 
natural only in a special context such as an official searching into the 
possible causes of a known death . 
Likewise, such Figure-Ground distinctions and the favored pattern of 
their ass ignments may be applied to causal relations as well .  According to 
Talmy, sentence (Sa) below represents the favored or unmarked relation 
between the two events, and hence can be indicated by the s imple 
express ion because o f,  while the inverted relation in (Sb), as describing a 
marked relation, can be indicated only by a "devised phrase" such as 
to -the-occas ion ing-o f- (the -dec is ion -o f). 
(5) a. We stayed home because of his arrival (=because he had 
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arrived) .  
b .  He arrived to-the-occasioning-of-(the-decision-of) our 
staying home. 
(Talmy ( 1 978b : 63 7)) 
Sentence ( Sa) expresses a causal relation between the event of their staying 
home and that of a man ' s  arrival, i .e . ,  his arrival has caused them to stay 
home. In sentence (Sb), the reversed causal relation holds and the devised 
English phrase to -the -occas ion ing-o f-(the -dec is ion -o f)  connects the two 
events expressed. Thus, Talmy takes the causal relation represented in 
( Sa) as being more natural than that in (Sb) .  From these arguments, Talmy 
presents the following generalization: 
(6)  The unmarked (or only possible) l inguistic expression for a 
causal relation between two events treats the causing event as 
Ground and the resulting event as Figure. Where the 
complete surface is a full complex sentence, the two events 
are in the subordinate and main clause, respective ly .  
(Talmy ( l  978b :639)) 
As Ohori ( 1 992) points out, without the Figure-Ground distinction, 
contrasts l ike the one in (2a, b) above could not be explained. Thus ,  
Talmy ' s  work is  important to  the extent that his research makes it possible 
to account systematically for many contrasts resulting from some pragmatic 
factors, and that it i s  because of his study that l inguists have recognized the 
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importance of the Figure-Ground distinctions . 
Yet there are some serious problems with Talmy' s analysis . First, 
his analysis cannot capture the difference between the reasons introduced 
by because and since . Even if Talmy ' s  observation is correct that 
subordinate clauses are understood as the Ground, how because-clauses and 
since-clauses (and other subordinate clauses) are different is sti l l  not clear. 
We need a grammatical system that makes it possible to capture both their 
s imilarities and differences . Thus, just saying that because- and 
since-clauses are equally understood as Ground is not adequate . 
Second, because-clauses (and some other types of subordinate 
clauses) are not always treated as Ground, but may be asserted as if they 
were an independent clause (e .g .  Hooper and Thompson ( 1973 ) , Lakoff 
(1987), Haegeman (2002), among others) .  Consider the following 
examples : 
(7) a. I ' m  leaving, because here comes my bus . 
(Lakoff (1987:4 73)) 
b .  I ' d  better leave, s ince here comes my bus ! 
(Lakoff ( 1987 :4 79)) 
In (7a, b ) , the deictic here construction here comes my bus occurs in the 
because- and since-clauses . Hooper and Thompson ( 1973) observe that it 
is only in an asserted clause that such constructions ("speech act 
constructions" in Lakoff s (1987) terms) occur. Crucially, as seen above, 
Talmy notes that Figure and Ground are very near, if not the same as, 
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assertion and presupposition for propositions . If, as Talmy argues, 
subordinate clauses were always understood as the Ground object, or being 
presupposed, how could the asserted because- and since-clauses be 
accounted for? Talmy notes that generalization (6) i s  true for "the 
unmarked . . .  l inguistic expression for a causal relation [ital ics are mine] . "  
Thus, he  does not say that this general ization always holds . One may then 
argue that the causal relations described in sentences (7 a, b) are marked, 
and the Figure-Ground relation may be inverted . Even if they are, it is not 
clear what determines the "unmarked" or "marked" causal relation. 
Some because-clauses, even without speech act constructions l ike the 
deictic here constructions in (7a, b ), need to be construed as Figure obj ects . 
For example, a because-clause can be a focus of the answer to a 
why-question with its main clause being backgrounded. Consider the 
fol lowing dialogue: 
(8 )  A :  Why i s  the ground wet? 
B :  (The ground is wet) because it has rained . 
In this dialogue, speaker B needs to assert the reason why the ground is wet . 
He can start the answer either with the main clause or with the 
because-clause. What is important is that the information conveyed by the 
main clause (whether it is repeated or not) is not asserted but presupposed, 
or backgrounded, because it has already been given by speaker A (cf. 
Lambrecht ( 1 994)) . In contrast, the because-clause, which introduces new 
information to the discourse, is asserted as the focus of the answer. 
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Talmy' s  general ization cannot correctly predict such asserted 
because-clauses . 
These two problems result from the view of subordinate clauses as a 
natural class, i . e .  as the Ground object . There is another problem of a 
different kind.  He argues in ( 6) that a causal relation treats the causing 
event as Ground and the resulting event as Figure and that only a devised 
phrase such as to-the-occas ion ing-o f-(the-dec is ion -o j)  can connect the 
inverted causal relation, as in (9) : 
(9) He arrived to-the-occasioning-of-(the-decision-of) our staying 
home. (= (Sb)) 
However, the conjunction because does connect two events expressing not 
only a causal relation, as in ( 1 Oa), but also an inferential relation, or an 
inverted causal relation, as in ( 1 Ob): 
( 1 0) a. 
b .  
The ground is wet because it has rained. 
It has rained, because the ground is  wet. 
Jespersen ( 1 949) argues that an inference can be drawn either from cause to 
result or from result to cause; the latter pattern is exempl ified by a sentence 
l ike ( 1 Ob) .  In this sentence, contradictory to  Talmy' s generalization, the 
cause event would be treated as Figure, and the resulting event as Ground. 
Nevertheless,  no devised phrases are necessary . Whereas the s imple  
prepositional phrase because of cannot connect the inverted causal relation, 
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as in (9), the simple conjunction because can, as in ( 1 Ob) .  This stems not 
from the unnatural assignment of Figure and Ground, but from the nature of 
an inference and the difference between because and because of I wil l  
argue about this point in chapter 4. 
2.3 Chafe (1984) 
Chafe ( 1 984) treats some adverbial subordinate clauses as "a s ingle, 
undifferentiated category," of which, in this subsection, I focus on reason 
subordinate clauses . He observes them from the viewpoints of ( i )  their 
positions with respect to their main clauses, i .e .  sentence-initial or 
sentence-final position, and (i i) how tightly they are bound to their main 
clauses, i . e .  the presence or absence of a comma intonation between the 
main clause and the subordinate clause. All these patterns are exemplified 
in ( 1 1 a-d) :4 
( 1 1 )  a. sentence- initial/bound [Type A] 
Because it has such a big money I decided to buy it. 
b .  sentence-final/bound [Type B]  
I decided to  buy i t  because i t  has such a b ig  money .  
c .  sentence-initial/free [Type C] 
Because i t  has such a big money, I decided to buy it. 
d .  sentence-final/free [Type D] 
I decided to buy it, because it has such a big money. 
(Chafe ( 1 984 :439)) 
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Chafe surveys both spoken and written English and discusses the relation 
between the combination of clause ordering and clause boundedness, on 
one hand, and the information structure, on the other. In addition to these 
notions, what Chafe calls "intonation units" plays an important role in his 
analysis .  Intonation units are spurts of words that have a coherent 
intonation contour, and have a s ingle coherent intonation contour .5 As 
Chafe notes, intonation units range from one word to a clause or multiple 
clauses. For the purpose of the present argument, it is meant to refer to a 
s ingle bound clause or bound clauses . 
Now, let us take a closer look at his arguments . First, both in 
spoken and written English, adverbial clauses of  Type A, i .e .  
sentence-initial bound adverbial clauses, are not so l ikely to be used as the 
other patterns . That is ,  if  a because-clause appears in the same intonation 
or punctuation unit with its main clause, the because-clause almost always 
follows the main clause .  Chafe observes that this is related to information 
structures or information flows, pointing out that main clauses, but not 
adverbial clauses, may very well express famil iar information, and thus the 
normal progression is one which moves from a main clause to an adverbial 
clause .  6 He notes that English speakers usually create information/ 
punctuation units which begin with familiar information (cf. Hall iday 
( 1 967)) .  
Second, using adverbial clauses of Type B ,  i .e .  sentence-final bound 
adverbial clauses, s ignals that sentence-initial main clauses convey familiar 
information; the adverbial clauses that follow convey unfamiliar 
information. Consider the following example:  
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( 1 2 ) He causes the death of many people . . .  He has the right to 
destroy precisely because he is  the creator himself. 
(Chafe ( 1 984 :44 1 f. ) )  
In ( 1 2), the proposition expressed in the main clause he has the r ight to 
destroy may be regarded as conveying famil iar information on the basis of 
the preceding statement he causes the death of many people . According to 
Chafe,  sentence-final bound because-clauses, on the other hand, present 
unfamiliar information.  Thus, Chafe ' s  arguments about bound adverbial 
clauses can be summarized as follows : (i) When two clauses occur within 
the same intonation or punctuation unit, only one of them is  l ikely to 
express unfamiliar information, (ii) unfamiliar information typical ly comes 
at the end of an intonation or punctuation unit, and (i i i)  the small number of  
the usage of Type A being concerned, adverbial clauses typically express 
unfamiliar information. 
Let us turn to considering free adverbial clauses , i . e .  Type C and 
Type D .  Chafe argues that adverbial clauses of Type C, i .e .  
sentence-initial free adverbial clauses , serve as "guideposts" to information 
flow (p .444 ) .  That is ,  they signal paths or orientations in terms of how the 
following information should be understood. Consider sentence ( 1 1  c ) ,  
repeated here as ( 1 3 ) :  
( 1 3 ) Because it has such a big memory, I decided to buy it. 
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(= ( l l c))  
In thi s  sentence, the because-clause provides a cause of the speaker' s 
decision, and indicates that the proposition expressed by the main clause 
that fol lows should be understood as its result. Chafe also observes that in 
this type, both the because-clause and the main clause convey unfami l iar 
information . 
Adverbial clauses of Type D, i .e .  sentence-final free adverbial c lauses, 
are s imilar to those of Type C to the extent that both the adverbial and main 
c lauses convey unfami liar information. In Type D, however, adverbial 
c lauses do not serve as guideposts . Rather, they convey additional 
information after sentence- initial main clauses are expressed, i .e . ,  the reason 
is given as something l ike an afterthought. Thus, as Chafe suggests, 
sentence ( l  4a) can be paraphrased as sentence ( l  4b) :  
( 1 4) a .  
b .  
That i n  itself was scary, cause I never fainted before. 
That in itself was scary, and the reason was that I had 
never fainted before. 
(Chafe ( l  9 84 :445f.))  
He observes that in sentences l ike ( 1 4a), both the main clause and the 
adverbial clause are focused. More precisely, the speaker focuses first on 
the information in the main clause, and subsequently on the cause 
represented in  the because-clause. Hence, a sentence l ike ( 1 4a) can be 
paraphrased as a coordinate sentence l ike ( 1 4b ). 
As noted at the beginning of this subsection, Chafe, like Talmy 
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( l 978b  ) , treats adverbial subordinate clauses as a single, undifferentiated 
category . However, Chafe ' s  analysis has some advantages over Talmy ' s .  
First, unlike Talmy ' s , Chafe ' s  analys is correctly expects the naturalness o f  
the following dialogue: 
( 1 5 ) A :  Why i s  the ground wet? 
B :  The ground is wet because it has rained .  
(= (8)) 
As I have pointed out in the previous subsection, this cannot be expected by 
Talmy ' s ( l  978b) analysis .  In Chafe ' s  terms, speaker B uses a sentence of 
Type B,  in which the main clause conveys famil iar information, and the 
adverbial clause that follows is unfamil iar. Then, the naturalness of the 
dialogue is straightforwardly accounted for. In a dialogue l ike ( 1 5 ) ,  the 
information in the main clause is assumed to be familiar to both speakers A 
and B ,  on the ground of speaker A ' s  utterance, while the reason for the 
ground being wet is newly introduced by speaker B ' s  utterance . That is ,  it 
i s  considered as conveying unfamiliar information. Hence, speaker B ' s  
utterance i s  natural . 
Furthermore, Chafe '  s analysis will  expect using a sentence of Type C ,  
e.g .  ( 1 6) ,  to be inappropriate as  an answer to  speaker A ' s  question in ( 1 5 ) ,  
and the expectation is borne out: 
( 1 6) A :  Why i s  the ground wet? 
C :  # Because i t  has rained, the ground i s  wet. 
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Fol lowing Chafe's  observation, we may say that the main clause of speaker 
C 's utterance in ( 1 6) conveys unfamil iar information, which is 
contradictory. 
Another advantage is that Chafe's  analysis implies the d ifference 
between because and since . Crucially, while because-clauses follow the 
four types in ( 1 1  a-d), since-clauses (in the sense of reason) ,  whether 
sentence- initial or sentence-final, are always used with a comma intonation 
(e .g .  Schourup and Waida ( 1 988),  Sweetser ( 1 990), Kanetani (2005c,  
2006c ) , among others) . 7 Consider the following sentence : 
( 1 7 ) * Do you like him since he speaks fluent Danish? 
(Schourup and Waida ( 1 98 8 :97))  
This unacceptable sentence belongs to Type B,  m which a comma 
intonation is not present between the main clause and the since-clause . 
Thus, a s ince-clause and its main clause cannot be in the same intonation 
unit. As seen above, Chafe claims that sentence-final bound adverbial 
c lauses present unfamil iar information . If so, since-clauses cannot present 
unfamil iar information . Indeed, some l inguists observe that since-clauses 
typical ly convey famil iar information (e .g .  Schourup and Waida ( 1 9 89) ,  
Swan (2005 )) .  It seems that Chafe 's  observation also correctly explains 
the grammar of since, though Chafe himself does not argue about s ince. 
However, when treating subordinate clauses as a single,  
undifferentiated category, Chafe '  s analysis has a similar probl em to 
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Talmy ' s  ( l  978b ) .  That is ,  while,  as I have mentioned above, Chafe ' s  
analysis does imply the information-structural difference between because 
and s ince, it is sti l l  not clear precisely where the difference comes from. 
More specifically, if  because and s ince are treated as the s ingle, 
undi fferentiated category, as subordinators , why does s ince not fit Types A 
and B whi le  because does. Once again, we need a grammatical system 
that makes it possible to clearly account for both similarities and differences 
between because and s ince .8 
2 .4  Sweetser (1990) 
Sweetser ( 1 990) points out that we use the same vocabulary in many 
cases to express relationships in the speech act and epistemic (reasoning) 
worlds that we use to express parallel relationships in the real-world, or 
sociophysical, events and entities. For example, the same modal auxiliary 
must i s  used e ither to denote real-world obligations ( i .e .  must as root 
modal ity), as in ( l  8a) ,  or to denote necessities ( i .e .  must as epi stemic 
modality), as in ( l  8b  ) : 
( 1 8) a. John must be  home by ten; Mother won' t  let him stay 
out any later. 
b .  John must be home already; I see  h i s  coat. 
( Sweetser ( 1 990 :49)) 
Sweetser argues, from historical, sociolinguistic, and psycholinguistic 
perspectives, that the epistemic use of modals i s  an extension of a more 
25 
basic root meaning, not vice versa (for more details, see Sweetser 
( l 990:49ff.)). 
Sweetser argues that the conjunctions be cau se and s ince are al so used 
in what she calls '"content," ''ep istemic," and ''speech-act" domains. When 
used in the content domain, these conjunctions connect two real-world 
s ituations and the sentence denotes a causal relation between them. 9 In the 
epistemic domain, the sentence expresses an inferential process, in which 
the speaker draws the conclusion expressed by the main clause from the 
premise expressed in the subordinate clause .  Used in the speech-act 
domain, the conjunctions introduce a reason why a certain speech act is  
performed in the main clause. Examples of be cause and sin ce as used in 
these three domains are given below:  
( 1 9) be cause 
a. content : John came back because he loved her. 
b .  epistemic : John loved her, because he came back. 
c. speech-act : What are you doing tonight, because 
there ' s  a good movie on. 
(Sweetser ( 1 990:77)) 
(20)  sin ce 
a .  content : S ince John wasn't there, we decided to leave 
a note for him. 
b .  epistemic : S ince John isn ' t  here, he  has (evidently) 
gone home. 
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c .  speech-act : S ince you are so smart, when was George 
Washington born? 
(Sweetser ( 1 990 :78)) 
Sentence ( l  9a) denotes the causal relation between his love and his coming 
back. In ( l 9b ) , because does not introduce a cause of his love, but rather 
introduces a premise from which to draw the conclusion that he loved her. 
In ( l 9c ), the because-clause conveys the reason for asking what the 
addressee is  doing that night. Likewise, in (20a-c), the since-clauses are 
understood as the reason for our decision, a premise to conclude that he has 
gone home, and the reason for asking the addressee when George 
Washington was born, respectively. 
Another important point that Sweetser makes is the correlation 
between the readings and the presence or non-presence of a comma 
intonation between the main clause and the subordinate clause .  She 
argues  that in the epistemic and the speech-act readings, a comma 
intonation i s  required between the main clause and the subordinate clause, 
whereas in the content domain, a comma intonation is optional . This is  
because, Sweetser argues, without a comma intonation, sentence-initial 
main clauses tend to be understood as being presupposed (cf. Chafe ( 1 984 )) .  
The main clauses in the epistemic and speech-act readings represent the 
speaker ' s logical conclusion and the speech-act being performed by the 
very utterance, respectively. These elements are unlikely to be taken as 
being presupposed. Hence, a comma intonation is required so that 
sentence-initial main clauses are asserted.  Sweetser further notes that 
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although because is triply ambiguous, since already has a strong tendency 
towards an epistemic or a speech-act reading, rather than towards a content 
read ing. This ,  according to Sweetser, leads to the non-occurrence of s ince 
in a commaless context . 
So  far, we have seen Sweetser' s analysis of because and since . 
Note in pass ing that although Sweetser does not deal with /or, it seems that 
for is also used in the three domains, as exemplified below: 
(2 1 )  for 
a.  content : John came back, for he loved her. 
b .  epistemic : John must have loved her, for he came 
back. 
c. speech-act : What are you doing tonight, for there ' s  a 
good movie on . 
In (2 1 a), the /or-clause denotes the reason why John came back. The 
/or-clause in (2 1 b) gives a premise from which to draw the conclusion that 
John must have loved her. In (2 1 c ) ,  the reason for asking the addressee 
what she is doing tonight is expressed by the for-clause .  However, 
Kanbayashi ( 1 989 :48)  notes that/or has only an inferential use.  Thi s  may 
not be surprising if we assume that for, l ike since, has a strong tendency 
towards an epistemic or speech-act reading. 1° Crucially, Sweetser argues 
that the conjunctions themselves are not polysemous but they are 
pragmatically ambiguous, i . e . ,  one single meaning of the conj unction is 
pragmatically applied in different ways according to the context . That is ,  
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it is difficult, if  not impossible, for the meaning of for to be applied in the 
way of expressing the real world causation. 
It  is then predictable that/or shou ld be used with a comma intonation, 
and indeed, it has to be used with a comma intonation . In this sense, 
Sweetser 's  observation of the correlation between a comma intonation and 
the reading of the sentence seems correct. Thus, Sweetser argues that 
when applied to different domains, an essentially unitary semantic entity, 
e .g .  because, cannot only be ambiguous but can even have different 
grammatical behaviors, e .g .  the presence or absence of a comma intonation . 
It is true that Sweetser ' s  arguments, especial ly on the correlation 
between the read ings and the presence or absence of a comma intonation, 
are insightful, but there are several problems that need to be solved. First, 
i f, as Sweetser argues, the conjunction because itself is pragmatical ly 
ambiguous, that is, if because may freely be used in the three domains, why 
can sentence-initial because-clauses not be understood as an epistemic or a 
speech-act conjunction? Consider the following examples: 
(22) a. * Because the ground is wet, it has rained . 
(Hirose ( 1 99 1  :27))  
b .  * Because you are a l inguist, what do you think of 
Chomsky? 
(cf. B ecause it has rained, the ground is wet . )  
Sentence (22a) is intended to describe the inferential process, in which the 
speaker draws the conclusion that it has rained from the premise that the 
29 
ground is  wet. In (22b ), the speaker means to ask about Noam Chomsky, 
a famous l inguist at MIT, based on his knowledge that linguists in general 
have a good knowledge of him. In these cases, as opposed to the 
parenthesized example of the content domain, sentence- initial 
because-clauses are not al lowed. As seen above, Sweetser argues that 
when applied to different domains,  the conjunction cannot only be 
ambiguous but can even have different grammatical behaviors . I f  so, we 
may say that the unacceptabil ity of sentences (22a, b) is also pragmatically 
conditioned.  That 1s ,  some "pragmatic factors" may prevent 
because-clauses from being in sentence-initial position . However, 
Sweetser does not clearly mention what, if any, the factors are l ike . 
Therefore, we need to explain the reason for the unacceptabi l ity of 
sentences (22a, b ) .  
Second, why i s  it possible that sznce, unlike because, may be 
interpreted as epistemic or speech-act conjunctions even in sentence- initial 
position? The relevant examples are reproduced below:  
(23 )  a .  S ince John isn ' t  here, he has (evidently) gone home .  
(= (20b)) 
b .  S ince you are so smart, when was George Washington 
born? (= (20c)) 
The s ince-clause in (23a) provides the premise from which to draw the 
conclusion that John isn ' t  there, and that in (23 b) the reason for asking 
when George Washington was born. Thus, they are understood as an 
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epistemic conj unction and a speech-act conj unction, respectively .  Notice 
that since-clauses in these sentences are in sentence-initial position with no 
problems (cf. (22a, b) ) . If  the position of because-clauses is pragmatically 
conditioned, the same condition might as well prevent sentence-initial 
s ince-clauses in the epistemic and speech-act domains .  Unl ike because , 
however, s ince may appear in sentence-initial position in these readings . 
Why should this be so? 
Third, whi le Sweetser acknowledges that since already has a strong 
tendency towards an epistemic or a speech-act reading, she sti l l  asserts that 
it may express content causal relations as well .  Why then can since, as 
well  as because, be used as a content conjunction? Sweetser gives the 
following paraphrases to sentences ( 1 9b, c ), where because is used as an 
epi stemic- and speech-act-conjunctions, respectively: 
(24) a .  The speaker ' s  knowledge of John ' s  return causes the 
conclusion that John loved her. 
(cf. John loved her, because he came back. ( = l 9b))) 
b .  I want to know what you are doing tonight because I 
want to suggest that we go see this good movie .  
(cf.  What are you doing tonight, because there ' s  a good movie 
on.  (= ( 1 9c))) 
(Sweetser ( 1 990 : 77)) 
The above paraphrases suggest that even in the epistemic and speech-act 
domains, certain causal relations hold. This is plausible, because the 
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conj unct ion because lexically introduces a cause . 1 1  That is ,  while in the 
content domain, e .g .  ( l 9a), sentences express literal causal re lations , 
sentences in the other domains, e .g .  ( l 9b, c ), can be taken as expressing 
"metaphorical" causal relations (cf. Hirose ( 1 999)) . Thus, following 
Sweetser, we may say that in the epistemic and speech-act domains, 
because-clauses give a ''cause" of drawing a certain conclus ion and a 
"cause'' of performing a certain speech act, respectively. Such causal 
relations may be guaranteed by the conj unction because, a conjunct ion of 
causation . It is  then mysterious why since can also be used in  the three 
domains . Since, unl ike because, does not lexically express a cause (at 
least in the etymological sense) . I wi l l  argue in  chapter 4 that 
since-clauses do not express a cause of event but provide the premise of an 
inference, and exp lain the reason. 
2 .5  Naka u  (1994) 
Nakau ( 1 994) argues that the full  sentence meaning consi sts of the 
modal component and the propositional component (cf. Lyons ( 1 977)  ) .  
The former i s  defined a s  " a  mental attitude o n  the part of  the speaker only 
accessible at the time of utterance (Nakau ( 1 994 :42)) ," and the rest of  the 
e lements in a given sentence are proposit ional elements . His bistructure 
model of sentence meaning can be schematized as in (25 ), where D-MOD 
indicates discourse modality, S -MOD sentence modality ,  and PROP 
proposition : 
(25 )  [D-MOD [S-MOD [PROP]]] 1 2  
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As in (25 ), Nakau divides the modal express ions into D-MOD and S-MOD : 
the former is  a mental attitude towards the utterance, and the latter a mental 
attitude  towards the proposition (Nakau ( 1 994 :2 1 )) . 
From th is vi ewpoint of sentence meaning, Nakau analyzes the 
mechanism of modifications by adverbial subordinate clauses including 
because- and since-clauses . Crucially, Nakau ( 1 994 : 1 0  I ff.) argues that 
because can be e ither a propositional element or a marker of D-MOD, whi le  
s ince i s  always a marker of D-MOD. Conjunctions as  propositional 
e lements roughly correspond to Sweetser' s content conj unctions, whi le  
those as markers of D-MOD roughly correspond to Sweetser' s 
epistemic/speech-act conjunctions (Nakau ( 1 994 :453 )) .  Thus, in Nakau ' s  
terms ,  the semantic structures o f  sentences ( 1 9) and (20) may be 
represented as fol lows : 1 3  
(26) a .  
b .  
[PRO P  John came back because he loved her] . 
[s-Moo <D [ PROP John loved her] ] ,  [o-Moo because [s-Moo <D 
[ PROP he came back] ] ] . 
c .  [s-Moo <D [ PROP What are you doing tonight]] ,  [ o-Moo 
because [s-Moo <D [PROP there' s  a good movie on] ] ] .  
(27)  a .  [o-Moo Since [s-Moo <D [PROP John wasn ' t there]] ] ,  [s-Moo 
<D [ PROP we decided to leave a note for him] ] . 
b .  [o-Moo Since [s-Moo <D [PROP John isn ' t  here]] ] ,  [s-Moo <D 
[ PROP he has (evidently) gone home]] .  
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c .  [ o- M o o  Since [ s-M o o  <V [ P RO P  you are so smart] ] ] ,  [ s-Moo <D 
[ P IW P  when was George Washington born] ] ?  
In the above structures, the subord inate clauses introduced b y  the ital icized 
conjunctions modify the underl ined express ions . In (26a), the 
because-clause is a propositional element that modifies another element in 
the same propositional component. In (26b, c) and (27a-c ), the because­
and since-clauses are D-MOD elements that, by definition, restrict S -MOD 
elements . In the b-examples,  the null elements in the S-MOD slots of the 
main c lause c/J could be fi l led with what N akau cal ls modal ity of truth 
judgment, e .g .  I think, must, and the l ike, whi le  in the c-examples and (27a), 
the s lot could be fil led with some performative expressions, e .g .  I ask you, I 
say, and the l ike.  All  of these expressions are, of course,  markers of  
S-MOD (cf. Nakau ( l  994 : 54ff. )) .  
Notice that the S-MOD slots in the modal because- and since-c lauses 
in (26b, c) and (27a-c) are also empty . Nakau argues that some expl icit 
S -MOD expressions may appear in such slots . In contrast, as easi ly 
predictable from the structure in (26a),  propositional because-clauses do not 
a l low S -MOD expressions to appear in it. To see this,  consider the 
following examples that Nakau cites from Ross ( 1 973 ) : 
(28)  a .  S ince I { take it/gather} that you and Miss  Pecan are 
acquainted, I wil l  be happy. 
b .  * Because I { take it/gather} that you and Miss  Pecan are 
acquainted, I wi l l  be happy. 
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(Ross ( 1 973 : 1 62)) 
I take it  and I gather, used in (28a, b ), are S-MOD expressions . According 
to Nakau, modal because-clauses must be in sentence-final position with a 
comma intonation (cf. Sweetser ( 1 990)) .  That is, the sentence-initial 
because-clause in (2 8b) cannot be a D-MOD element, but a propositional 
element. Hence, the sentence is unacceptable. By contrast, as Nakau 
observes,  such S-MOD expressions may appear in sentence-final,  free 
because-c lauses, as exemplified in (29) : 
(29)  I wi l l  be  happy, because I { take it/gather} that you and Miss  
Pecan are acquainted.  (N akau ( 1 994 : 1 07))  
This because-clause, according to Nakau, is a D-MOD element, and 
therefore, sentence (29) is no less grammatical than sentence (28a) i s .  
Another argument for the bistructure model that Nakau presents is  
concerned with contrasts in clefting. Consider the following examples : 
( 30 )  a .  It ' s  because he ' s  sick that he ' s  not coming to c lass . 
b .  * It ' s because his wife told me  that he ' s  not coming to  
class .  
c .  * It was since they wanted to save l ives that they retreated . 
(Nakau ( 1 994 : 1 62)) 
The because-clause in (30a) is a propositional element, while that in  (30b) 
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and the since-clause in (3 0c) are modal el ements . The above contrast 
( (3 0a) vs .  (3 0b, c)) shows that subordinate c lauses introduced by a modal 
subordinator cannot be clefted . Accord ing to Nakau, it is only 
propositional elements that may be focal ized . Thus, sentences (30b, c) are 
not acceptable, whereas sentence (3 0a) is .  
Nakau' s  observations above are thoughtful and indeed are of  great 
help in develop ing my proposals in later chapters, but it is unclear why 
because can be either a propositional element, as in (26a),  or a marker of  
D-MOD, as  in (26b, c ) ,  while since i s  always a marker of D-MOD, as  in  
(27 a-c ) .  This is ,  in  essence, the same problem as  the one with Sweetser' s 
( 1 990)  analys i s .  That is ,  despite Sweetser ' s  argument observed in the 
previous subsection that since already has a strong tendency towards an 
epistemic or a speech-act reading, she does not discuss the reason . 
S imi larly, the reason needs to be explained for Nakau ' s  observation that 
because is e ither a propositional element or a marker of D-MOD, whi le  
since i s  always a marker of D-MOD. 
There is another problem with Nakau' s  argument . As seen above, 
Nakau proposes the generalization that only proposit ional elements can be 
focal ized, based on which he explains the reason for modal because- and 
since-clauses not being clefted .  This generalization, however, i s  not 
always true.  Consider the following attested sentences : 
(3 1 )  a. Normal ly they were mi l itary officers, partly because the 
army provided a supply of trained talent, . . .  and mainly 
because the organization of defence was the crucial part 
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of their work . (BNC [ ital ics are mine] ) 
b .  Wearing a different one every time she went out would 
be only natural , particularly since a sari does not have to 
be washed as frequently as a dress . . .  
(BNC [ ital ics are mine] ) 
In  (3 1 a), the because-clauses provide the premise from which to draw the 
conclusion that they were mil itary officers . In  Nakau' s  terms, they are 
modal because-clauses . Nevertheless, they are focalized by the focusing 
adverbs .  Likewise, the since-clause in (3 1 b) is  focal ized by the focusing 
adverb particularly. Nakau is right, of course, in  saying that these 
subordinate c lauses may not be clefted . However, the grammaticality of  
the focal ized subordinate clauses in (3 1 a ,  b) is l eft  unexplained. Thus, 
s imply saying that propos itional elements can be focalized is  i nadequate . 
As I wi l l  argue in later chapters, focalizations by clefting and by using 
focusing adverbs are al lowed or not allowed for different reasons . I wi l l  
argue about the c lefting of because- and since-clauses in  chapter 4 �  their  
focalizations by focusing adverbs in chapter 5 .  
2 .6  Hirose ( 1998, 1 999) 1 4  
Hirose ( 1 999), fol lowing Hirose ( 1 99 1  ) ,  ful ly discusses semantic 
pecul i arities of the subject because-clause construction as exempl ified by a 
sentence l ike (32)  and describes in terms of inheritance l inks (see section 
3 .3 .2 �  cf.  Goldberg ( 1 995 )) how it is  related with other related 
constructi ons : 
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(32)  Just because I ' m a linguist doesn ' t  mean that I speak many 
languages . (Hirose ( 1 999 : 5 96)) 
In the course of  his analysis ,  H irose suggests the existence of what he cal ls  
the causal because-clause construction and the inferential because-clause 
construction.  
Hirose ' s observation of the causal because-clause construction and 
the inferential because-clause construction is summarized as follows . The 
form of the causal because-clause construction is  [P(,) because Q] , and its 
meaning is  "the s ituation Q causes the situation P as a result." When the 
cause s i tuation is contextual ly presupposed, the because-clause may 
precede the main clause, i . e . ,  the form [Because P, Q] is poss ible.  As for 
the inferential because-clause construction, the form [Q, because P] 
corresponds to the function of presenting the premise P from which to draw 
the conclus ion Q .  S ince the s ituation expressed i n  the because-clause i s  
newly presented b y  uttering the sentence, the because-clause cannot be 
contextually presupposed in the inferential because-clause construction . 
Hence, sentence-initial because-clauses are incompatible with the 
(pragmatic) function of the construction . 
However, Hirose does not investigate these constructions in  detail ,  
s ince h is  main interests are in discussing semantic/pragmatic  pecul iarities of 
the subj ect because-clause construction, e .g .  (32), and describing how it is  
related to the causal because-clause construction and the inferential 
because-c lause construction . In  chapter 4, I wil l  closely examine Hirose' s 
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observations of  the causal and inferential because-clause constructions and 
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propose an analysis based on it. 
2.7 Summary 
In  sections 2 .2 through 2 . 5 ,  I have overviewed ( i )  Talmy' s  ( l  978b) 
Gestalt psychological view of subordination in general (section 2 . 1 ), ( i i )  
Chafe '  s ( 1 9  84) relational analysis between the clause ordering and the 
boundedness (section 2 . 3 ), ( i i i )  Sweetser' s ( 1 990) pragmatic ambiguity 
analysis in because- and since-clauses (section 2 .4), and ( iv) Nakau ' s  
( 1 994)  semantic analysis o f  because and s ince as either a propositional 
e lement or a marker of  modal ity (section 2 . 5 ) .  As I have pointed out in  
each subsection, a l l  of these approaches correctly capture and account for 
some aspects of the phenomenon in question, but they all  have some 
inadequacies . 
An analys is  to be proposed should compensate for these inadequacies .  
It i s  a construction grammar approach, I believe, that sat isfies thi s  
requirement, because construction grammar approaches make i t  possible to 
capture the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of the expression in  
question simultaneously (e .g .  Lakoff ( 1 9 87), Fi l lmore et  al . ( 1 9 8 8), 
Goldberg ( 1 99 5 ,  2005) ,  Michaelis and Lambrecht ( 1 996) ,  Hirose ( 1 998 ,  
1 999) ,  Kay and F i l lmore ( 1 999), Croft (200 I ), Ostman and Fried (2005 ), 
and many others) .  T o  this  end, i n  section 2 . 6, I have referred t o  Hirose ' s  
( 1 999)  construction grammar analysis of the subj ect because-c lause 
construction, i n  which he points out the existence of the causal and 
inferential because-clause constructions . 
3 9  
Given the exi stence of the causal because-clause construction and the 
inferential because-clause construction, in chapter 4, I wil l  analyze them in 
more detai l ,  and show that the construction grammar approach provides an 
integrated account of conjunctions of reason.  Before that, in chapter 3,  I 
wi l l  overview what construction grammar approaches are al l about. 
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Notes to Chapter 2 
* Parts of  the arguments in this  chapter have appeared in Kanetani 
(20 0 5 c, 2006c ) .  For their useful comments, thanks are due to Yukio  
Hirose, N aoaki Wada, and reviewers for  Eigo Go ho  Bunpo Kenkyu 1 2  and 
Tsukuba English Studies 25 .  
1 .  I t  i s  we l l  known that because-clauses have two (or more) readings, 
i . e .  casual and inferential readings (Jespersen ( 1 949), Rutherford ( 1 970),  
S weetser ( 1 990), Nakau ( 1 994 ) , Hirose ( 1 998 ,  1 999), among many others ; 
see sections 2 .4-2 .6) ,  and that their behaviors vary with the readings (see 
chapter 4 ) . The conjunction since has been argued in  relation with its 
temporal meaning from various perspectives (e.g. Traugott and Konig 
( 1 99 1  ) ,  Wickboldt ( 1 99 8)), but as for its meaning of reason, i t  does not 
show such various behaviors as because. For these reasons, because may 
have been more fascinating to l inguists . 
It should  be noted here that the reason why Hirose does not refer to 
s ince in his articles is  that it is beyond the scope of his research . In his  
ear l ier work (Hirose ( 1 99 1  )) , some remarks have been made about since, 
but it is not directly relevant to the arguments in the present chapter. 
2 .  The judgment i s  Ohori ' s  ( 1 992 : 82) (cf. Croft (200 1 :Ch .9)) .  
3 .  Although Talmy puts no symbol  such as "?" or " * "  in  front of 
sentence (4b), he observes that the sentence does sound "comical (p .63 3 ) . "  
4 .  The bound-free distinction here is s imply a sty listic one. That is ,  
if a comma intonation is not present between the main clause and the 
subordinate clause, the subordinate clause is bound;  w ith a comma 
intonation between them, on the other hand, the subordinate c lause is free. 
5 .  As Chafe notes, the term "intonation units" corresponds to his 
earli er terms "idea units" (cf. Chafe ( 1 982)) .  
6 .  Notice that this  observation seems opposite to Talmy ' s ( l  978b) 
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(see section 2 .2) .  Talmy argues that subordinate clauses are construed as 
Ground obj ects, which are typ ically presupposed . As I have argued in 
section 2 .2 ,  this  is not always true, however. Then, one may argue that 
Chafe' s  observation is superior to Talmy' s , but crucially Chafe does not 
give any pos itive evidence for main clauses conveying famil iar information 
and subordinate clauses unfamiliar. Thus, we cannot immediately decide 
on which clause conveys famil iar or given information and which conveys 
unfamil iar or new information . 
7 .  This is not true for a temporal use of since . Temporal 
since-clauses, when in sentence-final position, do not require a comma 
intonation, as in ( i) : 
( i )  So  much has changed in the sport s ince I was a teenager. 
(COBUILD4, s .v .  since) 
8 .  It should b e  noted, however, that the notions o f  the clause 
ordering and the clause boundedness that Chafe proposes play important 
roles in constructing my proposals later on. Thus, I do not argue against 
Chafe '  s observation. Rather, his observation is fundamental for my 
analysis to be proposed in chapter 4, which will also account for why a 
comma intonation is  required between a since-clause and its main clause .  
9 .  The word "situation" i s  used as a cover term for both event and 
state of affairs (cf. Lyons ( 1 977 :483 )) . 
1 0 . For reasons to be discussed m chapter 4, I wil l  e l iminate the 
distinction between the epistemic and speech-act domains and wil l  treat 
them as a natural class .  Thus, i f, as Kanbayashi observes, for has such a 
strong tendency towards an epistemic reading, it then easily gets a 
speech-act reading, as wel l .  
1 1 . I t  i s  worth noting that the conjunction because was originally the 
prepositional phrase that introduces a cause; the prepositional phrase has 
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been grammatical ized to the conjunction : by cause>because . 
1 2 .  I n  Nakau ' s  terms, PROP does not have a monolayer structure, as 
m (25 ) , but has a quaternary layer structure . Here, I s imply represent 
PROP to cover all the layers of the propositional elements because the 
detailed internal structure of PROP is not necessary for the present 
discuss ion . For the detailed internal structure of PROP, see Nakau 
( 1 994 : 1 5 ) .  
1 3 .  Sentences with /or-clauses , e .g .  (2 1 a-c ) ,  cannot b e  described in 
the same way as (26) and (27),  because, as I wil l  argue in chapter 4, for is  
not a subordinator but a coordinator (cf. Quirk et al .  ( 1 985 )  ) . This, 
however, does not mean that Nakau ' s  b istructure model of sentence 
meaning cannot describe the structure of the meaning of sentences with/or. 
It should be noted that coordinated conjuncts should be paral lel  both in  their  
structure and in their meaning (e .g .  Quirk et  al .  ( 1 985 : 94 7)) . Observe the 
following example : 
( i) * a student [ A RG U M ENT p p  of physics] and [ A DJ U N CT P P  with long 
hair] (Radford ( 1 98 1 :99)) 
In ( i ) ,  the coordinator and connects two prepositional phrases, i . e .  
structurally paral lel elements , but functionally,  they are not paral le l .  One 
serves as an argument, and the other as an adjunct to the head NP, a student. 
Hence, the whole NP is not grammatical . 
As a coordinator, for should follow this general principle .  If, as 
Kanbayashi ( 1 989) notes, for has only an inferential use, it must connect 
S-MOD expressions, and the meaning of sentence ( i ia), for instance, may 
be represented as ( i ib ) :  
( i i )  a .  John must have loved her, for he  came back. (= (2 1 b ) )  
b .  [ s-Mo o must [ P 1W P John have loved her] ] ,  for 
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In ( i ib ) ,  for connects two S-MOD elements . What is important for now is  
that Nakau ' s  bistructure model can represent sentence meanings of 
coord inate structures as wel l .  I will  argue about for in more detail m 
chapter 4 .  
1 4 .  Hirose ( 1 999)  is an  extended vers ion of Hirose ( 1 998) ,  which 
means that the discussion of the former subsumes that of the latter. Thus, 
hereafter, I refer only to Hirose ( 1 999) .  
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Chapter 3 
Construction Gram mar Approaches to Human Language 
3 . 1  Construction Grammars at Glance 
As I have mentioned in the preceding chapters, I will propose an 
integrated account of conjunctions of reason within the framework of 
construction grammar (cf. Hirose ( 1 998,  1 999)) .  In the present chapter, I 
overview construction grammar approaches to human language. 
The word "constructions (which was derived from Latin constructio )" 
has been used as a grammatical term for more than two thousand years 
(Goldberg and Casenhiser (2006)), although it is over the last two decades 
that the new theoretical approaches to language, i .e .  constructionist 
approaches, have been developed (e.g. Lakoff ( 1 987), F illmore et al . ( 1 988) ,  
Goldberg ( 1 995 ,  2005),  Michaelis and Lambrecht ( 1 996), Hirose ( 1 998, 
1 999) ,  Kay and Fil lmore ( 1 999) ,  Croft (200 1 ) ,  and many others ) . 1  
As the plural form of the chapter title "construction grammar 
approaches" indicates, various analyses have been proposed under the name 
of construction grammar. However, they all conform to the basic principles 
l isted in ( l a-c) below (Croft and Cruse (2004 :265)), and generally assume 
that in order for a linguistic pattern to be recognized as a construction, some 
aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictab le from its component 
parts or from other constructions which are recognized to exist. 
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( 1 )  a .  The independent existence of constructions as symbolic 
units 
b .  The uniform representation of  grammatical structures 
c .  The taxonomic organization of  constructions in  a 
grammar. 
As mentioned in  ( 1 a, b ) ,  constructionist approaches, as opposed to 
componential syntactic approaches (e.g. Cul icover and Jackendoff (2005 )), 
see particular correspondences of the form and meaning, i .e . constructions, as 
symbol ic units and treat them as central in describing grammar of human 
language . 
In  componential syntactic approaches,  grammatical properties of 
d ifferent types are placed in different components such as  syntactic, semantic, 
and phonological components, and they are l inked by certain l inking rules, 
except for the lexicon, in which these grammatical properties are integrated .  
This can be represented as follows : 
(2) phonological component 
l inking rules 
semantic component 
l inking rules 
syntactic component 
(Croft and Cruse (2004 : 227)) 
By contrast, m constructionist approaches, syntactic and semantic 
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properties are not placed in separate components . Rather, they are paired 
together and their pairings are regarded as constructions. Thus, the 
symbolic structure of a construction may be represented as fol lows : 
(3)  
syntactic properties 
morphological properties � 
phonological properties 
i"41 symb 
semantic properties 
pragmatic properties � 
discourse-functional properties 
� CONSTRUCTION 
,_____ 
Dl ic 
FORM 
correspondence 
( l ink) 
,_____( CONVENTIONAL) 
MEANING 
(Croft and Cruse (2004 :25 8)) 
That is ,  constructionist approaches make it possible to account for the formal 
( i . e . syntactic, morphological, and phonological) and functional ( i .e .  semantic, 
pragmatic, and discourse-functional) aspects of given expressions m an 
integrated way.  This is  nicely reflected in the following quote : 
( 4) To adopt a constructional approach is  to undertake a 
commitment in principle to account for the entirety of  each 
language. (Kay and Fi l lmore ( 1 999 :  I )) 
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In  such a view, constructions are considered to be all levels of gram atical 
units, including morphemes (e.g. (Sa)), words (e.g. (Sb)), idioms (e.g. (5c)), 
partially lexically filled and fully general phrasal patterns (e.g. ( Sd)) 
(Goldberg (2006 : 5 )) .  That is, unl ike componential syntactic approaches, 
which place a special status on lexicon, as in (2), in constructionist 
approaches, l exicon, e.g. (5b ), and syntactic constructions, e.g. (Sc, d), are 
not d iscrete categories, but there is  a continuum between them. 
( 5 )  a. pre -, -ing 
b. avocado, anaconda, and 
c .  going great guns, give the Dev il h is due 
d .  The X-er the Y-er (e.g. the more you think about it, the 
less you understand) 
(Goldberg (2006 : 5 )) 
In ( 5d), for example, the conditional meaning that the syntactic string the 
X-er, the Y-er expresses is  not predictable from any e lements in the 
construction or their  combinations .  Likewise, in (5b ), the meaning of 
avocado is not predictable from its component parts . Rather, avocado itself 
represents a symbolic unit of form and meaning. Hence, a lexical element 
l ike avocado also counts as a construction. 
The taxonomic organization in ( 1 c) is  postulated so that information of 
constructions can be stored efficiently and made easi ly modifiable (Goldberg 
( 1 995 :72)) .  Haiman ( 1 98S)  argues that making generalizations i s  a 
necessary function of language, because human languages recognize a 
48 
l imited inventory of phonemes and sememes ( i .e .  concepts), rather than 
recognize infinity of sounds and of concepts . The same holds for the 
knowledge of constructions, given that constructions and lexicon have the 
same status in construction grammar. That is, constructions are not merely 
unstructured list but they form a structured inventory. In the fol lowing 
subsections, I wil l  investigate three types of constructionist approaches, each 
of which differently defines the notion of taxonomic organization of 
constructions . The constructional networks that Goldberg ( 1 995) proposes 
are particularly important for the present thesis (for details, see section 3 . 3 .2) .  
In addition to ( 1  a-c ), bstman and Fried (2005 : 1 )  point out the 
following requirements as original tenets of Construction Grammar (e.g. 
F i l lmore ( 1 988)  Fi l lmore et al . ( 1 988), Kay and Fillmore ( 1 999), among 
many others) : 2' 3 
(6) a. Construction Grammar should be consistent with what we 
know about cognition and social interaction. 
b. Construction Grammar should be a grammar with 
universal impact. 
The issue noted in (6a) is related to the history of Construction Grammar, 
which has been developed from Frame Semantics theories (e.g. Fil lmore 
( 1 97 5, 1 982, 1 985), Fi l lmore and Atokins ( 1 992)) .  In this connection, it is  
worthwhile briefly observing what Frame Semantics theories are l ike. Here, 
I s imply describe some basic concepts of the theories (for forther arguments 
of the relation between Frame Semantics and construction grammar, see 
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Fil lmore ( 1 982) and Goldberg ( 1 995 ), for example). Fil lmore and Atokins 
( l  992 :76f. )  describe a word's meaning as being "understood only with 
reference to a structured background of experience, beliefs, or practices, 
constituting a kind of conceptual prerequisite for understanding the 
meaning." That is ,  meanings are defined relative to some particular 
background frame, not according to s imple truth-conditional checkl ists . 
Take the commercial transaction frame as an example (Fil lmore and 
Atokins ( l  992 : 78f.)) .  A commercial transaction creates a frame, in which 
one person acquires control or possession of something from a second person, 
by agreement, as a result of surrendering to that person a sum of money. 
The constructed frame then requires categories for describing the lexical 
meanings l inked to it, such as Buyer, Seller, Goods, and Money. Thus, it i s  
not until one understands this frame and those props and roles in the scene 
( i . e .  the italicized items above) that one can "understand" the meanings of 
verbs of commercial transaction, e .g .  buy, sell, charge, spend, pay, cost, etc. 
In short, understanding word meanings requires understanding the 
frame in which the word is used. Such a view of meaning is reflected in 
Construction Grammar (or construction grammar), and therefore it is  
considered that the grammar should be consistent with what we know about 
cognition and social interaction. 
As for the issue noted in ( 6b) above, I just note the importance of the 
matter without going into any further details at present. In  order to satisfy 
this requirement, I shall present a contrastive analysis of constructions of 
causation and reasoning in English and Japanese in chapter 7 .  
The rest of  this chapter introduces Construction Grammar as originally 
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developed by Fil lmore and Kay (section 3 .2), Goldberg' s construction 
grammar (section 3 .3 ), and Croft's  Radical Construction Grammar (section 
3 .4 ), making clear their similarities and differences . In particular, I focus on 
(i) how each approach treats relations between lexical elements and the 
constructions in which they appear, and (i i)  how each approach captures 
relations between constructions . While each approach captures the relations 
between constructions in various ways, the notion of inheritance links that 
Goldberg ( 1 995)  proposes plays a particularly important role in the 
discussions in chapters 4 and 6 (cf. Hirose ( 1 998, 1 999), Kanetani (2005b, c, 
2006a, b, c)) . This is closely investigated in section 3 . 3 .2 .  
3.2 Construction Grammar as Developed by Fillmore and Kay 
Construction Grammar, a variant of construction grammars, is a theory 
developed mainly by Fi llmore and Kay (see fn .2) . In this model, all 
grammatical properties, both formal and functional, are uniformly 
represented as features with value. Hence, the uniform representation of 
grammatical structures . A simple example is  given in (7) : 
(7) cat v 
role head 
lex + 
role filler 
loc + + 
gf -.subj 
(Kay and Fi l lmore ( 1 999 : 8)) 
This structure represents the Verb Phrase (= VP) construction and is read as 
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follows . The two inner boxes specify the features of the verb and its 
complement. The feature-value pairs in the: left box indicate that the first 
constituent of the VP construction is its head ( [role head]), and must be 
lexical ( [ lex + ] ), i .e . ,  the first constituent of the VP construction is the lexical 
head verb (the category is designated by the feature-value pair indicated in 
the top l ine inside the box [cat( egory) v ]) . The feature-value pairs in the 
right box indicate that the second constituent of the VP construction 
functions as its filler ( [role fil ler]), that it is the sister to the preceding lexical 
head ( [loc(al ity) +] )," and that its g(rammatical) f(unction) is not subject ( [gf 
-.subj ] ) ." The + sign following the box means that there may be zero, one 
or more complements . Thus, in Construction Grammar, constructions are 
described in terms of combinations of atomic units such as [cat v ] ,  [gf-.subj ] ,  
and the l ike (cf. Michaelis and Lambrecht ( 1 996), Kay and Fi llmore ( 1 999), 
Kay (2002), Michaelis (2004)) . For Fillmore and Kay, Construction 
Grammar should be a generative grammar and formalizable (cf. 6stman and 
Fried (2005 : 1 )  ). Thus, they focus on fonnalizing constructions, using 
feature-bundles such as the one in (7) .  
3.2. 1 Relations between Lexical Elements and the Construction 
Construction Grammar distinguishes part-whole relations, i . e .  relations 
between a construction as a whole and the elements that appear in it, and 
part-part relations, i .e . relations between elements that appear in an identical 
construction (cf. Kay and Fi l lmore ( 1 999)) . This is i l lustrated in  (8 ) :  
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(8)  
[role fil ler 
Subj ect 
'Heather' 
Intransitive Construction 
'Heather sings ' 
relation 
Verb 
' sings ' 
(adapted from Croft and Cruse (2004 :268)) 
In the intransitive construction Heather sings, the verb sings bears the head 
role  of the construction ; Heather bears the grammatical role of the subject 
(filler of the construction), i .e . ,  Heather is the subject defined by the 
whole-part relation. At the same time, it describes a syntactic relation with 
another element of the same construction, i .e . ,  Heather is the subject defined 
by the part-part relation . Therefore, one may say that Heather is e ither the 
subj ect of the intransitive sentence or the subj ect of the verb sings . That is, 
in Construction Grammar, lexical elements are seen as bearing not only 
part-part relations but also part-whole relations .  
3.2.2 Relations between Constructions 
Let us now turn to the question how constructions are organized in 
Construction Grammar. It uses taxonomic relations between constructions 
to describe the relations between constructions . Take the VP construction 
in (7) as an example. It is an instance of the more schematic construction, 
the Head-Complement (HC) construction (i .e .  (9)) .  Since all the 
information that appears in (9) also appears in (8), the VP construction may 
be represented as ( 1 0) :  
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(9) role head 
lex + 
( 1 0) INHERIT HC 
cat v 
role fil ler 
loc + + 
gf �subj I +  
(Kay and Fil lmore ( l  999 :7f.)) 
That is, the VP construction inherits all the information that the HC 
construction has ( indicated as INHERIT HC), and the former, being more 
specific, has the additional information, i .e .  [cat v ] ,  [gf -,subj ] ,  and +. Thus, 
in Construction Grammar, inherited information is  not represented m 
dominated constructions, e.g. the VP construction; it is stored only m 
dominating constructions, e .g.  the HC construction . 
Needless to say, the VP construction is sti l l  a highly schematic 
construction, and it instantiates various levels of constructions, as i l lustrated 
below : 
( 1 1 )  (VERBPHRASE] 
[VERB OBJ] 
[kick OBJ] 
[kick [the habit]] 
(Croft and Cruse (2004 :263 ))  
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In the idiomatic verb phrase kick the habit, the noun phrase the habit bears 
the obj ect grammatical fonction to the verb kick. The feature-value set [gf 
obj ]  is represented in the possible highest level, i . e. the [VERB OBJ] 
construction in ( 1 1  ) .  As seen above, this property, even without being 
represented, is inherited by the constructions at the lower levels, i .e. the [kick 
OBJ] and [kick [the habit] ] constructions . Thus, shared properties are 
represented in the construction at the possible highest level ,  making it 
possible for information to be represented nonredundantly at the lower levels 
(Kay and Fi l lmore ( 1 999), cf. Goldberg ( 1 995)) . In this way, constructions 
are stored in taxonomic hierarchies from highly schematic ones, e.g. the HC 
construction in (9), to specific instances, e.g. the [kick [the habit] ] 
construction in ( 1 1  ). The less schematic the construction is ,  the more 
information it requires for the representation. In this way, adding 
information to schematic constructions, Construction Grammar "generates" 
less schematic constructions from more schematic ones . This is why 
Construction Grammar is regarded as a generative grammar. 
As seen in this subsection, Construction Grammar focuses on 
formalizing constructions using the feature-bundles . Note, however, that 
my analysis to be proposed in chapter 4 is not concerned with such 
formalizations. In this sense, my analysis is rather similar to Goldberg's  
( 1 995)  construction grammar and Croft's (200 1 )  Radical Construction 
Grammar, which wil l  be investigated in the following subsections. 
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3.3 Goldberg's  Construction G rammar 
3 .3 . 1  Relations between Lexical Elements and the  Construction 
Unl ike Construction Grammar as observed in the previous subsection, 
Goldberg does not put so much emphasis on relations between lexical 
e lements and a construction as a whole. She puts more focus on the 
constructional networks, which I shall take a close · look at in section 3 .3 .2 .  
It does not mean, however, that Goldberg ignores relations between lexical 
e lements and the construction that they appear in. In her study of argument 
structure constructions, she captures the relations by considering how the 
argument roles, i . e .  roles of the construction, are associated with participant 
roles, i . e .  roles of the verb . 
In order to see how the associations are described, let us take the 
following caused-motion construction with the verb sneeze as an example :  
( 1 2) He sneezed the napkin off the table. (Goldberg ( 1 995 : 5 5 )) 
According to Goldberg' s ( 1 995)  notation, the association of the argument 
and participant roles for sentence ( 1 2) can be represented as follows : 
( 1 3 ) Sem CAUSE-MOVE < cause goal theme > 
I 
KICK < sneezer > 
t � � � 
Syn v SUBJ OBL OBJ 
(Goldberg ( 1 995 : 54)) 
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The semantics directly associated with the caused-motion construction 1s 
CAUSE-MOVE <cause goal theme>. That is ,  the "cause" argument causes 
the "theme" argument to move to the "goal" argument. The roles in 
boldface are profiled (for detai ls about "profil ing," see Langacker ( 1 987) and 
Goldberg ( 1 995 :44ff.)):  The goal argument is not profiled, and hence it is 
represented as an oblique. The solid lines indicate the argument roles 
obligatorily fused with the participant roles ; the dashed lines, on the other 
hand, indicate argument roles that are not obligatorily fused with participant 
roles . The only participant of the verb sneeze is the sneezer, and the 
arguments of the caused-motion construction are cause, goal , and theme. 
As shown in ( 1 3  ), the cause role is fused with the sneezer role, while the goal 
and theme roles of the construction cannot be associated with any participant 
role of the verb . That is, a mismatch occurs between the participant roles 
and the argument roles .  This mismatch is not a problem, however. The 
theme and goal roles are directly contributed by the construction. In other 
words, a construction may introduce arguments that are not necessarily fused 
with the participant roles of the verb in it .  
Thus, Goldberg describes constructions as monostratal syntactic 
structures associated with simple semantic representations, as in ( 1 3  ) . What 
i s  important in her analysis is to describe how the argument roles are 
associated with participant roles. More important is to represent how 
existing constructions are related to each other. As I have stated in section 
3 . 1 ,  this  plays a particularly important role in the present thesis. In the 
following subsection, I observe in detail how Goldberg captures relations 
between constructions . 
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3.3 .2 Relations between Constructions 
In order to explain relations among constructions, Goldberg ( 1 995)  
proposes the notion of ''inheritance link." She notes , "by postulating 
abstraction hierarchies in which lower levels inherit information from higher 
l evels, information is stored effectively and made easi ly modifiable (p .72) ." 
This can be i l lustrated as follows : 
( 1 4) Construction 1 
Inheritance l ink 
j Construction2 I 
The arrow indicates an inheritance link, through which construction2 inherits 
its information from construction 1 • Note that inheritance l inks are 
asymmetric, and as noted above, the direction is determined by abstraction 
hierarchies, which require construction 1 to be more abstract or general than 
construction2 . Note also that unlike Construction Grammar, Goldberg 's  
model allows the same information to  be  stored redundantly both in 
construction 1 and construction2, taking them as static objects, not on-line 
products . She says, "instead of stating the specifications twice, aspects of 
the patterns that are inherited are shared by two overlapping patterns (p .74) ."  
This follows from Goldberg 's  construction grammar adopting the 
usage-based model, which considers the frequency of occurrence of the 
grammatical forms and structures, and meaning to affect grammatical 
representation (Croft and Cruse (2004 :292)) . 
In order for an inheritance l ink to be posited between construction 1 and 
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construction2, the former needs to "motivate" the latter. More accurately, i f  
construction2 i s  related to construction , syntactically, the system of 
construction2 is motivated to the degree that it is related to construction , 
semantically. Such motivation is maximized (The Principle of Maximized 
Motivation : Goldberg ( 1 995 :67);  cf. Haiman ( 1 985)) . Based on how the 
more general construction is motivated, Goldberg distinguishes four major 
types of inheritance l inks, of which the following three are relevant for the 
present thesis : Instance l inks (I-links, for short), metaphorical extension 
l inks (M-l inks, for short), and subpart l inks (S-links, for short) . They are 
defined as follows (Goldberg ( l  995 :78ff.)) :  
( 1 5 ) a .  
b .  
c .  
An I-link is posited when a particular construction is  a 
special case of another construction. 
An M-l ink is posited when two constructions are found to 
be related by a metaphorical mapping. 
An S-link is posited when one construction is a proper 
subpart of another construction and exists independently. 
Hirose ( 1 999) shows how these inheritance links work, providing some 
practical examples . First, I-l inks are helpful to capture the common feature 
of the following constructions, for example : 
( 1 6) a. 
b. 
c. 
V-Comp (e.g. kick the ball) 
P-Comp (e.g. on the table) 
N-Comp (e.g. top of the mountain) 
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d .  A-Comp (e.g. fond of dogs) 
The constructions listed in ( 1 6a-d) are instances of the more general 
construction, the HC construction, in which it is specified that a lexical head 
must precede its complement (cf. section 3 .2). In other words, each 
construction ( l  6a-d) is an instance of the HC construction, and hence I-l inks 
are posited between the HC construction and each construction l isted in 
( l  6a-d).  Note that I-l inks are close (or equivalent) to the taxonomic 
hierarchies used in the Construction Grammar. 
Second, as an example of M-links, Hirose ( 1 999) considers the 
following ditransitive constructions (cf. Goldberg ( 1 995) ) :  
( 1 7) a .  
b .  
Bob gave Jack a book. 
Bob told Joe a story. 
A typical ditransitive construction l ike ( 1 7a) expresses transfer of an object. 
Sentence ( 1 7b) does not express such transfer, but expresses a 
communication of some information between the speaker Bob and the hearer 
Joe. Communication of some information is metaphorically understood as 
transfer via the COMMUNICATION AS TRANSFER metaphor. That is, in 
( l  7a), a book is transferred from Bob to Jack; in ( l  7b ), information (of the 
story) is transferred from Bob to Joe. Hence, sentence ( 1 7b) is related to 
sentence ( 1 7a) via M-link. 
Thirdly, Hirose ( 1 999) takes the relation between the nominal 
extraposition construction (e.g. ( 1 8a)) and the bare-NP exclamative 
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construction (e.g. ( I  Sb)) as an example of an S-link being posited (cf. 
Michaelis and Lambrecht ( 1 996)) .  
( 1 8 ) a.  
b .  
It' s amazing the amount I spent. 
The amount I spent ! 
Bare-NP construction ( l 8b) is subsumed under nominal extraposition 
construction ( l  8a). Therefore, an S-l ink is posited between them. The 
former inherits information from the latter, resulting in the exclamative sense 
of sentence ( l 8b ) . 
As noted above, the taxonomic hierarchies in the sense of Construction 
Grammar correspond to Goldberg's  I-l inks . In addition to such taxonomic 
hierarchies, Goldberg proposes other mechanisms that can capture relations 
among constructions, i .e .  M-links and S-l inks. Thus, inheritance l inks make 
it possible to describe richer relations between constructions .4 
F inally, it is worthwhile considering the possibi l ity of multiple 
inheritance links .  Goldberg ( l  995 :97f. )  argues that multiple inheritance 
l inks are allowed, in which a construction inherits information from two (or 
more) independently existing constructions . She cites Bolinger' s ( 1 97 1 )  
observation of some resultative constructions showing similar behaviors to 
the verb-particle construction . Observe the following examples : 
( 1 9) a.  
b. 
He cut short the speech. 
He cut the speech short . 
6 1  
(Goldberg ( 1 99 5 : 97)) 
In sentences ( 1 9a, b ), the resultative phrase short can occur either before or 
after the postverbal NP the speech, as in the verb-particle construction (e.g. 
He put the light on/ He put on the light) ; i .e . ,  sentences ( l 9a, b) can be 
instances of the resultative construction, and at the same time, can be 
instances of the verb-pai1icle construction . Goldberg argues for multiple 
inheritance l inks to account for the bi lateral characteristics of sentences l ike 
( l 9a, b ) . That is, these sentences are understood to inherit information both 
from the verb-particle construction and the resultative construction, as shown 
in (20) : 
(20) erb-Particle Constructio Resultative Construction 
I-l ink 
(adapted from Goldberg ( 1 995 : 98)) 
Thus, allowing multiple inheritance makes it possible to account for 
instances which can be s imultaneously motivated by two distinct 
constructions . 
3.4 Croft 's  Radical Construction Grammar 
3.4 . 1 Relations between Lexical Elements and the Construction 
Radical Construction Grammar is developed by Will iam Croft (e .g .  
Croft (200 1 )) in order to account for typological variation in the construction 
grammar framework, i . e .  the cross l inguistic generalization by drawing not 
on language universals, but on general cognitive and pragmatic factors . In 
62 
this subsection, I observe relations between lexical elements and the 
constructions in which they appear, with the consideration of what makes this 
model "radical . " 
Radical Construction Grammar is a nonreductionist model (Croft and 
Cruse (2004 :283 )). Reductionist models, such as Construction Grammar, 
consider that a construction is made up of parts that are defined 
independently of the construction . For example, verbs are considered to 
belong to the same part of speech no matter what construction they appear in .  
Consider the following examples : 
(2 1 )  a. Judith danced. 
b .  Judith danced a kopanica. 
(Croft and Cruse (2004 :284 )) 
As shown in (2 1 a, b ), the verb dance may occur either in the intransitive 
construction or in the transitive construction. Reductinst models thus take 
the c lassical categorization of parts of speech as primitive. 
However, Croft points out a shortcoming in the reductinist view of 
parts of speech as primitive elements . As shown in (22a, b ), verbs l ike 
sleep can occur in the intransitive construction, but not in the transitive 
construction, and as in (23a, b ), the verb find can occur only in the transitive 
construction. 
(22) a. Judith slept. 
b. * Judith slept bed. 
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(23) a. * Judith found . 
b .  Judith found a 20 dol lar bi l l .  
(Croft and Cruse (2004 :284)) 
That is, some verbs, e .g. dance, can occur either in the transitive construction 
or in the intransitive construction, some, e .g. sleep, only in the intransitive 
construction, and others, e .g. find, only in the transitive construction. Then, 
Croft's question is as fol lows : If verbs are primitives that cannot be 
analyzed further, how can we account for the different distributions of words 
of the same category? 
Radical Construction Grammar considers constructions as the basic 
units of syntactic representation, and categories as being derived from 
construction(s) in which they appear. Thus, in contrast to reductionist 
models, it is constructions, and not lexicon, that are primitive, and in this  
sense, the model is cal led "Radical" Construction Grammar (cf. Iwata 
(2006)). To see how it works, let us take the intransitive construction and 
the transitive construction for example.  S ince it is constructions, not their 
constituents, that are considered to be the basic units of the grammatical 
representation, Radical Construction Grammar labels the subject used in the 
intrans itive construction "intransitive subj ect," and the one used in the 
trans itive construction "transitive subject," and so forth. Thus, the 
intransitive and transitive constructions are represented as follows : 
(24) a. Intransitive Construction 
jintrSbj l I ntrVI 
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b .  Transitive Construction 
1� � �1 
(adapted from Croft (200 1 : 54)) 
In sum, grammatical categories can be defined construction-specifical ly, as 
the class of fillers of a particular role in a s ingle construction (Croft 
(200 I :46)) . 
3.4 .2 Relations between Constructions 
Let us now turn to the question how Radical Construction Grammar 
represents relations between constructions . As seen in the previous 
subsection, the categories of constituents are defined by what construction 
they appear in .  Croft (200 I :46) argues that grammatical categories can be 
defined not only construction-specifically, as seen in  the previous subsection, 
but also cross-constructionally, i . e . as the class of fillers that has an identical 
distribution across the relevant roles for all constructions . 
For example, the category Verb may be established as a superordinate 
category to InrV and TrV in (24a, b) above. It is  the cross-constructional 
generalizations that motivate the category Verb. That is ,  the abstract ion 
from the transitive construction and the intransitive construction generalizes 
the category Verb, which Croft calls MVerb (M for morphological) .  
However, there needs to be some linguistic motivation for the category 
MVerb. Croft argues that the abil ity of its members to be inflected with the 
tense and agreement suffixes (abbreviated as -TA) motivates the existence of 
the category MVerb .  These facts may be i llustrated as  follows : 
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(25)  
/ 
I ntrSbjj Jlnt;V} 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
.... 
.... 
.... 
.... 
.... 
.... 
1� � �1 
(adapted from Croft (200 1 : 5 6)) 
The dashed-lines indicate the meronomic relations between the MVerb, on 
one hand, and the IntrV and TrV, on the other. Again, it i s  important to 
note that the category MVerb is not primitive but derived as a result of the 
abstraction from parts of the lower-ranked constructions .  
Croft also postulates multiple inheritance. Importantly, any 
construction is a partial specification of the grammatical structure. For 
example, the intransitive construction specifies nothing but the structure 
associated with the intransitive verb and its subject, as in (24a) above. A 
sentence like (26a) inherits information not only from the intransitive 
construction but also from the negative construction, as represented in (26b ) :  
(26) a. I d idn ' t  s leep 
b .  Sb '  Aux-n 't Verb 
(Croft (200 I : 26)) 
The negative construction in (26b) only specifies the structure associated 
with the subject, auxil iary, and verb� it does not specify anything about 
transitivity of the verb . Hence, the transitivity of the subject and verb in  the 
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negative construction is underspecified, and there is no representation of the 
verb ' s  object. Likewise, the intransitive construction only specifies the 
intransitive verb following its subject; it does not convey any information 
about, say, negation, tense, etc .  Using such a multiple inheritance explains 
the fact that the structure of any specific utterance is  specified by a number of 
distinct schematic constructions . 
Thus, Radical Construction Grammar represents relations between 
constructions in a similar way to Construction Grammar, using taxonomic 
hierarchies .  They are differentiated, however, in the following respect . 
Construction Grammar, in which constructions are represented by sets of  
syntactic features and values (section 3 .2 . 1 ) , uses classical categorizations for 
the representations of relations between constructions, while Radical 
Construction Grammar does not, because each part of a construction i s  
derived from the construction that i t  i s  used in .  In  this  connection, Rad ical 
Construction Grammar is  similar to Goldberg' s theory in  that it allows for 
ful l-entry representations of each construction (Goldberg ( 1 995 : 74)), i .e . ,  the 
same information may be stored redundantly both in the governing and 
governed constructions . 
3.5 Summary 
I have observed m this  chapter that there are several types of 
construction grammar approaches, and that they are differentiated in  the way 
of formalization of constructions and the way of representation of the 
relations between constructions. What we have seen so far may be 
summarized as follows :  
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(27) 
Fil lmore-Kay 
Goldberg 
Croft 
Reductionist 
yes 
N/A6 
no 
Inter-constructional relations 
taxonomic hierarchies 
inheritance links 7 
taxonomic hierarchies 
First, in section 3 . 1 ,  I have observed Construction Grammar as original ly 
developed by Fi l lmore and Kay.  Construction Grammar uses sets of 
syntactic features and values for the representation of each construction and 
sees constructions as l isted in the taxonomic hierarchies . Next, as observed 
in section 3 .2 ,  Goldberg 's  ( 1 995 )  model does not focus much on the status of 
the syntactic elements and relations with the construction that they are used 
m. What she is  interested in is matching argument roles with participant 
roles, and much more interesting to her is to establ ish constructional network 
by using inheritance l inks . Lastly, Croft' s (200 1 )  Radical C onstruction 
Grammar takes a thoroughly nonreductionist approach, according to which 
the syntactic elements are defined by the construction that they are used in .  
Relations between constructions are captured by the taxonomic hierarchies, 
as in  Construction Grammar. However, it i s  differentiated from 
Construction Grammar in that it allows for redundant (or full-entry) 
representations of constructions, as Goldberg ' s  model . 
No matter how different the three approaches are, they all conform to 
the essential principles of construction grammar l isted in ( 1 a-c ) ,  repeated 
here as (28a-c ) : 
(28 )  a. The independent existence of constructions as symbolic 
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units 
b .  The uniform representation of grammatical structures 
c .  The taxonomic organization of constructions in a 
grammar 
(= ( 1 )) 
As taking a constructional approach, I wil l  also accept these principles in 
making my proposals .  
Although I have compared the three types of construction grammar 
approaches, I do not mean to make my proposals only within any specific 
theory of the three. Rather, my proposals are similar to Goldberg ' s  model 
in some respects, and Croft' s Radical Construction Grammar in  others . As 
noted in section 3 .3  .2,  I am not concerned with formalizing constructions by 
using sets of syntactic features and values. In  this sense, the analys is  to be 
proposed may not be similar to Construction Grammar, but stil l  being a 
constructionist approach, the analysis  wil l  be proposed in  the same spirit. 
Thus ,  as an original tenet of Construction Grammar requires, the analys is  
wi l l  consider the grammar as  being consistent with what we know about 
cognition and social interaction (cf. (6a)). Furthermore, as mentioned in 
section 3 . 1 , I wil l  show in chapter 7 that the analysis to be proposed in  the 
next chapter has a universal impact (cf. ( 6b) ) .  
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Notes to Chapter 3 
1 .  It is  often argued that constructionist approaches have been 
developed as a reaction to Chomskian generative grammar (e.g. Hirose 
( 1 999), Goldberg (2006), Iwata (2006)). The present thesis is not concerned 
with d ifferences between these two paradigms. 
2 .  Written in capital letters, "Construction Grammar" refers to the 
theory developed by Fil lmore, Kay, and collaborators (Croft and Cruse 
(2004 :257) ;  see section 3 .2 for details about Construction Grammar). 
Fol lowing this convention, I use "Construction Grammar (in capital letters)" 
to refer to the theory developed mainly by Fi l lmore, Kay, et al . ,  and 
"construction grammar ( in lower cases)" to refer to constructionist 
approaches in  general (or otherwise mentioned) . 
3 .  The requirements in ( 6a, b ), especially the first one, are not 
postulated only in Construction Grammar, but accepted in  other 
constructionist approaches as wel l .  
4 .  Note, however, that I do not mean to  say here that Goldberg ' s  
proposals are superior to Kay and Fil lmore ' s  ( 1 999), o r  vice versa. The 
representations of relations between constructions depend largely upon how 
each theory defines constructions .  
5 .  Croft (200 1 :26)  simply represents the subj ect as  "Sbj ." Here, i n  
order to  avoid  confusion,  I represent i t  as "IntrSbj ,"  following the notation in  
(24a) .  
6 .  Croft and Cruse (2004 :272) observe that Goldberg takes both 
nonreductionist and reductionist approaches in  her book. 
7. The notion of inheritance l ink does not deny taxonomic hierarchies, 
but it does rely upon taxonomic hierarchies of constructions .  Goldberg 
postulates both schematic constructions and specific constructions, and it is  
via I- l inks, a subsystem of the inheritance l inks, that information i s  inherited 
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from the former to the latter. Thus, I-links are motivated by taxonomic 
hierarchies .  As noted in section 3 . 3 .2, Goldberg' s ( 1 995) theory is 
d ifferentiated from the others in that the former can represent richer relations 
between constructions (cf. fn. 4 ) .  
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Chapter 4 
Constructions of Causation and Reasoning* 
4. 1 Introduction 
In chapter 2 ,  I have reviewed some previous studies of because, since, 
and/or, and pointed out some problems with them. I have thus suggested in 
section 2 . 7  that a construction grammar approach (cf. Hirose ( 1 999)) can deal 
with these problems in an integrated account, and then in chapter 3, I have 
overviewed what construction grammar approaches are all about. 
Now that basic ideas of construction grammar approaches are given, 
this chapter presents a detailed construction grammar analysis of because, 
since, and for. In particular, based on differences as to how people 
understand a causal relation and a reasoning process, I propose a schematic 
construction of causation and that of reasoning: 1 The former is cal led the 
casual construction, and the latter the reasoning construction. Crucially, the 
conjunction because participates both in the causal construction and in the 
reasoning construction, whereas since and for are used in the reasoning 
construction, but not in the causal construction (for reasons to be discussed in 
section 4 .5). Through an investigation of these constructions, I show that 
the proposed analysis  is not only consistent with the facts pointed out in the 
l iterature but also capable of handling the potentially difficult matters that 
previous studies could not adequately explain. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4 .2 observes how we 
understand a causal relation and a reasoning process in general . Based on 
the observations, sections 4 .3  and 4.4 propose and analyze the causal 
construction and the reasoning construction. Section 4 .4 . 1 observes in 
detai l the reasoning construction in which because is used, comparing it with 
the causal construction. Section 4 .4 .2 points out s imilarities and 
dissimilarities between the reasoning construction in which because is used, 
on one hand, and the reasoning construction in which s ince or for is used, on 
the other. That is, section 4 .4 . 1 makes clear differences between what has 
traditionally been called causal because-clauses and inferential 
because-clauses ; section 4 .4.2 clarifies the difference between reason clauses 
introduced by because, since, and for. After describing relations between 
constructions and the conjunctions used in them (section 4 .5 ), section 4 . 6  
discusses some related issues pointed out in  the literature, and shows how the 
proposed analysis handles them. Section 4 .7  describes relations among 
constructions in terms of inheritance links (cf. Goldberg ( 1 995), Hirose 
( 1 999); for details, see section 3 . 3 .2) .  S ection 4.8 summarizes the 
arguments, followed by an appendix on the form-meaning mismatch found in 
the constructions .  
4.2 Causal  Relations and Reasoning Processes 
In this subsection, I am concerned with how we understand a causal 
relation and a reasoning process .  As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
the grammar ( in construction grammar terms) should be consistent with what 
we know about cognition and . social interaction (see (6a) in chapter 3 ) . That 
73 
is, the causal construction needs to be consistent with what we know about a 
causal relation; the reasoning construction should be consistent with what we 
know about a reasoning process .  Thus, before starting the analysis of these 
constructions, it is helpful to consider how we understand a causal relation 
and a reasoning process .  
First, in  order to see  how a causal relation i s  understood, observe the 
following example:  
( 1 )  It has rained and the ground i s  wet. 
This sentence may be interpreted as expressing a causal relation among many 
possible readings (cf. Lakoff ( 1 97 1 ), B lakemore and Carston ( 1 999)). In 
the causal reading, the first conjunct it has rained is understood as the cause 
of the second conjunct the ground is wet. Thus, the sentence conveys 
almost the same meaning as a sentence like the ground is wet because it has 
ra ined. 
The two situations described in and-conjunctions, like ( 1 ), general ly 
have a strong cohesion and form one proposition as a whole (Blakemore and 
Carston ( 1 999), cf. Quirk et al. ( 1 972) ; combined process) . To see this, 
observe the following example: 
(2) Did Peter [ [tell a lie] and [hurt his friend]] ?  
(Quirk et al .  ( 1 972 : 5 92)) 
What is  asked by the sentence is whether the two processes denoted, i .e .  
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Peter told a lie and Peter hurt his friend, occurred as a single process. Thus, 
the two coordinated verb phrases are taken as a s ingle process . 
These facts suggest that given a causal relation, we see the cause 
situation and the result situation as a single process as a whole, rather than as 
two separate s ituations . 
Let us now consider how we conceptualize reasoning processes . 
Compare the following examples: 
(3 ) a .  John broke his  leg. He tripped and fell .  
b .  John broke his leg and tripped and fel l .  
(Blakemore and Carston ( 1 999)) 
In (3a), two sentences are s imply j uxtaposed, and in (3b ) ,  these two sentences 
are coordinated by and. Blakemore and Carston suggest that sentence (3 a) 
may express a reasoning process, in which the speaker concludes that John 
broke his leg from the premise that he tripped and fell, while sentence (3 b)  
may not. A possible interpretation that sentence (3b) obtains is, for example, 
that John broke his leg (for some reason) and then he tripped and fell, i .e . ,  the 
described situations occur in a temporal sequence. The fact that two 
juxtaposed sentences, e .g .  (3a) ,  can describe a reasoning process shows that 
in contrast to a causal relation, a reasoning process requires that the two 
situations described be independent of each other. Thus, reasoning can be 
viewed as a process in which the speaker takes two situations separately and 
relates them based on his knowledge. For example, given the two situations 
John broke his leg and he tripped and fell (separately), the speaker restores a 
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relation based on his knowledge that tripping and falling generally cause 
someone to have a broken bone. In other words, the "restored" causal 
relation does not have to hold in the real world, because the two situations are 
merely related in the speaker' s  mind. The fact that and-conjunctions, e .g .  
(3b ) ,  cannot describe a reasoning process makes this observation more 
plausible, since, as seen above, two situations coordinated by and are 
understood as a single process .  
A piece of supporting evidence for the above observation comes from 
Traxler et al . '  s ( 1 997) psycholinguistic research. Traxler et al . time a 
person understanding a sentence with a causal because-clause (e.g.  ( 4a)) and 
a sentence with a reasoning because-clause (e.g. ( 4b )) ; they observe that the 
latter takes longer to understand than the former. 
(4) a. The streets are wet because it is raining. 
b .  It  is raining because the streets are wet. 
(Traxler et a l .  ( 1 997 : 8 8)) 
As I have argued so far, in a reasoning process, the speaker needs to restore a 
causal relation between the two situations given to him separately. Thus, it 
may take longer to understand, or restore, the relation between the two 
situations in ( 4b) than to understand the causal relation described in ( 4a), 
where the relation described is directly understandable .  
In sum, a causal relation requires the cause situation and the result 
s ituation to have a strong cohesion so that they can be understood as a s ingle 
process, whereas reasoning is a process in which the speaker perceives two 
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s ituations separately and relates them based on his knowledge. Again, the 
causal construction and the reasoning construction to be proposed should be 
consistent with these facts about a causal relation and a reasoning process . 
Keeping this in mind, I wi ll investigate these two constructions in the 
following subsections .  
4 .3  The Causal Construction 
In this subsection, I investigate the causal construction. The causal 
construction is  defined as follows : The causal relation between 
P(roposition) 1 and P2 is mapped onto either [C2 because C i ]  or [Because C i ,  
C2] ,  where C(lause) 1 and C 2  denote P 1  and P2, respectively . Their form and 
meaning correspondences may be represented as follows : 
( 5 )  causal construction 
Sem: 
Syn : C2 because C 1 
OR 
Because C 1 ,  C2 
The semantics associated directly with the causal construction is  "P 1 is a 
cause of P2." The construction specifies that the because-clauses represent 
cause situations and the main clauses the result s ituations, and that the two 
situations are understood as a single process. As represented in (5 ), the 
causal construction, whose schematic meaning of causal relation is specified, 
has two instances of different syntactic forms. That is ,  the syntactic forms 
[C2 because C i ]  and [Because C i ,  C2] , with which the same meaning is  
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associated, are two distinct constructions . If so, the above representation 
may be somewhat misleading . 
The two constructions, being syntactically distinct and semantically 
identical , should be pragmatical ly distinct. Goldberg ( 1 995 :67) notes that if 
two constructions are syntactical ly distinct and semantical ly synonymous, 
then they must not be pragmatically synonymous (cf. Haiman ( 1 985 )) .  
When the because-clause appears in  sentence-initial position, an additional 
information structural specification is required : The because-clause is 
contextually presupposed (cf. Hirose ( 1 99 1 ,  1 999) ) .  Thus, the schematic 
causal construction and its two instances may be represented as follows :2 
(6) a .  Causal Construction 
Sem: "P 1 is a cause of P2" 
C2 Syn : because C 1  
(clause-order irrelevant) 
b .  Sem: "P 1 is a cause of P2" c. Sem:  "P 1 is a cause of P2" 
I 
Syn: C2 because C 1  Syn: Because C 1 ,  C2 
I-S :  presupposed 
In (6a), the causal meaning is specified in the schematic causal construction. 
At the highly schematic level, as in (6a), the clause-order in the syntactic 
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specification is not relevant. At the lower level, as in ( 6b, c ) ,  however, the 
clause-orders in their syntactic specifications are crucial :  The different 
clause-orders account for the information-structural distinction between them. 
"I-S" in ( 6c) stands for information structure. That is, when the 
because-clause precedes its main clause, as in ( 6c ), it is contextually 
presupposed. In contrast, when the because-clause follows its main clause,  
as in ( 6b ) , such a specification is not required . This is how the two 
constructions are differentiated .  
In  what follows, I show that the causal construction has a general 
property of causal relations such as the one discussed in the previous 
subsection. As argued in the previous subsection, in order for a causal 
relation to hold, the cause s ituation and the result s ituation need to be 
understood as a single process .  Let us first consider the construction in 
which the because-clause follows its main clause, i .e. the one represented in 
( 6b ) .  In  constructions of this kind, sentence-final because-clauses are inside 
the scope of matrix question or negation . Consider the following example :  
(7) Is the ground wet because it has rainedV 
The arrow indicates that the rising intonation is used at the end of the 
sentence. This suggests that both the main clause and because-clause are 
inside the scope of the matrix question. By uttering this sentence, the 
speaker does not simply ask whether the ground is wet or not, but asks 
whether the rain has caused the ground to become wet or not. Thus, 
sentence (7) performs one speech act as a whole. Therefore, in analogy 
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with the case of and-conjunctions, e .g.  (2), we can say that the situations 
described in sentence-initial main clauses and sentence-final because-clauses 
are understood as a single process .  
Let us now tum to the construction with a sentence- initial 
because-clause, i .e .  the one in ( 6c ). As defined above, sentence- initial 
because-clauses generally convey old information, or they are contextually 
presupposed . To see this, take the following dialogue as an example :  
(8 )  A:  Why is the ground wet? 
B :  # Because it has rained, the ground is  wet. 
B ' :  The ground is wet because it has rained . 
The above dialogue shows that using a sentence-initial because-clause is not 
appropriate as an answer to a why-question, whereas using the sentence-final 
counterpart is appropriate. As we have already seen, when sentence-final 
because-clauses are used, the cause s ituation and the result situation are 
understood as a s ingle process .  Thus, the answer given by speaker B ' ,  
which expresses a causal relation between the rain and the wet ground, is  
informative to speaker A, even if speaker B'  repeats a given piece of 
information, i .e .  the ground is wet (cf. Lambrecht ( 1 994) ) .  In contrast, the 
utterance of  speaker B is not appropriate. The inappropriateness stems from 
sentence-initial because-clauses being presupposed. Although speaker A 
asks the reason why the ground is wet, the answer given by speaker B,  using 
the sentence-initial because-clause, indicates that the reason is already known 
to speaker A .  Hence, the contradiction. 
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In addition to being presupposed, sentence-initial because-clauses 
cannot perform speech acts on their own. Lakoff ( 1 987) observes that 
speech act constructions do not occur in sentence-initial because-ciauses.3 
Consider the following sentence : 
(9) * Because here comes my bus,  I 'm leaving. 
(Lakoff ( 1 987  :4 74)) 
In (9) ,  the deictic here construction here comes my bus, a kind of speech act 
construction, cannot occur in the sentence-initial because-clause. As the 
very name indicates, a speech act construction performs a speech act on its 
own. Thus, the unacceptability of sentence (9) suggests that a 
sentence-initial because-clause cannot perform a speech act on its own . 
Chafe ( 1 9  84) argues that a sentence-initial because-clause serves as 
something like a guidepost to information flow (see section 2.3 ) : It 
provides a cause of a certain situation, and indicates that the proposition 
expressed by the main clause that follows should be understood as its result. 
That is, the information expressed by the main clause is understood in 
relation to the (presupposed) information that the sentence-initial 
because-clause conveys . Besides, sentence-initial because-clauses cannot 
perform speech acts on their own. In other words, they alone do not make 
sense, and it is not until the main clause is given that sentence-initial 
because-clauses make sense.  Thus, the sentence-initial because-clause and 
the sentence-final main clause in ( 6c) are interpreted depending upon each 
other, and it is in this manner that the two situations described are viewed as 
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a s ingle process . 
In sum, there are two instances of the causal construction, as shown in 
( 6b, c ) .  Whether the because-clause is in  sentence-final position or  in 
sentence-initial position, the cause situation and the result situation are 
understood as a single process . This is compatible with what we know 
about causal relations in general . 
4.4  The Reasoning Construction 
In this subsection, I analyze the reasoning construction . Before that, 
however, I make clear the reason for using the term "reasoning" rather than 
"inferential ." 
As seen in section 2 .4, Sweetser ( 1 990) argues that conjunctions of 
reason are used in the content, epistemic, and speech-act domains . 
However, as far as the discussion of conjunctions of reason i s  concerned, the 
distinction between the epistemic and speech-act domains, I believe, is not 
crucial for the three reasons mentioned below. Hence, integrating causal 
relations that hold in Sweeter' s epistemic and speech-act domains, I use the 
term "reasoning process" as a cover term. It seems that the term 
"inference" has already been preempted; i .e . ,  it seems to refer only to causal 
relations that hold in the epistemic domain, and therefore sounds misleading. 
Thus, I use the word "reasoning," rather than "inference," consistently in the 
present thesis .  
A first reason to eliminate the distinction between the epistemic and 
speech-act domains is that sentences in these two domains behave so 
s imilarly, as l isted in ( 1 0), that their distinction seems not to be crucial : 
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( 1 0) a .  Sentence- initial because-clauses are not allowed. 
(e.g. Schourup and Waida ( 1 988) ,  Hirose ( 1 99 1 ,  1 999)) 
b .  The main clause and the subordinate clause form two 
separate intonation units . (sections 4 .4 . 1 -4.4 .2)  
c .  What Lakoff ( 1 987) calls speech act constructions may 
occur within because-clauses used in these domains and 
since-clauses . (sections 4 .4 . 1 -4 .4 .2)  
d .  Because-clauses are not nominalized into because of 
(section 4 .6 .2 )  
Of the four properties or  behaviors listed above, I have already mentioned the 
first one; the others will be discussed in the sections specified in the 
parentheses. What is important is that none of them is observed in 
because-clauses used in the content domain. Thus, it is true that the 
distinction between the content domain, on one hand, and the epistemic and 
speech-act domains, on the other, is important, but there seems to be no 
positive reason for the distinction of the epistemic domain from the 
speech-act domain. 
Secondly, in both the epistemic and the speech-act domains, a mental 
attitude on the part of the speaker is involved. In other words, what is 
important i s  whether such a mental attitude is  present or not (cf. N akau 
( 1 994)) .  In the epistemic domain, for example, the speaker draws a 
conclusion from the premise expressed by the subordinate clause. Consider 
the following sentence:  
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( 1 1 ) John is not coming to class, because he just called from San 
Diego. 
In ( 1 1  ) ,  the speaker arrives at the conclusion that John cannot come to class 
from the premise that he is in San Diego, a city far away from their school .  
The modal auxi liary cannot represents a mental attitude on the part of the 
speaker; i .e . ,  the speaker is sure that "John ' s  coming" is not true . L ikewise, 
in the speech-act domain, such a mental attitude needs to be present, because 
it is the speaker of the sentence that perfonns the speech act. Take the 
following sentence as an example :  
( 1 2) What are you doing tonight, because there ' s  a good movie on. 
(Sweetser ( 1 990 :77)) 
Sup pose that the speaker utters this sentence in order to ask out the addressee 
that night. The speech act of question in the main clause may be performed 
according to a script like the following : 
( 1 3 ) a. 
b. 
c .  
d. 
The speaker knows that there is a good movie on tonight. 
The speaker wants to ask the addressee out for the movie 
if she is not busy tonight . 
The appropriate way to do that must be asking what she is 
doing tonight. 
The speaker says, "What are you doing tonight?" 
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In the above script, expressions of mental attitudes on the part of the speaker 
are italicized. Thus,  causal relations that hold in the epistemic and speech 
act domains have the following properties in common : Mental attitudes on 
the part of the speaker are present and sentences express a process in which a 
certain conclusion is drawn from the premise in these domains.  
The last reason for eliminating the distinction of the speech-act and 
epistemic domains is that, as Sweetser ( 1 990) observes, since has a strong 
tendency towards these two readings . This observation suggests that 
Sweetser herself acknowledges that the distinction between the epistemic and 
the speech-act domains is less important than the distinction between the 
content domain and the epistemic/speech-act domains . 
For the above reasons, I integrate what Sweetser cal ls causal relations 
in the epistemic and speech-act domains, and call them reasoning processes . 
Now that the reasons for integrating Sweetser' s  epistemic and speech-act 
domains are clear, let us tum to defining the reasoning construction. The 
reasoning construction has four instances and they are defined as follows : 
The meaning of a reasoning process in which the speaker draws the 
conclusion (expressed by the main clause) from the premise ( i .e .  situation 
described in the subordinate clause) is  mapped onto either [C2, because C 1 ] ,  
[Since C 1 ,  C2] , [C2, since C 1 ] ,  o r  [C2, for C 1 ] .  That is, the reasoning 
construction, whose schematic meaning of reasoning process is specified, has 
four instances of different syntactic forms, and their form and meaning 
correspondences can be represented as follows (for the convenience of 
reference, I refer to the reasoning construction in which because, since and 
for are used as the reasoning because construction, the reasoning since 
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construction, and the reasoning/or construction, respectively) : 
( 1 4) Reasoning Constructions 
a. Reasoning Because Construction 
Sem : "P 1 is a premise from which to draw the conclusion that P2" 
Syn: C2,  because C 1 
b .  Reasoning Since Constructions4 
Sem:  "P 1 i s  a premise from whi ch to draw the conclusion that P2' 
EITH� 
Syn :  C2, since C 1  
c .  Reasoning For Construction 
S em :  "P 1 is a premise from which to draw the conclusion that P2' 
Syn: 
As one may notice, since and for are used in the reasoning construction, 
but not in the causal construction. Then, a question immediately arises : 
How do we deal with examples of since and for used in Sweetser 's  content 
domain, i .e .  sentences that express causal relations, by using since or for? 
The relevant examples are given below: 
( 1 5 ) a. S ince John wasn' t  there, we decided to leave a note for 
him. 
b .  John came back, for h e  loved her. 
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(Sweetser ( 1 990 :78 )) 
According to Sweetser, sentence ( 1 S a) describes the causal relations in the 
real world, and is an example of since being used in the content domain. 
Simi larly, for may be used in the content domain, as in ( I  Sb ) . 5  Here, I 
assume following Nakau ( 1 994) that since-clauses are always modal 
expressions . That is, although sentence ( 1 5a) seems to represent real world 
causation, it does not express the simple causal relation but expresses the 
reasoning process .  Assuming that for has only a reasoning use (Kanbayashi 
( 1 989)), we can explain in the same way why for seemingly can express real 
world causation. That is, even if John ' s  loving Mary has indeed caused him 
to come back in the real world, sentence ( 1 5b) does not express the causal 
relation between them but expresses the speaker' s reasoning process .  
To  see  the validity of these assumptions, consider the following 
contrast : 
( 1 6) John died {because/?since/?for} the bull et hit him in the head. 
Sentence ( 1 6) describes the causal relation between the bullet hitting him in 
the head and John' s  death. The causal relation expressed by the sentence is 
so direct and so easy to understand that it  is  difficult for the speaker' s  
reasoning t o  l i e  between the two situations. In such a context, since and for 
are less acceptable than because . Thus, even if a given sentence seems to 
express a causal relation in the real world, since- and /or-clauses should be 
understood as providing the premise from which to draw a conclusion .  
As discussed in section 4 .2 ,  in a reasoning process, two situations or 
propositions are perceived separately, and they are related based on the 
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speaker' s knowledge. Reasoning · constructions, as those expressing 
reasoning processes, should be cons istent with this property .6 Keeping this 
in mind, I wil l  closely investigate the reasoning because construction in the 
section 4 .4 . 1 ,  and reasoning s ince/for constructions in section 4 .4 .2 .  
4.4. 1 The Reasoning Because Construction 
As described in ( 14 ), there are four instances of the reasoning 
construction, of which I investigate the reasoning because construction in this  
subsection. S ince because is used both in the causal construction and in the 
reasoning construction, by comparing behaviors of because-clauses used in 
these constructions, I make clear differences between them. 
As we have seen in section 4 .2 ,  in a reasoning process, the speaker 
relates the two situations perceived separately based on his knowledge. 
Then, the main clause and the because-clause of the reasoning because 
construction should be understood as forming separate information units . 
Assuming that one information unit corresponds to one speech act (cf. 
Hali day ( 1 985), McCarthy ( 1 99 1 )  ), I show that the reasoning because-clause 
and its main clause perform two speech acts independent of each other. 
F irst, an interrogative sentence of a reasoning because construction shows a 
different intonation pattern from the corresponding causal construction (e.g. 
(7) above). Observe the following interrogative sentence of the reasoning 
becaus e  construction: 
( 1 7) Has it raine�cause the ground is w� 
(cf. Is  the ground wet because it has raine�(= (7))) 
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As indicated by the arrows, the ris ing intonation is used at the end of the 
main clause, and the sentence-final because-clause is pronounced with fall ing 
intonation. Note also that the sentence-final punctuation is a period, not a 
question mark. These facts show that the because-clause is not inside the 
scope of the matrix question. This means that sentence ( 1 7) perfonns two 
speech acts, i .e .  the question in the main clause and the statement in the 
because-clause. Thus, the main clause and the because-clause belong to 
different information units . 
Another p iece of evidence for the because-clause performing a speech 
act independently of the main clause comes from Lakoff' s  ( 1 987)  
observation. Lakoff observes that speech act constructions that convey 
statements can occur in sentence-final because-clauses, as in ( 1 8) :  
( 1 8) I ' m  leaving, because here comes my bus ! 
(Lakoff ( 1 987 :4 73 ))  
In  ( 1 8) ,  the deictic here construction occurs in the because-clause. As the 
very name suggests, speech act constructions perform speech acts on their 
own. This means that the because-clause in ( 1 8) performs a speech act on 
its own. 
Note m passmg that although Lakoff observes that speech act 
constructions conveying statements can occur in because-clauses only when 
they are in sentence-final position, it is not sufficient. Consider the 
following examples : 
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( 1 9) a. * He' s  not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his 
wife is cooking. 
b .  He' s  not going out for dinner because his wife i s  cooking 
Japanese food . (Hooper and Thompson ( 1 973 :494)) 
In ( l  9a), even if the because-clause i s  in sentence-final position, the 
topical ization, a kind of speech act construction conveying a statement, 
cannot occur in the because-clause. The original counterpart ( l 9b ), in 
which the because-clause is inside the scope of matrix negation, is an 
instance of the causal construction (cf. Rutherford ( 1 970) ) . That is ,  even in 
sentence-final position, if  the because-clause is a causal one, speech act 
constructions, l ike the topicalization in ( l 9a), are not allowed. Hence, in 
order to give an appropriate description of the occurrence of speech act 
constructions in because-clauses, s imply saying that because-clauses should 
be in sentence-final position is not sufficient : What provides the sufficient 
condition is the because-clause of the reasoning construction. 7 It is quite 
natural that speech act constructions can occur in reasoning because-clauses 
if they form an information unit independently of main clauses. At the 
same time, we may straightforwardly explain why speech act constructions 
are not allowed in causal because-clauses, as in ( l  9a) . In the causal 
construction, the cause situation and the result situation are understood as a 
s ingle process (see section 4 . 3 ) .  Its because-clause cannot perform a speech 
act on its own, and therefore speech act constructions cannot occur in causal 
because-c lauses . 
Thus, as is  expected, the main clause and the because-clause of the 
90 
reasoning because construction form information units independent of each 
other. 
4.4.2 The Reasoning Since Construction and the Reasoning For 
Construction 
In the previous subsection, I have analyzed the reasoning because 
construction and showed that the main clause and the because-clause are 
understood as forming separate information units . This subsection 
investigates the reasoning since and for constructions . F irst, in section 
4 .4 .2 . 1 ,  I argue that they both have similar behaviors to the reasoning 
because constructions.  By comparing the reasoning since/for constructions 
with the reasoning because construction, I show that not only are the 
reasoning since/for constructions similar to each other but also they are 
s imi lar to the reasoning because construction, and the abstraction of their 
s imilarities leads us to posit a schematic construction, namely, the reasoning 
construction. Next, I point out in section 4.4 .2 .2 that the reasoning since 
construction and the reasoning for construction have a dissimilarity as well ,  
despite the fact that they are instances of the same schematic construction. 
This i s  not surprising, however. Rather, this is a natural corol lary of use of 
the d ifferent lexical elements . 
4.4.2. 1 Similarities 
The reasoning since/for constructions are similar to the reasoning 
because construction in the following two respects. First, a rising 
intonation of interrogative sentences is used at the end of the main clause, not 
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at the end of the sentence . Consider the following examples : 
(20) a. Is the ground we$nce/for } it has raine� 
b .  * Is the ground wet, { since/for} i t  has rain/ 
The sentence should be read with the intonation pattern indicated in (20a), 
but not with the one as in (20b ) .  This suggests that the since- and 
for-clauses are not inside the scope of matrix question, which is parallel to 
the reasoning because construction (cf. ( 1 7) ), and opposite to the causal 
construction (cf. (7) ) .  
Recall that in  the reasoning construction, while because-clauses cannot 
appear m sentence-initial position, since-clauses can. Even m 
sentence-initial since-clause configurations, the mam clause performs a 
speech act independently of the since-clause. Observe the following 
example :  
(2 1 )  S ince you ' re so smart, when was George Washington born? 
(Sweetser ( 1 990 :78))  
The main clause in (2 1 )  by itself asks when George Washington was born; 
the since-clause is not inside the scope of the question, but provides the 
reason for asking the question . 
Another s imilarity is that since- and for-clauses, l ike the reasoning 
because-clauses, allow speech act constructions to occur in them, as 
exemplified below :  
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(22) a. I 'm going to cheat my taxes, since who will ever find out? 
(Lakoff ( 1 987 :4 79)) 
b .  . . .  since in n o  real sense could they b e  said to have had the 
opportunity of avai ling themselves of the action project, 
they are omitted . . .  from most of the fol lowing analysis .  
(BNC) 
c. Gay, she knew, must be desperate to write a letter like 
that, for never before had she lowered her flag to such an 
extent. (BNC) 
In (22a), the rhetorical question occurs in the sentence-final since-clause.  In 
(22b ) ,  the subj ect-auxiliary inversion occurs in the sentence-initial 
s ince-clause, and in (22c ), the same construction occurs in the /or-clause .  
They are all speech act constructions that convey statements (Lakoff ( 1 987)), 
and therefore, these since- and /or-clauses perform speech acts of statement 
independently of the main clauses . This is also parallel to reasoning 
because-clauses . Thus, like reasoning because-clauses, since- and 
/or-clauses perform speech acts on their own. 
In sum, the reasoning since/for constructions behave similarly . Their 
behaviors are also similar to those of the reasoning because construction : 
The main clause and the subordinate clause perform speech acts independent 
of each other, and therefore are understood as separate information units . 
These similarities lead us to posit a schematic construction, i .e .  the reasoning 
construction. It is the abstraction of the common meaning from the 
reasoning because/since/for constructions that makes it possible to posit the 
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schematic construction, and the abstraction generalizes the meaning of a 
reasoning process .  Thus, the relation between the (schematic) reasoning 
construction and its instances may be represented as fol lows : 
(23 )  Reasoning Construction 
Sem:  ���r?1�ing sense> 
/ I \ 
/
/ I \ 
/ I \ 
/ I \ 
Syn: C2, qoNJUNcTION C 1 
/ I \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ 
��������-r-/���� .---��--\ �������---, \ 
Reasoning Becaus?/Construction ReasoningFor Construction 
\ / 
/ 
/ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
Sem :  <Reasoi{ing Sense> Sem: <Reasoning Sense> 
Syn : C2, because C 1 Syn : 
Reasoning Since �onstructions 
I 
I 
Sem: <Reasoning Sense> 
In (23 ) , the meaning of the construction is s implified as <Reasoning Sense> 
due to the limitations of the space (for the detailed semantic representation, 
see ( 1 4a-c)) .  The dashed l ines indicate the abstraction of the reasoning 
sense from the relevant constructions . As many conjunctions are used in 
the reasoning construction, its syntactic representation is something like [C2, 
CONJUNCTION C i ] . Notice that the presence of a comma intonation is 
specified in the syntactic representation. Thus, whatever conjunction it is 
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combined with, a comma intonation is  obligatory . 
4.4 .2 .2 Dissimila rity 
In the previous subsection, we have observed similarities between the 
reasoning since construction and the reasoning for construction . However, 
they do not always behave alike. Consider the following contrast : 
(24) a. * For he was unhappy, he asked to be transferred .  
(Quirk et  al . ( 1 985 : 922)) 
b .  S ince he was unhappy, he asked to be transferred. 
The above contrast shows that /or-clauses cannot take place m 
sentence- initial position, while s ince-clauses can. 
Quirk et al . ( 1 985)  note that for is  a "semi-coordinator," which has 
properties of both a coordinator and a subordinator. They argue that for i s  
l ike a subordinator in that i t  does not allow subject ell ipsis, as  exemplified in  
(25 a) ;  otherwise i t  behaves like a coordinator. 
(25 )  a. 
b. 
c. 
He did not want it, for * (he) was obstinate .  
I may see you tomorrow or (I) may phone later in the day .  
(Quirk e t  a l .  ( 1 985 :923f.)) 
John is happy, since * (he) is rich .  
As shown in  (25b ) ,  coordinators can, in essence, connect either clauses or 
clause constituents, e.g. verb phrases, while, as in (25c  ), subordinators cannot 
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connect clause constituents . In this respect, Quirk et al . argue,/or is d istinct 
from other coordinators, and is somewhat similar to subordinators . 
However, given the property of the reasoning construction, we can explain 
why /or-clauses cannot connect clause constituents without postulating such 
a fuzzy category as semi-coordinator: We have only to say that for is  a 
coordinator used in the reasoning construction. 
If it is a coordinator, then why can for not connect clause constituents? 
Taking into consideration the fact that the main clause and the subordinate 
clause of the reasoning construction form separate information units, we may 
account for the reason as follows. S ince the construction in which for is  
used is  the reasoning construction, /or-clauses have to perform a speech act 
independently of its main clause. 8 I f  subject ellipses were allowed in 
/or-clauses, as in other coordinated structures, they would not perform speech 
acts on their own. For example, i f  sentence (25a) were acceptable without 
the parenthesized he, the for-clause would have to be interpreted depending 
upon the main clause, i . e . ,  it would be he in the main clause that was 
obstinate . In other words, despite belonging to the category ( i .e .  
conjunction)  that can essentially connect clause constituents, for has to 
connect two clauses because of the property of the construction that it is used 
m. 
Thus ,  the reason that /or-clauses do not appear in  sentence-initial 
position i s  very s imple:  For i s  a coordinator. That is ,  sentence (26a) is no 
more grammatical than sentence (26b) i s :  
(26) a. * For he was unhappy, he asked to be transferred. (= (24a)) 
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b .  * O r  they are spending a vacation there, they are l iving in 
England. (Quirk et al . ( 1 985  :92 1 )) 
(cf. They are living in England, or they are spending a vacation 
there . )  
4 .5  Status of the  Conj unctions 
To sum up, the categories of the conjunctions m question and the 
constructions that these conjunctions are used in can be summarized as 
follows : 
(27) a .  Because is  a subordinator used in the causal construction 
and the reasoning construction. 
b .  Since is  a subordinator used in the reasoning construction . 
c .  For is  a coordinator used in the reasoning construction . 
Given the summary in (27), both s imilarities and differences between the 
conjunctions are clear. F irst, while because and since are s imilar in that 
they are both subordinators, the range of constructions that they appear in is 
not the same. Second, the range of the constructions in which since and for 
are used is the same, but they belong to different categories . Third, for i s  
categorially d istinct from because and since, while for i s  similar to  since in 
that the two conj unctions are used only in the reasoning construction . 
4.6 Further Issues 
In the previous subsections, I have investigated the causal construction 
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and the reasoning construction, showing that the constructional approach 
provides a clear explanation of both simi larities and differences of the 
conjunctions of reason. In this subsection, I show that the proposed analysis 
gives answers to the questions raised in chapter 2,  as wel l as it explains the 
facts observed in the l iterature . The issues to be discussed in this subsection 
are l isted below : 
(28)  a .  Why can since not be used in the causal construction? 
(Nakau ( 1 994) ; cf. Sweetser ( 1 990)) 
b .  In the reasonmg construction, while because-clauses 
cannot be in sentence-initial position, since-clauses can .  
The reason for because-c lauses not being m 
sentence-initial position has already been explained (e .g.  
Hirose ( 1 99 1 ,  1 999) ) .  Why then can since-clauses be in  
sentence-initial position? 
c .  Why can causal because-clauses be  nominalized into 
because of {NP/Gerund} ,  while reasomng 
because-clauses cannot? (cf. Rutherford ( 1 97 0))  
d .  Why may since-clauses not be nominalized into since 
{NP/Gerund} ?  (cf. Wickboldt ( 1 99 8))  
e .  Why can reasoning because-c lauses and since-clauses not 
clefted? (cf. Nakau ( 1 994 )) 
The answers to questions (28a) and (28b) are intimately related, and so are 
the answers to questions (28c) and (28d) . I will first give answers to 
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questions (28a, b) in section 4 .6 . 1 ,  and then to questions (28c, d) in section 
4 .6 . 2 .  Lastly, I wil l  answer question (28e) in  section 4 .6 . 3 . 
4.6. 1 Since as a Subord inator  Only fo r  the Reasoning Construction 
As summarized in (27) in section 4 . 5 ,  while because is  used both in the 
causal construction and in the reasoning construction, since is used only in 
the reasoning construction . Importantly, it is metaphorical extensions that 
make it possible for both because and since to be used in the reasoning 
construction. In order to answer question (28a), we need to consider two 
types of metaphorical extensions, each of which has a different source 
domain ,  i . e .  what a reasoning process is compared to. 
Recal l first that Sweetser sees a reasoning process as a metaphorical 
causal relation (see section 2 .4 ;  cf. Hirose ( 1 999)) . Thus, when because, i .e .  
the conj unction that introduces a cause of another s ituation, is used, a 
reasoning process may be compared to a causal relation : Along with the 
REASONING IS CAUSATION metaphor, because may be used to introduce the 
premise from which to draw a conclusion . 
As for since, it is often pointed out that its reasoning sense has been 
developed from its temporal meaning (e .g.  Traugott and Konig ( 1 99 1 )) .  
That is ,  when since i s  used, a reasoning process is compared to  a period of  
time, not to  a causal relation. Thus, postulating the REASONING IS 
TEMPORAL SEQUENCE metaphor, we may say that the reasoning is a process 
that begins with the time of giving the premise (designated by the 
since-clause) and ends by drawing a conclusion. 9 
Crucially, Lakoff and Johnson ( 1 980 : 56ff.) argue that metaphorical 
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mappings occur unidirectional ly : Abstract concepts are compared to 
concrete ones, and not vice versa. Note also that as Sweetser ( l  990 :23 ff.) 
discusses at length, we conceptualize our internal mental world by mapping i t  
onto the external world. Then, we may say that reasoning processes can be 
compared to causal relations, but not vice versa, because causal relations, 
which occur in the external world, is  more concrete than reasoning processes, 
which occur inside the speaker' s  internal mental world.  Therefore, because 
can be used in both the causal construction and the reasoning construction by 
the metaphorical mapping of a reasoning process onto a causal relation, while 
since cannot be used in the causal construction, because a casual relation 
cannot be compared to a reasoning process, i .e . ,  it i s  not plausible to compare 
the less abstract concept to the more abstract one. 
In sum, the reasoning sense of because is compared to its causal sense, 
and therefore, because may be used both in the causal construction and in the 
reasoning construction .  In contrast, the reasoning sense of since i s  
compared to its temporal sense, and crucially, we cannot compare a causal 
relation to a reasoning process .  Therefore, since is used in the reasoning 
construction but not in the causal construction. 
Let us now tum to question (28b ) :  Why can since-clauses b e  in 
sentence-initial pos ition whi le reasoning because-clauses cannot? As 
argued above, since is  used only in the reasoning construction . Therefore, 
whether in  sentence-initial or sentence-final position, since-clauses are 
understood with no ambiguity as providing the premise from which to draw a 
conclusion (see fn. 4). Unlike since, because i s  ambiguous : I t  can be 
understood as introducing either a cause or a premise. These two readings 
1 00 
are disambiguated by the position of the because-clause (and the presence or 
absence of a comma intonation) . That is ,  a reasoning because-clause must 
appear in sentence-final position with a comma intonation; otherwise it is a 
causal one . 
4.6 .2 Nominalization of Because- and Since-Clauses 
In this  subsection, I give answers to questions (28c, d) : Why can 
reasonmg because-clauses and since-clauses not be nominalized? 
Rutherford ( 1 970) observes that causal because-clauses can be nominalized 
into because of {NP/Gerund} ,  while reasoning because-clauses cannot. 1 0  
Observe the following causal constructions, in  which the because-clauses are 
nominal ized into because ofNP : 
(29) a .  John is  not coming to class because of his s ickness . 
(Hirose ( 1 992 : 85) )  
(cf. He' s  not coming to class because he was s ick . )  
b .  B ecause of  the law in Ireland, we had to  work out a way 
of getting her over to Britain.  (COBUILD4, s .v .  because) 
Sentences (29a, b) indicate that the nominalization of because-clauses is  
allowed in the causal construction, whether they are in sentence-initial or 
sentence-final position. Now, consider the following i l l-formed sentence : 
(30)  * He' s  not coming to class, because of his having just called from 
San Diego . (Rutherford ( 1 970 : 1 05 )) 
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(cf. He' s  not coming to class, because he just cal led from San 
Diego .)  
The il l-formed sentence is meant to express the reasoning process in which to 
draw the conclusion that he is not coming to class from the premise that he 
just cal led from San Diego . The unacceptabil ity suggests that reasoning 
because-clauses, unlike the causal counterparts, may not be nominalized into 
because of {NP /Gerund P } .  
The contrast can be explained based on the different properties o f  each 
construction discussed in sections 4 .2 through 4 .4 .  That i s ,  the main clause 
and the subordinate clause in the causal construction are understood as 
forming one information unit as a whole, while  those in the reasoning 
construction are understood as forming two separate information units . I f  
because-clauses are nominalized, they wil l  no longer perform speech acts on 
their own. As a result, the information conveyed by such nominalized 
because-clauses cannot be seen as an independent information unit, but is 
regarded as merely a part of larger information unit. 
As one might notice, this is exactly the same reason as the one that 
for-clauses do not allow subject ell ipsis (see section 4 .4 .2 .2) .  The relevant 
example i s  repeated in (3 1 ) :  
(3 1 )  He did not want it, for * (he) was obstinate. (= (25a)) 
S ince sentence (3 1 )  is a reasoning construction, for-clauses have to perform a 
speech act independently of its main clause .  However, if  this sentence were 
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acceptab le without the parenthesized he, the /or-clause would have to be 
interpreted depend ing upon the main clause, i . e . ,  it would be he in the main 
clause that was obstinate . That is ,  if  subject ell ipses were allowed in the 
/or-clause, it would not perform a speech act on its own . 
For essentially the same reason, the nominalized because-clause in 
(30) above, i .e .  because of his just having called from San Diego, i s  not 
allowed : The nominalization also forces such a dependent interpretation on 
the because-clause. In this case, we can identify who the person is  that 
called from San Diego, independently of the main clause, because it is  
explicitly mentioned in the subordinate clause. However, when the 
phone-call takes place needs to be interpreted depending upon the tense of 
the main clause, because i t  is expressed by the nonfinite form, having Oust) 
called (cf. Wada (200 1 :34ff.)) . 1 1  That is ,  the nominalized because-clause 
cannot be seen as forming an independent information unit. Such a 
dependent interpretation is not problematic to the causal construction, in 
which the cause s ituation and the result s ituation are understood as a s ingle 
process . Hence, while the nominal ization of a because-clause is  compatible 
with the causal construction, it is incompatible with the reasoning 
construction. 
Given this answer to question (28c ) ,  the answer to question (28d) is  
straightforward. Wickboldt ( 1 998) ,  among others, observes that 
s ince-clauses cannot be nominalized. Consider the following example :  
(32) * S ince having written the book, Mary was writing the blurb . 
(cf. S ince Mary has written the book, she was writing the 
1 03 
blurb . )  
(Wickboldt ( 1 99 8 : 92)) 
We can account for the unacceptabil ity of sentence (32) in exactly the same 
way as the unacceptabil ity of the nominalization of reasoning 
because-clauses (e .g .  (30)) .  If a since-clause were nominal ized, i t  could not 
form an independent information unit. Considering that since is used only 
in the reasoning construction, it is quite natural that the nominalization of  
since-clauses is  not allowed. The norninalization forces since-clauses to be 
interpreted depending upon the main clause; this is incompatible with the 
property of the reasoning construction . That is, since-clauses are not 
nominal ized for the same reason that reasoning because-clauses cannot be 
nominal ized . 
The norninalizabil ity of because- and since-clauses might not be 
accounted for in such an integrated way if one focuses only on the 
differences of these conjunctions . In this sense, it may be said that the 
arguments in this subsection have demonstrated the importance of 
considering the type of constructions.  
4.6.3 Reasoning Subordinate Clauses Are Not Clefted 
In this subsection, I answer the final question, i .e .  (28e ) : Why can 
reasoning because-clauses and since-clauses not clefted? Recall Nakau' s  
( 1 994) argument about clefting o f  because- and since-clauses (section 2 . 5 ) .  
He claims that because can be  either a propositional element or  a modal 
marker (a marker of D-MOD in his terms). He observes that 
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because-clauses may be clefted if because is a propositional element, whi le 
they may not if  it is a marker of D-MOD. Observe the following contrast : 
(3 3 )  a. It ' s  because he' s  s ick that he' s  not coming to class .  
b .  * It' s because his w ife told me  that he' s  not coming to  class . 
(Nakau ( 1 994 :  1 62)) 
Nakau also observes that s ince is always a marker of D-MOD and that 
s ince-clauses cannot be clefted, as shown in (34 ) : 
(34) * It was s ince they wanted to save l ives that they retreated . 
(Nakau ( 1 994 : 1 62)) 
From these facts, Nakau argues that only propositional elements can be 
focal ized, and that it i s  S-MOD elements that focalize proposit ional elements .  
However, it is  not clear why S-MOD elements cannot be focalized. 
Bes ides, as I shall point out in chapter 5, reasoning because-clauses and 
since-clauses may be focalized by certain focusing adverbs.  Hence, it i s  not 
l ikely that only propositional elements can be focalized. The proposed 
analysis can explain why reasoning because-clauses and since-clauses may 
not be c lefted. F irst, recall the properties of the causal construction and the 
reasoning construction. The main clause and the subordinate clause in the 
causal construction are understood as forming one information unit as a 
whole, while those in the reasoning construction are understood as forming 
two separate information units . Consider the following examples : 
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(3 5 )  a.  
b .  
c .  
[He ' s  not coming to  class because he' s  s ick] . 
[He ' s  not coming to class ] ,  [because his wife told me] . 
[They retreated] , [s ince they wanted to save l ives] . 
Sentences (3 5a-c) are examples of the causal construction, the reasoning 
because construction, and the reasoning since construction, respectively . In 
(3 S a-c ) ,  a pair of brackets corresponds to one information unit .  
Keeping this  in mind, let us consider the information structure of  cleft 
constructions . Cleft constructions may be schematized as fol lows : 
(36) It  is  X that Y 
In (3 6), while the proposition denoted by X, i .e .  P(X), i s  focal ized, the 
proposition denoted by Y, i .e .  P(Y), i s  backgrounded with respect to P(X). 
Thus, the reason for the unacceptabi l ity of sentences (33b) and (34) 
may be explained as follows. As the brackets in (3 5b, c) indicate, in  the 
reasoning construction, the main clause and subordinate clause form separate 
information units, and each should be asserted independently .  S ince the 
element in the that-clause of a cleft construction is understood as being 
backgrounded, clefting reasoning because- and since-clauses results in the 
backgrounded main clause. Hence, the contradiction. Thus, i t  is the 
information structural mismatch that prevents reasoning because- and 
since-clauses from being clefted .  
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4. 7 Relations among Constructions 
So far, I have fully discussed the causal construction and the reasoning 
construction, and shown that the proposed analys is  provides reasonable 
answers to questions raised in chapter 2 .  I n  this  subsection, I describe in 
terms of inheritance l inks (e.g. Goldberg ( 1 995) ,  Hirose ( 1 999)) how the 
causal and reasoning constructions are related to each other and how they are 
related to other constructions. 
As I have observed in section 3 .3 .2, in order to capture the relations 
among constructions, Goldberg ( 1 995)  proposes the notion of inheritance 
l inks . She notes, "by postulating abstraction hierarchies in which lower 
levels inherit information from higher levels, information is stored efficiently 
and made eas i ly modifiable (Goldberg ( 1 995 : 72)) ."  Recall that there are 
several types of inheritance l inks , among which instance l inks (I-l inks) and 
metaphorical extension links (M-links) are helpful to describe relations 
among the constructions under discussion .  Their definitions are repeated as 
in (3 7 ) :  
(37) a .  Instance links are posited when a particular construction 
is a special case of another construction. 
(Goldberg ( 1 995 :79)) 
b .  Metaphorical extension l inks are posited when two 
constructions are found to be related by a metaphorical 
mappmg. (adapted from Goldberg ( 1 995  : 8 1 ) )  
With the notion of inheritance l inks ,  relations among the relevant 
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constructions can be represented as follows : 
(3 8)  causal construction (schema) 
Sem :  "P 1 is a cause of P2" I [P 1--tP2] 
Syn : C2 [ clause-order J because C 1 i rrelevant 
� 
causal constructions ( instances) 
lc2 because C 1\ !Because C 1 , C2\ 
I 
I reasoning constructions (instances) \ll 
reason i ng because construct ion reason ing since construct ions 
Jc2 ,  because c 1 j Jc2 , since C 1 1 Wince C 1 , C2I 
..... 
Ji\ ----------- / JI\ I 
' I Ji\ I I 
temporal since constructions 
reasoning construction (schema) 
reason i ng for 
construct ion 
lc2 ,for C 1l 
� 
Sem :  "P 1 is a premise from which to draw the conclusion that P2" 
[P i ]�[P2] 
I 
Syn : C2, CONJUNCTION C 1 
\ 
I subordinate structure constructions I coordinate structure constructions 
The above diagram is read as follows. The boxes represent constructions 
whose names and/or semantic/pragmatic or syntactic specifications are 
indicated therein. The boxes with the thick l ines represent construction 
schemas, and those with thin l ines construction instances (though the degree 
of the instantiations varies) .  Each construction schema has a meaning such 
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as the one enclosed in the quotation marks. The meaning of the causal 
construction can be schematized as [P 1 �P2] : The arrow represents the 
causal relation; the brackets mean that the causal relation described therein is 
understood as forming one information unit as a whole. Likewise, the 
schematic meaning of the reasoning construction may be represented as 
[P i ]� [P2] ,  in which the two propositions are understood as forming 
independent information units ( indicated by the two separate brackets) and 
they are related by the speaker' s  subjective reasoning process ( indicated by 
the Ien-right arrow) . N ote that only relevant information is  represented in 
each box for the sake of simplification. For example, the semantic 
representation is not repeated in each instance of the causal and reasoning 
constructions . The solid arrows and the dashed arrows between 
constructions indicate I- l inks and M-links, respectively . Correlations 
between the arguments through the present chapter and what are i l lustrated in 
(3 8)  are noted below.  
Firstly, as I have argued in  sections 4 .3  and 4 .4 ,  each of the syntactic 
forms of causal constructions and reasoning constructions is an instance of 
the schematic constructions .  For example, [C2 because C 1 ] is an instance of 
the causal construction ;  hence, an I- link is posited between them. Note here 
that if two constructions are syntactical ly distinct and semantically 
synonymous, they must be pragmatical ly distinct (Goldberg ( 1 995 :67)) .  
Indeed, the two instances of the causal construction are 
information-structurally distinct, i .e . ,  sentence-initial because-clauses are 
contextually presupposed (e.g. Hirose ( 1 99 1 )  ) .  For this reason, the 
reasoning since constructions of different clause-order must be pragmatical ly 
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distinct, as wel l .  At this point, however, how they are differentiated cannot 
be answered (see fn . 4 ) .  I leave i t  for future research . 
Secondly, the reasoning because construction is an instance of the 
reasoning construction, and at the same time, it is related to the causal 
construction by a metaphorical mapping. The reasonmg processes 
expressed by the reasoning because construction may be understood as 
metaphorical causal relations due to the causal meaning of because (cf. 
Sweetser ( 1 990), Hirose ( 1 999)) . Thus, an M-link is posited between the 
causal construction and the reasoning because construction. 
Thirdly, l ike the reasoning because construction, the reasoning since 
construction is an instance of the reasoning construction, but it is not related 
to the causal construction. In the reasoning since construction, a reasoning 
process is  compared to a period of time (section 4 .6 . 1 ) .  Therefore, an 
M-link is posited between the reasoning since construction and constructions 
of temporal since . It is  in this  way that the difference between the reasoning 
because construction and the reasoning since construction is captured .  
Lastly, the difference between the reasoning for construction and the 
other types of reasoning constructions can be captured by considering what 
syntactic categories the conjunctions belong to (section 4 .4 .2 .2) : Because 
and since are subordinators � for is a coordinator. In terms of construction 
grammar, the reasoning since construction is an instance of subordinate 
structure constructions, whi le the reasoning/or construction is an instance of  
d . . 1 2 coor mate structure construct10ns. 
them.  
Therefore, I-l inks are posited between 
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4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I have proposed two schematic constructions that 
express a causal relation and a reasoning process, i .e .  the causal construction 
and the reasoning construction . The conj unction because is used in both of 
them, whereas since and for participate only in the reasoning construction. 
Analyzing these constructions in detail ,  I have claimed that both similar and 
different behaviors of the conjunctions are best accounted for not by focusing 
only on the conjunctions themselves but by considering what constructions 
the conj unctions are used in . 
Appendix A :  Form-Meaning Mismatches and Coercion 
As I have argued in the present chapter, reasoning because-clauses 
have to be in sentence-final position. Observe the following sentences : 
(39)  a. It has rained, because the ground is  wet .  
b .  * Because the ground i s  wet, i t  has rained. 
(40) a. What do you think of Chomsky,  because you are a 
l inguist .  
b. * B ecause you are a l ingu ist, what do you think of 
Chomsky? 
In  (3 9a), the main clause, it has rained, represents the speaker' s  conclusion 
drawn from the premise that the ground is wet; in ( 40a ) ,  the speaker asks 
about Noam Chomsky,  a famous l inguist at MIT, based on his know ledge 
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that linguists in general have a good knowledge of Chomsky . I have 
already explained why sentence- initial because-clauses, as in b-sentences 
above, are not allowed in the reasoning construction (cf. Schourup and 
Waida ( 1 988), Hirose ( 1 99 1 ,  1 999), Nakau ( 1 994), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c)) . 
As Hirose ( 1 99 1 )  observes, sentence-initial because-clauses are generally 
presupposed . The premise from which to draw a conclusion cannot be 
presupposed, because it is newly introduced to the hearer by the utterance of 
the sentence. Thus, sentence-initial because-clauses are not compatible 
with the meaning of the reasoning construction . 
Interestingly, however, with an expression of the speaker' s thought, 
request of information, or the l ike, some speakers accept sentence- initial 
because-clauses, even if the sentences seem to express the reasoning process .  
Examples are given below : 
( 4 1 )  a. 
b. 
Because the ground is  wet, {I think it has rained/it must 
have rained } .  
Because you are a l inguist, I want to know what you think 
of Chomsky. 
While sentences ( 4 1  a, b) express the same meaning as sentences (39 a) and 
( 40a),  respectively, their because-clauses are in sentence-initial position, and 
the sentences are acceptable. Hence, the form-meaning m ismatch i s  
observed. What makes sentences (4 l a, b) different from i l l-formed 
sentences (39b) and ( 40b) is the existence of expressions that expl icitly 
indicate the speaker' s thought and the speaker' s request of information, such 
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as I think/must (in (4 l a)), and I want to know (in (4 l b)). How then are the 
sentences interpreted? 
To answer th is question, arguments about "coercion" are helpful .  De 
Swart ( 1 998) and Michaelis (2004, 2005) ,  for instance, discuss mismatch 
phenomena and coercion, or type-shifting, observed in some constructions 
(cf. Pustejovsky ( 1 996)) .  To see how coercion works, consider the 
fol lowing simple examples cited from Michaelis (2005 ) :  
( 42 )  a .  
b .  
She read a book. [ lexical match] 
Did you eat a pudding? [ lexical mismatch] 
(Michaelis (200 5 : 5 3 )) 
In ( 4 1  a, b ), the ital icized phrases represent the Indefinite Detennination 
construction, in which the indefinite article a requires a singular countable 
noun as its complement. In ( 41  a) ,  a book transparently reflects the 
semantics of the construction: The input lexical item a shares semantic 
value with the right daughter of the construction book, because book i s  a 
s ingular countable noun. By contrast, a pudding in ( 4 1  b) shows lexical 
mismatch : The noun pudding is a mass noun, and therefore fails to unify 
with the construction ' s  right daughter. Michaelis (2005 : 5 3f. )  explains thi s  
mismatch phenomenon as  follows :  
. . .  the relevant feature of the input noun wi l l  switch to those required 
by the construction. This means that mass nouns like pudding will  
receive the value [count +] in combination with the Indefinite 
Determination construction. 
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That is ,  upon the request from the construction that the lexical item is used in, 
the semantic feature of the mass noun pudding, i .e .  uncountable, is canceled 
and switched into countable. This is generalized as follows : 
( 43 ) The Override Principle :  If a lexical item is semantically 
incompatible with its syntactic context, the meaning of the 
lexical item conforms to the meaning of the structure in which 
it is embedded. (Michael is  (2005 : 5 1 )) 
The mismatch phenomenon in ( 4 1  a, b) above may be explained in 
accordance with the Override Principle .  In ( 41 a) ,  for example, despite the 
reasoning sense of I think or must, because of the syntactic context in which 
it appears, the whole sentence expresses a causal relation. That is ,  those 
who can recognize a causal relation between the ground being wet and the 
speaker concluding that it has rained may accept this sentence . 1 3 The 
acceptabil ity of sentence ( 4 1  b) may be explained in the same way .  In other 
words, sentences ( 4 1  a, b) may be accepted not as irregular instances of the 
reasoning construction, but as instances of the - causal construction. Without 
those italicized expressions in ( 4 1  a, b ) ,  that is, if a causal relation cannot be 
recognized at all, the sentences are not acceptable. Therefore, even if the 
itali cized expressions in these examples denote the speaker' s  thought or 
request of information, such semantic features are overridden by the sentence 
forms ; the interpretations of the sentences are coerced into the causal ones . 
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2006c) .  
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This chapter is a revised and extended version of Kanetani (2005c, 
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1 .  I use the term "reasoning" rather than "inferential" for reasons to 
be discussed in section 4 .4 .  
2 .  Detail s  about the instantiations wi l l  be discussed in section 4 .  7 .  
3 .  Note that, a s  we  shall see i n  section 4 .3 .3 . 1 , speech act 
constructions do occur in inferential because-clauses . That is, j ust because 
because-clauses are subordinate clauses does not mean that speech act 
constructions, a.k.a. root transformations (Emonds ( 1 970)), do not occur in 
them (cf. Hooper and Thompson ( 1 973 ), Lakoff ( 1 987), Haegeman (2002, 
2003 , 2004), etc . ) .  
4 .  The two distinct forms of reasoning since constructions should be 
pragmatically differentiated for the same reason that I have pointed out for 
the two distinct forms of causal constructions in section 4 .3 . At present, 
however, how they are differentiated is not clear. Some l inguists observe 
that sentence-initial since-clauses are preferred to the sentence-final 
equivalents (e.g. Ford ( 1 993), Swan (2005)) .  It is also well known that 
since-clauses convey given or old information (e.g. Schourup and Waida 
( 1 989),  Swan (2005)) .  These facts could be a key to  the question. At any 
rate, however, I leave it for future research, and here I s imply represent 
reasoning since constructions as in ( 1 4b ) .  
5 .  Although, as mentioned i n  section 2 .4,  Sweetser ( 1 990) does not 
discuss for, I take sentence ( l 5b) as an example of for used in the seeming 
content domain, because the sentence has the same logical meaning as the 
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sentence John came back because he loved her. 
6. Note here that no matter what conj unction is used, the main clause 
and the subord inate clause of the reasoning construction are separated by a 
comma intonation (see ( 1 4a-c)) . The presence of a comma intonation 
symbolically reflects this characteri stic of a reasoning process in general, i .e . ,  
the two situations described are understood separately (section 4 .2) .  
7 .  I do not mean to argue against Lakoff' s ( 1 987) observation, but his 
general ization is a little coarse-grained . S ince the reasoning because-clause 
is  always in sentence-final position, the analysis here is not incompatible 
with Lakoff' s  observation . Lakoff' s generalization, however, cannot 
explain the unacceptabi l ity of sentence ( l 9a) .  Thus, in order to capture the 
fact more accurately, it is necessary to take into consideration the 
constructional distinction that I propose in this chapter. 
8 .  If for is a coordinator, the term "main clause" may not be 
appropriate. Here, for want of a better term, I use the term merely to refer 
to the clause that expresses the conclusion. 
9 .  The question remains open as to why the temporal meaning of 
since extends to the reasoning one, not to the causal one . 
1 0 . Rutherford does not exp licitly distinguish the causal and reasoning 
because-clauses . He argues that bound because-clauses may be 
nominalized, while free because-clauses may not .  
1 1 . For detailed arguments of how the tense of the gerund is defined at 
the base time, i .e .  the tense of the main clause, see Wada (200 1 ). In the 
present thesis, I do not go any further. 
1 2 . Needless to say, the causal construction, in which because is used, 
is an instance of subordinate structure constructions . For the sake of 
s impl ification, however, the arrow that indicates the inheritance relation is 
not represented in diagram (3 8) .  
1 3 .  Of course, those who cannot recognize such a causal relation are 
not expected to accept sentence ( 4 1  a) . 
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Chapter 5 
Focalizations of Because and Since 
5 . 1  Introduction 
It has often been pointed out that while because-clauses can be 
focal ized by adverbs such as just, only, and simply, since-clauses cannot (e.g. 
Quirk et al . ( 1 985 ), Schourup and Waida ( 1 988) ,  Wickboldt ( 1 997),  among 
others) :  
( 1 )  a.  He went to college just {because/* since } his parents 
asked him to . 
b .  Don ' t  expect m e  to marry you simply { because/* s ince} 
you' re rich . 
(Schourup and Waida ( 1 98 8 : 95 )) 
According to Schourup and Waida ( 1 988), the above grammatical ity 
contrasts stem from the fact that the reason introduced by because conveys 
new information, while the reason introduced by since represents old 
information. 
This claim, however, is  not plausible for the following reasons . First, 
there are cases in which since-clauses can be focalized by focusing adverbs, 
as shown in (2) : 
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(2) Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only 
natural, particularly since a sari does not have to be washed as 
frequently as a dress . . .  (BNC [italics are mine]) 
Secondly, just because the reason is introduced by because does not always 
make it possible for the because-clause to be modified by focusing adverbs.  
Observe the following example :  
(3 ) * It has rained, j ust because the ground is wet. 
(cf. It has rained, because the ground is  wet. ) 
Furthermore, the contrasts between old and new information seem irrelevant 
in accounting for the focalizabi lity of because- and since-clauses by focusing 
adverbs for reasons to be explored later. 
In this chapter, based on the argument m the prev10us chapter, I 
propose a generalization that accounts for when because- and since-clauses 
can or cannot be focalized by focusing adverbs.  In particular, I argue that 
the focalizability of because and since is best explained by considering the 
interaction between characteristics of the constructions that these 
conjunctions are used in and the types of focusing adverbs .  In chapter 4 ,  I 
have postulated the causal construction and the reasoning construction, 
arguing that because participates in both of them while since is used only in 
the latter. The present chapter demonstrates the validity of the argument by 
applying it to the analysis of the focalizabi lity of because and since . 
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This  chapter is organized as follows. Section 5 .2 makes a brief 
argument against information structural accounts of the focalizabi lity of 
because and since . Section 5 . 3 then investigates characteristics of the 
constructions where because and since are used, reviewing the discussion in 
chapter 4.  Section 5 .4, following Quirk et al . ( 1 985), classifies focusing 
adverbs into two groups, and shows how they focalize what follows them. 
Based on the discussion in sections 5 . 3 and 5 .4,  section 5 . 5 presents an 
alternative account of the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of sentences 
( 1 )-(3)  above and other examples to be given later on, and proposes a 
generalization about the focalizabi lity of because- and since-clauses by 
focusing adverbs .  Section 5 .6  summarizes the argument in this  chapter. 
5.2 Against Information Structural Accounts 
As seen in the previous subsection, Schourup and Waida ( 1 988)  
attempt to  account for the focalizability of  because- and since-clauses in  
terms of their information structural distinction, c laiming that the reason 
introduced by because conveys new information, while that introduced by 
since presents old information. 1 As shown in (2) and (3 ) above, however, 
there are many counterexamples to Schourup and Waida' s generalization 
about the focalizabi lity of because- and since-clauses . Thus, their 
information structural account does not satisfactorily exp lain the facts . 
The generalization based on the information structural d istinction is 
not only empirically inadequate but also poses two theoretical problems.  
One is  that although the general ization states that because-clauses convey 
new information, this  is not always true. Hirose ( 1 99 1  : 3 1 )  notes that 
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sentence-initial because-clauses generally convey old information (cf. 
chapter 4 ) .  To  see this ,  consider the fol lowing dialogue : 
(4) A :  Why i s  the ground wet? 
B :  # Because it has rained, the ground is wet. 
(cf. The ground is wet because it has rained . )  
(Kanetani (2005 : 8 5 )) 
The above dialogue shows that using a sentence-initial because-clause is  not 
appropriate to answer a why-question . The inappropriateness of speaker B ' s  
utterance stems from the sentence-initial because-clause being presupposed . 
Although speaker A asks the reason why the ground is wet, the answer given 
by speaker B, with the sentence-initial because-clause, indicates that the 
reason is already known to speaker A .  Hence, the incompatibil ity between 
A and B .  That is, just because the reason i s  introduced by because does not 
necessari ly mean that it conveys new information. 
Another problem, which is similar to the first one, is that since-clauses 
do not always convey old information . They may present new information 
and be asserted as if they were independent clauses (cf. Hirose ( 1 99 l :fn. 1 3 ) ) . 
Observe the following sentence: 
( 5 )  I 'm going to  cheat my taxes ,  s ince who wil l  ever find out? 
(Lakoff ( 1 987  :4 79)) 
In ( 5 ), the rhetorical question who will ever find out occurs m the 
1 20 
since-clause . Lakoff observes that speech act constructions that convey 
statements, such as the rhetorical question in (5), may occur in since-clauses 
as wel l  as in because-clauses .2 Crucially, Hooper and Thompson ( 1 973)  
argue that i t  is  only in  asserted clauses that speech act constructions ("root 
transfonnations" in their terms) can occur. 
asserted as if they were independent clauses : 
Thus, since-clauses may be 
At least the since-clause in (5 )  
i s  asserted. Therefore, it is not l ikely that the reason introduced by since 
always presents old information .  
I n  brief, just because the reason is introduced by  because does not 
mean that it always conveys new information. Likewise, just because the 
reason is introduced by since does not necessarily mean that it conveys old 
information . It then follows that Schourup and Waida ' s  ( 1 988)  account of 
the focalizabi l ity of because and since based on the information structural 
distinction is not plausible .  I wil l  present an alternative account in section 
5 . 5 ,  which i s  not dependent upon the information structural d istinction. 
Before that, however, we need to consider (i) characteristics of the 
constructions that because and since are used in (cf. chapter 4 ), and (i i)  the 
meanings of relevant focusing adverbs (cf. Quirk et al .  ( 1 985 )) ,  i . e .  the two 
main factors that the analysis to be proposed is dependent upon. 
5.3 Interpretations of Because-Clauses and Since-Clauses : Causal vs. 
Reasoning 
5.3. 1 Because-Clauses 
As i s  well known, the conjunction because has two interpretations (e.g. 
Jespersen ( 1 949), Rutherford ( 1 970), Sweetser ( 1 990), Hirose ( 1 99 1 ), Nakau 
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( 1 994 ) ,  among many others ; see chapters 2 and 4 ) .  One is  the causal 
interpretation . In this interpretation, the because-clause expresses the cause 
of (non-)occurrence of the situation described in the main clause. The other 
is the reasoning interpretation. Reasoning because-clauses are understood 
as providing the premise from which to draw a conclusion that is expressed 
in the main c lause.  The two uses of because-clauses are exemplified in ( 6 ) :  
(6 )  a .  He ' s  not coming to  class because he' s  s ick . 
b .  He's  not coming to class, because he has just called from 
S an D iego .  
(Rutherford ( 1 970 :97)) 
In (6a),  the because-clause expresses the reason for his not coming to class . 
The because-clause in ( 6b) does not give a reason for his not coming to class, 
but is understood as providing the premise to conclude that he is  not coming 
to c lass .  
I have argued in chapter 4 that this  functional difference between 
causal and reasoning because-clauses is reflected in some syntactic behaviors 
of the because-clause. F irst, as Rutherford ( 1 970) observes, causal 
because-clauses can be nominalized into because of NP, while reasoning 
ones cannot, as indicated in (7 a, b) : 
(7) a .  He' s  not coming to class because of his s ickness .  
b .  * He' s not coming t o  class, because o f  his having j ust called 
from San Diego. (Rutherford ( 1 970 : 1 05 )) 
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The grammatical sentence in (7 a) is gained by nominal izing the causal 
because-clause in ( 6a) .  In contrast, the sentence in  (7b ) ,  which involves the 
nominalization of the reasoning because-clause in ( 6b ), is ungrammatical . 
Second, when a negation occurs in the main clause, causal 
because-clauses can be inside the scope of the negation, whereas reasoning 
because-clauses cannot (e.g. Rutherford ( 1 970), Hirose ( 1 99 1  ), among 
others) .  Observe the following : 
(8 )  a. He doesn' t  beat his wife because he loves her. 
(Rutherford ( 1 970 :  1 00)) 
b. NEG [he beats his wife] because he loves her 
c. NEG [he beats his wife because he loves her] 
(9) a .  He' s  not coming to class, because he just called from S an 
Diego. (= (6b ))  
b .  NEG [He 's  coming to class] because h e  just called from 
San D iego 
c .  * NEG [He' s coming to class because he just called from 
S an D iego] 
According to Rutherford ( 1 970), the sentence in (8a) · i s  ambiguous between 
the two readings in (8b, c) . That is, the causal because-clause in (8a) can be 
e ither inside or outside the scope of the negation in the main clause .  The 
reasoning because-clause in (9a),  on the other hand, is not ambiguous. The 
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sentence does not allow a wide-scope interpretation such as the one shown in 
(9c) .  
Third, causal because-clauses can be in sentence-initial position, whi le 
reasoning because-clauses cannot (cf. Schourup and Waida ( 1 988)  and 
Hirose ( 1 99 1  )) . Observe the following: 
( 1 0) a Because it has rained, the ground is wet. 
b .  * Because the ground is wet, i t  has rained. 
(Hirose ( 1 99 1  :27)) 
The fact that it has rained is a cause of the ground being wet. Hence, the 
because-clause in ( 1 Oa) is a causal one. In ( 1 Ob), on the other hand, the 
because-clause cannot be causal. The intended reading of the sentence is 
something l ike this : "From the fact that the ground is wet, I conclude that it 
must have rained." In such a case, sentence-initial because-clauses are not 
allowed (see Hirose ( 1 99 1 )  for a more detailed d iscussion) . 
Fourthly, as Nakau ( 1 994) observes, a causal because-clause can be 
clefted, as in ( l  l a) ,  whereas a reasoning because-clause cannot, as in ( l  l b) :  
( 1 1 )  a.  It' s  because he' s  s ick that he' s  not coming to class .  
b .  * It ' s  because his wife told me that he ' s  not coming to class .  
(Nakau ( 1 994 : 1 62)) 
Lastly, speech act constructions that convey statements can occur in 
sentence-final because-clauses (e.g. Lakoff ( 1 9 87)) .  Consider the following 
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contrast: 
( 1 2) a. We should go on a picnic, because isn ' t  it a beautiful day ! 
b .  * Because isn ' t  i t  a beautiful day, we should go  on a picnic .  
(Lakoff ( 1 987 :474)) 
The rhetorical question isn 't it a beautiful day, a kind of speech act 
construction, occurs in the sentence-final because-clause in ( 1 2a), and the 
sentence is acceptable.  Such constructions, however, cannot occur in the 
sentence-initial because-clause as in ( l 2b ) .  Reviewing Lakoff' s analysis ,  I 
have argued in section 4 .4 . 1  that it i s  in reasoning because-clauses, and not in 
causal ones, that speech act constructions can occur. To see the validity of 
this analysis ,  observe the following examples : 
( 1 3 ) a .  S am i s  not gomg out for dinner because his wife 1s  
cooking Japanese food. 
(Hooper and Thompson ( 1 973 :494)) 
b . * Sam is  not going out for dinner because Japanese food, 
his wife is  cooking. 
S ince the sentence in ( 1 3 a) allows a wide-scope reading of the matrix 
negation, the because-clause is a causal one (cf. (8c) ) .  Thus even in 
sentence-final position, if the because-clause is a causal one, speech act 
constructions l ike the topicalization in ( 1 3b) are not allowed.3 S ince 
sentence-initial because-clauses, in which speech act constructions are not 
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allowed, are always causal ones, we can say, along this l ine, that reasoning 
because-clauses allow speech act constructions to occur in them, while 
causal because-clauses do not. 
So far, we have observed five syntactic behaviors of causal and 
reasoning because-clauses . Their different behaviors may be used for 
diagnosis of causal and reasoning because-clauses . The d iagnosis table is 
shown below: 
( 1 4) causal reasonmg 
a. nominalization OK * 
b .  wide scope of  matrix negation OK * 
c .  sentence-initial position OK * 
d. clefting OK * 
e .  speech act constructions * OK 
5.3.2 Since-Clauses 
Let us now tum to since-clauses . The conjunction since arguably has 
only a reasoning use (see chapter 4, in particular section 4 .6 . 1 ;  cf. Sweetser 
( 1 990), Nakau ( 1 994)) .  Here, I use the term "reasoning" in a wide sense . 
That is ,  as I have argued in section 4 .4,  even if  the situations described in the 
main clause and the since-clause seem to express a causal relation between 
them, some kind of speaker' s reasoning process must be involved. This can 
be demonstrated by th� following contrast: 
( 1 5) John died { ?since/because }  the bullet hit him in the head. 
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The sentence above describes the causal relation between John's  death and 
the bul let hitting him in the head . The causal relation in this sentence is so 
direct and so easy to understand that it is difficult for the speaker' s subj ective 
reasoning process to lie between the two situations . In such a context, only 
marginally can since connect the two s ituations . 
In the previous subsection, the diagnosis of causal  and reasoning 
because-clauses ( = ( 1 4)) has been presented. Note here that the different 
syntactic behaviors l isted in ( 1 4) should be attributed to the different 
interpretations ; thus, the diagnosis is not restricted to because-clauses, but 
can be  extended to other conj unctions of reason. In what follows, to show 
that since-clauses have only reasoning uses, I inyestigate syntactic behaviors 
of since-clauses, applying the d iagnosis in ( 1 4) to since-clauses in the order 
of ( l  4a)>( l 4b )>( l 4d)>( l 4e )>( l 4c ) .  
F irst, l ike reasonmg because-clauses, and unlike causal 
because-c lauses, since-clauses cannot be nominalized, as shown in ( 1 6) :  
( 1 6) * S ince John ' s  death, Mary remarried. ( Wickboldt ( 1 997 : 85))  
The sentence in ( 1 6) is  intended to mean "John died, and for that reason, 
Mary remarried." The sentence is not grammatical, although its clausal 
counterpart Since John died, Mary remarried i s  perfectly acceptable.  
Second, as Hirose ( 1 99 1 )  argues, s ince-clauses are not inside the 
matrix negation. Consider the following: 
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( 1 7) a. John is not happy since he' s  rich. 
b. NEG [John is happy] since he' s  rich 
c .  * NEG [John is happy s ince he ' s  rich] 
(Hirose ( 1 99 1 :29)) 
The behavior regarding the scope of negation is parallel to reasoning 
because-clauses, but is  different from causal because-clauses (cf. ( 1 4b) ) .  
Third, a s  Nakau ( 1 994) observes,  since-clauses cannot be clefted, as 
shown in ( 1 8) (cf. Wickboldt ( 1 997)) : 
( 1 8) * It was s ince they wanted to save l ives that they retreated .  
(Nakau ( 1 994 : 1 62)) 
Again, this is a parallel behavior to reasoning because-clauses and i s  a 
different behavior from causal because-clauses (cf. ( 1 4d)) .  
Fourthly, as we have already seen in section 5 .2 ,  Lakoff ( 1 9 87)  
observes that speech act constructions that convey statements can occur in  
since-clauses as  well .  The relevant example i s  repeated below : 
( 1 9) I ' m  going to cheat on my taxes, s ince who wil l  ever find out? 
(= (5 )) 
Here, the rhetorical question, who will ever find out, occurs m the 
since-clause and the sentence is grammatical . This is also the same 
behavior as reasoning because-clauses (cf. ( 1 4e)) .  
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So far, our examination of since-clauses based on the diagnosis of 
because-clauses in ( 1 4) has revealed that the conjunction since introduces the 
premise of an inference rather than the cause of a situation . The third item 
of the diagnosis table ( l 4c ), i .e .  sentence-initial subordinate clauses, however, 
seems to be contradictory to the present view, because since-clauses can 
appear in sentence-initial position, expressing the premise of an inference. 
Consider the following sentence: 
(20) S ince John isn't here, he has gone home. (Sweetser ( 1 990 :78)) 
In this sentence, the speaker draws the conclusion that John has gone home 
from the premise that he "is not here ." The sentence-initial since-clause, 
however, is not a counterexample. On the contrary, it i s  a piece of 
supporting evidence for since-clauses having only reasoning uses . The 
reason why sentences with the sentence-initial since-clause can describe a 
reasoning process is ,  as I have argued in  section 4 .6 . 1 ,  that the conjunction 
since, unlike because, unambiguously introduces the premise of an inference. 
That is,  while because-clauses may have a reasoning interpretation only 
when they are in sentence-final position, since-clauses do not need such a 
requirement to have a reasoning interpretation.4 From these observations, 
we can conclude that since-clauses do not have causal uses . 
There i s  another good piece of evidence to show that sentence-initial 
since-clauses behave in the same way as reasoning because-clauses.  
Observe the following example :  
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(2 1 )  . . .  s ince in no real sense could they be said to have had the 
opportunity of avai ling themselves of the action proj ect, they 
are omitted . . .  from most of the following analysis .  (BNC) 
The subject-auxil iary inversion, a kind of speech act construction express ing 
a statement, occurs in the sentence-initial since-clause in this  sentence . The 
occurrence of this type of speech act constructions in subordinate reason 
clauses is characteristic to their reasoning uses (cf. ( 1 4e) ). Hence, the 
reason introduced by since, even in sentence-initial position, is considered 
not to be a cause of the s ituation described in the main clause, but to be the 
premise from which to draw the conclusion described in the main clause. 
In sum, the conj unction since unambiguously has a reasoning use. 
5.3.3 Characteristics of the Constructions 
In the last two subsections, I have argued that the reason introduced by 
because i s  ambiguous between a cause of another s ituation and the premise 
of a reasoning process, while the reason introduced by since i s  
unambiguously the premise of an inference. In chapter 4, I have proposed a 
construction grammar approach to the conj unctions in question (cf. Hirose 
( 1 999), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c)) . I have stated that the differences at issue 
are the constructional differences rather than the difference of conjunctions 
themselves and argued that different syntactic behaviors such as those listed 
in ( 1 4) should be attributed to the characteristic of each construction. More 
specifically, the causal relation between s ituation 1 and s ituation2 is mapped 
onto either [C2 because C i ]  or [Because C i ,  C2] , in which C 1 and C2 denote a 
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situation 1 and another situati9n2, respectively. These form-meaning 
correspondences are understood as grammatical units called causal 
constructions . Likewise, a reasoning process in which the speaker draws a 
conclusion (situation2) from the premise (s ituaition i )  is mapped onto either 
form-meaning correspondences is an instance of the reasoning construction 
(for details, see chapter 4 ) .  
What i s  important for  the present discussion is  that a s  I have repeated 
in the previous chapter, causal .constructions perform one speech act in a 
whole sentence, whi le reasoning constructions perform two . The following 
contrast demonstrates this  point : 
(22) a .  
b 
Is  the ground wet because it has rained?/ 
Has it raine�ause the ground is  w� 
Sentence (22a) is  an interrogative sentence of the causal construction, whi le 
sentence (22b) is an interrogative sentence of the reasoning because 
construction. The arrows indicate intonation patterns. The different 
intonation patterns (and punctuations) suggest that the causal construction 
performs one speech act, i . e .  the question asking whether the rain caused the 
ground to become wet, whi le the reasoning construction performs two, i .e .  
the question asking whether it has rained and the statement that the ground is  
wet. 
The difference reflects how we conceptualize causal relations and 
reasoning processes . As for causal relations, the speaker takes as a s ingle 
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process the whole process in which a situation causes another situation . 
Consider the following example :  
(23 ) The ground is wet because it has rained. 
In this  sentence, the whole causal chain in which the rain has caused the 
ground to be wet is taken at once. On the other hand, sentences that 
describe reasoning sense denote the process in which the speaker 
( subj ectively) connects two s ituations that may not necessarily be related in 
the real world .  Take the sentence in (24) as an example :  
(24) It has rained, because the ground is  wet. 
Logically, the cause of the wet ground does not have to be the ram. 
However, the speaker sees the wet ground, and then concludes that it has 
rained based on his common knowledge of the world or experience. In 
other words, it may not have rained, and even if  it has, there need not be a 
necessary causal relation between the rain and the wet ground .  B es ides, 
there may be other possible reasons for the speaker to conclude that it has 
rained, say, to see a rainbow in the sky, to see someone get home wet, to hear 
the news about the rain, etc. 
Note in passing that the reasoning construction, whether because or 
since is used, requires a comma intonation between the main clause and the 
subordinate clause (e .g.  Rutherford ( 1 970), Sweetser ( 1 990), Nakau ( 1 994), 
Hirose ( 1 999), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c )) . The obligatory comma intonation 
1 32 
symbolically functions as separating speech acts between the main clause and 
the subordinate clause. 
Lastly, it is important to note that what is crucial in describing the 
focalizabi lity of conjunctions by certain focusing adverbs is not the type of 
conjunctions, but the type of constructions that the conjunctions participate in. 
More precisely, the characteristics of causal and reasoning constructions 
discussed in this subsection are the most important; that is, causal 
constructions perform one speech act as a whole and the whole sentence is 
taken as one information-unit, while the main clause and the subordinate 
c lause of reasoning constructions are taken as independent 
information-units . 5 
5.4 Two Types of Focusing Adverbs : Exclusives and Pa rticularizers 
In the previous subsection, I have discussed the characteristics of the 
constructions that because and since participate in. In this subsection, I 
investigate how focusing adverbs focalize what follows them, i .e .  another 
important factor crucially involved in the focalizabi lity of because-clauses 
and since-clauses by focusing adverbs .  
Quirk e t  al . ( 1 985 ) draw a l ine between two types of  focusing adverbs . 
One group is called exclusives, and includes just, simply, only, precisely, and 
the l ike . The other group, called particularizers, includes especially, 
particularly, largely, and the like. According to Quirk et al . ,  these adverbs 
indicate that the utterance concerned is  true in respect of the part focused, 
and the ways adverbs in each group restrict the utterance are different. 
Specifically, exclusives restrict the appl ication of the utterance exclusively to 
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the part focused; particularizers restrict the application of the utterance 
predominantly to the part focused . 
Now that the basic characteristics of each group of focusing adverbs 
are given, let us observe the meaning of some adverbs more closely and 
investigate how they restrict the utterances . First, observe the dictionary 
definitions of some exclusives and particularizers l i sted in (25 )-(26) : 
(25 )  exclusives 
a. only : as a single fact or instance and nothing more or 
b .  
c .  
different (WEB STER) 
just: simply 
simply : without ambiguity 
(WEBSTER) 
(WEB STER) 
d .  merely : used meaning ' only' or  s imply' to  emphasize a 
fact or s [  ome ] th [ing] that you are saying (OALD6) 
e .  solely :  only; not involving s [  ome ]b [  ody] /s[ ome ] th [ing] 
else (OALD6) 
f. precisely : emphasize that a reason or fact is the only 
important one there is . . .  (COBUILD4) 
(26) particularizers 
a .  particularly: distinctive among other examples or cases of 
the same general category (WEBSTER) 
b .  especially : in particular (WEBSTER) 
c .  largely: in a large manner; especially (WEBSTER) 
d .  mainly : used to  show that a statement is true to  a large 
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degree 
e .  mostly : indicate that the statement i s  general ly true . . .  in 
most respects 
f. principally : more than anything else 
(COBUILD4) 
(COBUILD4) 
The dictionary definitions of ex:clusives in (25)  show that adverbs in this 
group exclude other possibil ities than the one described . Exclusives thus 
highlight what follows them by singling it out and denying other possibilities . 
Considering the definitions of particularizers in (26), on the other hand, we 
can see that they do not exclude other possibil ities . Rather, they imply that 
there are other possibil ities than the one described. Particularizers thus 
highlight what follows them by comparing it with other s imilar examples or 
cases . 
Let us then observe more clearly how focal izations are done by 
exclusives and particularizers . First, consider the following example :  
(27) You can tel l  j ust by looking at me that I am al l right . . .  
(COBUILD4, s .v . just) 
In (27), the by-phrase is focalized by the exclusive just. The sentence 
indicates that the only way the addressee can tel l  the speaker is  right is  by 
looking at him: No other way can be evoked .  
Next, to  see how particularizers focalize what follows them, observe 
the following sentence, which involves the focalization by the particularizer 
especially: 
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(28) Mill ions of wild flowers color the val leys, especially in Apri l  
and May. . .  (COBUILD4, s .v .  especially) 
In this sentence, the period during which the valleys are colored by wild 
flowers is not limited to April and May. Rather, the focal ization of the 
period by the particularizer implies that there are other seasons when people 
can enj oy the colored valleys, say, March, June, etc. 
Huddleston and Pul lum (2002) divide focusing adverbs into two 
groups from a similar point of view.6 They refer to adverbs such as only, 
just, precisely, simply, and the l ike, as total restrictive focusing modifiers; 
adverbs such as especially, mainly, particularly, mostly, and the l ike, as 
partial restrictive focusing modifiers . The former corresponds to Quirk et 
al .  ' s  ( 1 985 )  exclusives and the latter to their particularizers . Henceforth, in 
order to avoid confusion, I use Quirk et al . ' s  ( 1 985 )  terms. Consider the 
following sentence, where the particularizer mainly focalizes the 
prepositional phrase that follows : 
(29) I was concerned mainly about the cost. 
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002 : 592)) 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002 : 592) say that this sentence "do[ es] not say (as 
[ it] would with only) that I wasn' t  concerned with anything except the cost, 
but rather that I wasn't  concerned with anything else to the same extent : 
any other concerns are relativ.ely minor [emphasis is  mine] ." As the 
italicized phrase "any other concerns" suggests, focalization by a 
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particularizer impl ies that there are other possibilities that are not expl icitly 
mentioned in the given sentence. Furthermore, as indicated by the 
parenthesized phrase "as [ it] would with only," Huddleston and Pullum also 
acknowledge that when an exclusive l ike only is used, such an implication is 
not present. 
In sum, if exclusives restrict utterances, there are no other possibi lities 
than those described. I f  particularizers are used, there are other impl icit 
possibi l ities than those described . 7 
5.5  Analysis 
The last two subsections have investigated the characteristics of causal 
and reasoning constructions and the ways exclusives and particul arizers 
restrict utterances . Based on those observations,  I propose in this  section a 
generalization about the focalizabi lity of because-clauses and since-clauses 
by focusing adverbs . Before that, however, let us observe what type of  
focusing adverbs can focalize what type of  conjunctions and argue about 
why. 
First, causal because-clauses can be focalized by exclusives, as 
i l lustrated in  (30) :  
( 30)  He went to  college just because h i s  parents asked h im to . 
(= ( l a) )  
In this sentence, the s ituation of h i s  parents ' asking a favor of h im has caused 
another s ituation, i .e. his going to college. The exclusive just in front of the 
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because-clause restricts the cause to the one expressed in the sentence. 
Thus, the sentence in (30) denotes that only the fact that his parents asked 
him to go to col lege is the cause of his going to college. Recall that in 
causal constructions, the whole sentence is taken as one information-unit. 
In other words, the cause situation and the result situation are not taken 
independently, but taken as a kind of combined process .  Hence, the 
inseparabil ity of cause from result. That is, if  there is  a certain result, its 
cause must exist. F ocalizations of because-clauses by exclusives assert that 
there are no other causes or reasons than the one expressed, and at the same 
time, presuppose that the situation described in the reason clause exists (cf. 
Hom ( 1 969)) .8 Therefore, exclusives may focalize causal because-clauses, 
restricting the cause s ituation exclusively to the one described. 
Second, causal because-clauses may be focalized by particularizers as 
well as exclusives . One such example is  given in (3 1 ) : 
(3 1 )  I t  was l argely because of you that he failed. 
(KDEC, s .v .  because) 
The because-clause in (3 1 )  is nominalized and clefted, which means that the 
because-clause is a causal one (see ( 1 4a, d)) .  In fact, the sentence denotes 
the causal relation between the· addressee ' s  action and the failure of the 
person referred to as he. The because-clause is focalized by largely, a 
particularizer. Again,  the important characteristic of causal constructions is 
that the cause and result are inseparably l inked. This,  however, does not 
necessari ly mean that there is only one cause for one result; there may be 
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more than one cause for one result as far as they are inseparably linked. 
Consider the following example :  
(32) Above all , it is because I can distinguish the narrating from the 
narrated and because I can (re )constitute the latter with the 
fonner that I can begin to talk about the world represented.9 
(Prince, G . ,  Narratology, 1 982 : 60)  
The because-clauses in  this sentence are clefted; that i s ,  they are causal ones . 
What i s  important here i s  that there are two because-clauses and that the two 
s ituations therein, i .e .  that the speaker can distinguish the narrating from the 
narrated and that the speaker can (re )constitute the latter with the former, 
j ointly cause another situation, i .e .  that the speaker can begin to talk about the 
world represented (cf. Rutherford ( 1 970)) . 1 0 Thus, there may be multiple  
causes for one result. I f  so ,  focalizations of  causal because-clauses by 
p articularizers, like the one involved in (28) ,  do not present any problem. 
Such focalizations imply that there are other situations than the one expressed 
in the because-clause, which jointly cause the result expressed in the main 
clause. In (3 1 ) , for example, "his failure" has been caused by not only the 
addressee' s  action but also some other additional factors, but the addressee ' s  
action was the most noteworthy or  the most important. Therefore, not only 
exclusives but also particularizers · may focalize causal because-clauses, 
implying that there are other possible situations that, together with the 
s ituation described in the sentence, cause the one result. 
Third, reasoning because-clauses and since-clauses cannot be focalized 
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by exclusives . The relevant examples are repeated below:  
(3 3 )  a .  * I t  has rained, just because the ground i s  wet. (= (3))  
b .  * He went to college just since his parents asked him to . 
(= ( l a))  
In (3 3 a, b ) ,  the reasoning because-clause and the since-clause are focalized 
by the exclusive just, and the sentences are not acceptable. Since exclusives 
exclude other possibil ities than the one described, using them in front of 
subordinators excludes other reasons than those described. For example, in 
(33 a),  if the sentence were grammatical, the focalization of the 
because-clause by the exclusive just would exclude other reasons to conclude 
that it has rained. However, this is not plausible. As I mentioned in 
section 5 .3 . 3 ,  there may be other reasons to conclude that it has rained, since 
reasoning is merely a process in which the speaker subj ectively connects two 
s ituations that need not have a necessary causal relation in the real world.  
Hence, it is not possible to restrict the reason for the inference only to the one 
expressed. A s imilar explanation holds for the ungrammaticality of (33b  ). 
Therefore, subordinators in the reasoning construction cannot be focalized by 
exclusives . 
Fourthly, and as can be expected, reasoning because-clauses and 
since-clauses may be focalized by particularizers, as exempl ified in (34 ) :  
(34) a. Normally they were mi litary officers, partly because the 
army provided a supply of trained talent, . . .  and mainly 
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because the organization of defence was the crucial part 
of their work. (BNC [ ital ics are mine] ) 
b .  Wearing a different one every time she went out would be 
only natural, particularly since a sari does not have to be 
washed as frequently as a dress . . .  (= (2)) 
In (34a ), the because-clauses are used to express the premises from which to 
draw the conclusion that they were military officers . Those because-clauses 
are focalized by such particularizers as partly and mainly. In (34b ) ,  the 
since-clause is focalized by the particularizer particularly. As I have 
repeatedly mentioned, in reasoning processes, there is no necessary causal 
relation between the two situations described. Rather, the two s ituations 
happen to be related to each other by the speaker. To see this ,  consider 
sentence (24), repeated here as (3 5 ) :  
( 35 )  I t  has rained, because the ground is  wet. (= (24)) 
In this sentence, the situation of the ground being wet happens to be used as 
the premise to conclude that it has rained, but at the same time, there are 
other possible s ituations that may be used as premises from which to draw 
the conclusion (see section 5 .3 .3 ) .  Reasons described in the reasoning 
subordinate clauses are thus chosen from many other possible candidates . 
S ince particularizers highlight one among other examples or cases of the 
same general category, they can focalize the subordinate clause in the 
reasoning construction, without denying other possible reasons . Hence, 
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there is no reason to ban the focal ization of reasoning because-clauses and 
since-clauses by particularizers . 
The above discussion is summarized as follows : 
(36) 
causal constructions 
reasoning constructions 
exclusives 
OK 
* 
particularizers 
OK 
OK 
That is, the following generalization is made about the focalizabi lity of 
because-clauses and since-clauses by focusing adverbs : Causal 
because-clauses can be focalized by both exclusives and particularizers ; 
reasonmg because-clauses and since-clauses can be focalized by 
particularizers, but not by exclusives .  
Given the above generalization, despite the widely accepted view that 
s ince-clauses cannot be focalized by focusing adverbs (e.g. Quirk et al . 
( 1 985 ), Schourup and Waida ( 1 988), Wickboldt ( 1 997)), one may predict 
that there are many examples l ike (34b) in which since-clauses are focalized 
by particularizers . This prediction is borne out: 
(3 7)  a . . . .  since I ' ve just sworn an oath to this effect, it might 
seem pointless to offer further assurances, particularly 
since I can ' t  back them up. (BNC) 
b .  Specifically since you ' re from Midwest City, are you 
aware of any around Interstate 40 between Oklahoma City 
and Midwest City? 
1 42 
( edition.cnn .com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/may/05 l 4 
97 .am.html?eref=sitesearch) 
c .  Measuring biomass in vegetation monitoring 1s  used 
infrequently mostly since it involves some degree of 
destructive sampling. 
(www .nps .gov/plants/restore/pubs/intronatplant/caring.htm) 
d .  Spring i s  general ly a calm, cool and dry season, 
principally since the Atlantic has lost much of its heat 
throughout the autumn and winter. 
( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate _of_ the_ United Kingdom) 
((37a-d) : i tal ics are mine) 
In (37a-d), the since-clauses are focalized by particularly, specifically, mostly, 
and principally, all of which belong to particularizers . These findings are 
not surprising at all under the proposed analysis .  If, as  Schourup and Waida 
( 1 988)  claim, since-clauses conveyed old information and were not focalized, 
how would  the grammaticality of these examples be explained? 1 1  Under the 
proposed analysis, their grammaticality can be explained in the same way as 
that of sentence (34b ), and no problem arises . There are so many examples 
of since-clauses being focalized by focusing adverbs as in (3 7a-d) that we 
may say that the focalized since-clause in (2) (= (34b )) is not exceptional but 
just one example  of a wider phenomenon. 
I conclude this subsection by considering the following attested 
example :  
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(3 8)  Carl ' s  Jr .  has done i t  again . 
I mean, showing us a half-clad, car-washing Paris Hilton was 
one thing, but they may have gone too far this time. 
Especially since, who really cares about Paris Hilton, anyway? 
(www.newsreview. info/section/BLOG08 [ italics are mine] ) 
In this example, the speaker criticizes the content of a commercial for the 
burger restaurant chain Carl ' s  Jr. , whose broadcast was prohibited because of 
the extreme content. The since-clause is focalized by the particularizer 
especially. In addition, the rhetorical question who really cares about Paris 
Hilton occurs in it. Note also that the since-clause in (3 8) no longer 
syntactically subordinates to the main clause, i .e . ,  the since-clause behaves as 
an independent clause, though it stil l  provides the premise from which to 
draw the conclusion that Carl ' s  Jr. may have gone too far. That is, the 
s ince-clause is focalized and asserted as an independent clause at the same 
time. These facts are exactly what is predicted by the proposed analysis ;  
they will be difficult to account for in terms of the previous analyses which 
claim that since-clauses convey old information. Therefore, the proposed 
analysis is both empirically and theoretically more convincing than the 
analysis  based on information structural distinction . 
5.6 Summary 
I have argued (especial ly in section 5 .5 )  that conjunctions used in the 
causal construction may be focused by exclusives and particularizers, while 
those in the reasoning construction can be focalized only by particularizers . 
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This generalization is obtained by considering the characteristics of the 
causal and reasoning constructions (section 5 .3 ; see also chapter 4) and the 
ways focusing adverbs focalize what follows them (section 5 .4 ) . As is clear 
from the discussion in section 5 .2, the status (old vs . new) of information 
conveyed by because- and since-clauses is not relevant to accounting for the 
focal izability of because-clauses and since-clauses . Thus, the validity of  the 
construction grammar analysis of because and since proposed in chapter 4 is 
shown. 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
* The present chapter is a revised and extended version of Kanetani 
(2005 a, to appear) . For helpful comments on the present article, I am 
indebted to Yukio Hirose, Nobuhiro Kaga, Naoaki Wada, and two 
anonymous reviewers for English Linguistics . My deep gratitude goes to 
Patrick Farrel l ,  who has kindly and patiently acted as an informant. 
1 .  Such an information structural distinction has also been observed 
by other researchers (e.g. Poutsma ( 1 904 ) ,  Swan (2005) ,  among others) .  
2 .  Lakoff ( 1 987)  observes that not a l l  kinds of speech act 
constructions can occur inside subordinate clauses : Only speech act 
constructions that convey statements may occur in them. The rhetorical 
question used in (5) ,  who will ever find out, for example, conveys the 
statement no one will find out. 
3 .  The topical ization in the sentence-final because-clause in ( 1 3  b ) ,  
Japanese food, his wife is cooking, conveys a statement l ike his wife is 
cooking Japanese food (see fn .2) . Nevertheless, the sentence is not 
acceptable .  Thus, I have pointed out in chapter 4 that because-clauses 
being in sentence-final position is not a sufficient condition for speech act 
constructions to occur in them, and that the reasoning because-clause, 
which must appear in sentence-final position, provides the sufficient 
condition for speech act constructions to occur therein. 
4. In order to distinguish sentence-final causal because-clauses from 
reasonmg because-clauses, another elaboration 1s  required. In 
Rutherford' s  ( 1 970)  terms, the former are restricted and the latter 
non-restricted .  The difference is particularly important for distinguishing 
a causal relation from a reasoning process for reasons to be mentioned in 
section 5 . 3  . 3  (cf. chapter 4 ) .  
5 .  Haegeman (2002), who mainly focuses o n  interpretations o f  
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conditional if-clauses and the applicabi l ity of topical ization in them, 
presents a similar observation from a generative perspective, usmg 
minimalist terminology (cf. Chomsky ( 1 99 5 )) .  Haegeman distinguishes 
central and peripheral adverbial clauses in terms of the different timings of 
their merger with the main clause, and points out that while the central 
adverbial clause (our because-clause in the causal construction) is part of 
the speech act of the matrix clause, the peripheral adverbial clause (our 
subordinate clause in the reasoning construction) has independent 
i l locutionary force . Haegeman' s  analysis thus supports our view. For 
the purpose of the present discussion, however, detai led internal structures 
of adverbial clauses such as the ones that Haegeman presents in the latter 
part of her paper are, presumably, not necessary . Therefore, I wi l l  not go 
into detai l about the internal syntactic structures .  
6 .  I thank an  anonymous EL reviewer for  call ing my attention to 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002) .  
7 .  B iber et al .  ( 1 999 : 780-78 1 )  do not distinguish exclusives and 
particularizers, integrating them as restrictive adverbial s .  They say that 
"restrictive adverbials [especially and only in ( ia, b)] emphasize that the 
proposition is true in a way which expressly excludes some other 
possibilities [ italics are mine] ."  
( i )  a .  The vi l lagers say j okingly that only a s ick man would 
choose such a remote place to bui ld .  
b .  A heart born especially for me,  Jackie used to tease .  
( ib id . )  
As far as (ia) is  concerned, their observation is true . However, as I have 
argued so far, the adverb especially in (ib) does not exclude other 
possibi l ities than for me, but rather imp lies the presence of some other 
possibilities. In this respect, their observation seems inappropriate. The 
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distinction of exclusives and particularizers (Qurik et al . ( 1 985 ), Huddleston 
and Pullum (2002)) is crucial (especially for the present discussion), and 
therefore, I do not follow B iber et al . '  s ( 1 999) observation . 
8 .  Horn ( 1 969) discusses the semantics of only. He argues that 
"Only X" presupposes the affirmative proposition, P(X), and asserts the 
negative proposition, P(X and no other than X) . A simi lar point is made 
by Huddleston and Pullum (2002 : 5 88) .  At present, I s imply assume that a 
similar explanation holds for other exclusives, because the ways they 
restrict the utterance are al l  the same. 
9. I thank Naoaki Wada for providing me with this example .  
1 0 . Rutherford ( 1 970) provides the following example :  
( i )  He' s not coming to class because he' s s ick and because he 
doesn ' t  l ike school anyway . (Rutherford ( 1 970 : 9 8) )  
This sentence also expresses two causes for one result; h i s  s ickness and his 
school phobia  cause him not to come to class .  
1 1 . The examples of ungrammatical since-clauses given by Schourup 
and Waida ( 1 988 )  are focalized by the exclusives just and simply, as in ( ia, 
b ) .  ( I t  should  also be  noted that Quirk e t  al . ' s  ( 1 9 85 )  and Wickboldt' s 
( 1 997)  examples of unacceptable since-clauses are focalized by the 
exclusive only (with no explanation about the unacceptabi lity) . )  
( i )  a .  He went to college just { because/* s ince } his parents 
asked him to. (= ( l a)) 
b .  Don ' t  expect m e  to marry you s imply { because/* s ince } 
you ' re rich . (= ( l b)) 
(Schourup and Waida ( 1 9 8 8 :95 )) 
As far as these examples are concerned, their observation i s  correct. What 
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I would like to emphasize is that information structural accounts would 
wrongly rule out even grammatical sentences such as (34b ) , (3 7 a-d), and 
(3 8) ;  in this respect, their account is inadequate . 
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Chapter 6 
Constructions of Metalinguistic Reasons* 
6. 1 Introdu ction 
In the previous chapters, I have investigated the causal and reasoning 
uses of because . In addition to these uses, because has a certain 
metalinguistic use, as in ( 1  ) :  
( 1 )  The Blackwell collection was reputed t o  b e  the most valuable 
private collection in the world .  Reputed, because no one 
outside of invited guests was permitted to see it .  
(Hirose ( 1 992 : 82)) 
In the second sentence in ( 1 ), the because-clause expresses the reason why 
the speaker used the word reputed in the preceding sentence. In the present 
chapter, I am concerned with this  kind of metalinguistic use of because. 1 
Little attention has been paid  to this use of because : As far as my 
knowledge goes, Hirose ( 1 992) is  the only one that pays attention to this use 
of because and gives an account of it. Following Hirose, I refer to 
expressions of this kind as the expression-because construction (or the 
E-because construction, for short) . 
As Hirose points out, the E-because construction in ( 1 )  i s  semantically 
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equivalent to sentence (2) : 
(2) I say "reputed," because no one outside of invited guests was 
permitted to see it. 
The main clause of this sentence is a finite clause, while that of ( 1 )  is only the 
expression used in the preceding sentence .2 In order to distinguish 
constructions l ike (2) from the E-because construction, I call them the I say E 
because construction (or the I SE-because construction, for short) . 
In the present chapter, I discuss how the properties of these 
metalinguistic reason constructions can be accounted for in the construction 
grammar framework. In chapter 4, I have proposed a construction grammar 
approach to the conjunction because, and postulated the causal construction 
and the reasoning because construction, as exemplified in (3a, b ) ,  
respectively : 
(3 )  a. 
b. 
Sam is  not coming to class because he' s  sick. 
Sam is  not coming to class, because he j ust called from 
San Diego. 
(adapted from Rutherford ( 1 970 : 95 )) 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 observes general 
properties of the metalinguistic reason constructions. Section 6.3 compares 
them with the causal construction and the reasoning construction, and points 
out three questions that emerge in the course of the comparison. Sections 
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6 .4 through 6 .6  answer these questions . Section 6 . 7  observes another type 
of metalinguistic reason construction . Section 6 . 8  describes in terms of 
inheritance links how the constructions at issue are related to each other. 
Section 6 .9 summarizes the arguments, followed by an appendix that 
presents a possible alternative to an analysis to be proposed in section 6 .6 .  
6 .2  Facts on  the Metalinguistic Reason Constructions 
In this subsection, I observe properties of the E-because!ISE-because 
constructions .3 First, their because-clauses do not appear in sentence-initial 
position. Consider the following examples : 
( 4) a. * B lackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable 
private collection in the world. Because no one outside 
of the invited guests was permitted to see it, Reputed. 
b .  * B lackwell collection was reputed to be  the most valuable 
private collection in  the world.  Because no one outsi de 
of the invited guests was permitted to see it, I say reputed. 
(cf. ( 1  )-(2)) 
As Hirose ( 1 99 1 )  observes, sentence-initial because-clauses generally 
express the reason that is  presupposed (see chapter 4) .  In the 
E-because/ISE-because constructions, the reason cannot be presupposed. 
More accurately, the reason must be asserted, because these constructions 
express the reason why the speaker used a certain expression in the preceding 
context. Therefore, it is natural that sentence-initial because-clauses are not 
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used in these constructions . 
Second, as Hirose ( 1 992) observes, the because-clause in the 
E-because construction can be nominalized into because of NP, as 
exemplified in (5 ) :  
(5 )  Talking about verbal defensiveness has proven to be a 
particularly effective way of making linguists defensive : 
"defensive" because of wide-scale disagreement concerning 
the validity of speech act interpretations which must be 
necessarily be highly context dependent, intuitive, and, in 
addition, must confront the controversial problem of discerning 
a speaker' s  intention. (Hirose ( 1 992 : 85 )) 
In this example, the reason why the speaker used the word defensive i s  
expressed by the nominalized because-clause, i . e .  because of wide-scale 
disagreement. Likewise, the because-clause of the !SE-because 
construction may be nominalized, as exemplified in (6) : 
( 6) This i s  an historic session for a number of reasons. This i s  the 
26th special session in our special state' s  special history . . . .  
And, finally, I say historic because of the subj ects at hand. 
(mt.gov/racicot/spch/SpecSess99 .htm) 
Third, the because-clause of the !SE-because construction and the 
E-because construction can be focalized by exclusives, as exemplified in (7) :  
1 53 
(7) a .  F igure 2 shows the theoretical response of the filter. I 
say "theoretical", simply because it is unrealistic to 
expect any signal to be over 200dB down from the 
passband level . (sound.westhost.com/proj ect99 .htm) 
b .  F igure 2 shows the theoretical response of the filter. 
"Theoretical", simply because it is unrealistic to expect 
any signal to be over 200dB down from the passband 
level . 
In (7a, b ) , the because-clause is focalized by simply, which belongs to 
exclusives . Exclusives other than simply involve just, only, precisely, and 
the l ike (Quirk et al . ( 1 98 5  : 604 ) ;  for details, see chapter 5 ) .  
Fourth, speech act constructions that convey statements (cf. Lakoff 
( 1 987)) can occur in the because-clause of the !SE-because construction and 
the E-because construction, as shown in (8a, b ) : 
(8 )  a. . . .  they serve for lunch the surprisingly delicious 
cucumber salad. I say surprisingly, because who would 
think one could tum the big, fat American (instead of the 
sl im, English variety) into anything one would want a lot 
more of. 
(www . sfexaminer.com/templates/print .cfm?storyname=O 
1 0704e _tower) 
b .  Surprisingly, because who would think one could tum the 
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big, fat American (instead of the sl im, English variety) 
into anything one would want a lot more of. 
In (8a) ,  the rhetorical question, a kind of speech act construction, appears in 
the because-clause of the I SE-because construction . As shown in (8b ), such 
speech act constructions may also occur in the because-clause of the 
£-because construction. 
The observations so far suggests that the £-because construction and 
the ISE-because construction behave alike. However, there is  a difference 
between them, as well .  The because-clause of the !SE-because construction 
can be clefted, as in (9a, b ), whereas that of the E-because construction 
cannot, as exemplified in ( 1  Oa, b ) : 4  
(9 )  a .  . . . It is  because of  this "gripping," this  "holding onto," 
that I say "behold ! "  
(www .toltec-foundation.org/extracts/qfm .pdf) 
b. I currently l ive in Hanover Pennsylvania and why I say 
currently is because I have l ived in 5 different places 
around the US mostly on the east coast though. 
(students .juniata .edu/mclelnm2/) 
( 1 0) a. * . .  . It is because of this "gripping," this  "holding onto,"  
that "behold ! "  (cf. (9a)) 
b. * I currently l ive m Hanover Pennsylvania and why 
currently is because I have lived in 5 different places 
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around the US mostly on the east coast though. (cf. (9b)) 
Thus, the properties of the E-because construction and the 
!SE-because construction may be summarized as follows : 
( 1 1 )  a.  
b .  
c .  
d .  
e .  
Sentence-initial because-clauses are not al lowed. 
The because-clause is nominalized into because of NP. 
The because-clause can be focalized by exclusives . 
Speech act constructions can occur in the because-clause. 
The because-clause of the !SE-because construction can 
be clefted, while that of the E-because construction 
cannot. 
In the following subsection, I will review the properties of the causal and 
reasoning constructions and compare them with those of the metalinguistic 
reason constructions . 
6.3 Comparison with the Causal and Reasoning Constructions 
In the previous subsection, I have observed the behaviors of the 
E-because/ISE-because constructions . In this subsection, I compare them 
with those of the causal construction and the reasoning because construction, 
reviewing the arguments in chapters 4 and 5 .  From the comparison, some 
problems arise .  I will  point them out in section 6 . 3  .2 .  
6.3.1 The Causal Construction and the Reasoning Construction 
The causal construction and the reasoning because construction are 
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exemplified by sentences (3a, b), respectively, repeated here as ( 1 2a, b) : 
( 1 2) a .  Sam is not coming to class because he' s  sick. (= (3a)) 
b .  Sam is  not coming to class,  because he  just called from 
San Diego. (= (3b)) 
Sentence ( 1 2a) describes the causal relation between Sam' s  being sick and 
his not coming to class .  Sentence (l 2b) describes the speaker' s reasoning 
process in which he draws the conclusion that Sam is not coming to class 
from the premise that he just called from San Diego . As I have argued in 
chapter 4,  in the causal construction, the main clause and the because-clause 
are understood as forming one information unit as a whole, while in the 
reasoning construction, they are understood as forming separate information 
units . To see this, consider the following interrogative sentences : 
( 1 3 ) a. 
b. 
Is the ground wet because it has rainedV 
Has it rainedfeause the ground is  w� 
Sentence ( l  3 a) is  an instance of the causal construction, in which a rising 
intonation is  used at the end of the sentence. Sentence ( 1 3 b) is an instance 
of the reasoning construction, where a rising intonation is used at the end of 
its main clause; its because-clause is read in a falling intonation . This 
different intonation pattern suggests that sentence ( 1 3 a) performs one speech 
act of question as a whole, while sentence ( 1 3b) performs two speech acts, i . e .  
the speech act of question in the main clause and the speech act of the 
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statement in the because-clause. I have argued in chapters 4 and 5 that a lot 
of phenomena may be accounted for by the different constructional 
properties . 
First, causal because-clauses may be nominal ized into because of 
{NP /Gerund} ,  while reasoning because-clauses may not (cf. Rutherford 
( 1 970)) .  Observe the following sentences : 
( 1 4) a. He' s  not coming to class because of (his) s ickness .  
b .  * He' s not coming t o  class, because o f  his having j ust called 
from San Diego. (Rutherford ( 1 970 :  1 05 )) 
If because-clauses are nominalized, as m ( l 4a, b ), they may no longer 
perform speech acts on their own. As a result, such nominalized 
because-clauses are regarded as merely a part, or a constituent, of larger 
speech act. Hence, the nominal ization of a because-clause is  incompatible 
with the reasoning because construction, whereas it is compatible with the 
causal because construction. 
Second, as argued in chapter 5, causal because-clauses can be 
focalized by an exclusive, as in (l  S a) ,  whi le reasoning because-clauses 
cannot, as in ( l 5b) : 
( 1 5 ) a. He went to college simply because his parents asked him 
to. (Schourup and Waida ( 1 98 8 : 95 )) 
b .  * I t  has rained, just because the ground i s  wet .  
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Since it is  the speaker that relates two situations expressed in the main clause 
and the because-clause in a reasoning process, even if one says, "it has rained, 
because the ground is wet," logically, the cause of the wet ground does not 
have to be the rain. In other words, it may not have rained, and even if it 
has, there need not be a necessary causal relation between the rain and the 
wet ground .  Besides, there may be other possible reasons for the speaker to 
conclude that it has rained, say, to see a rainbow in the sky, to see someone 
get home wet, to hear the news about the rain, etc. Therefore, reasoning 
because-clauses may not be focalized by an exclusive that excludes other 
possible reasons.  
Third, speech act constructions that convey statements, e .g.  
topicalizations, rhetorical questions, etc . ,  may appear m reasonmg 
because-clauses, but not in causal because-clauses (cf. Hooper and 
Thompson ( 1 973), Lakoff ( 1 987)) . Consider the following sentences :  
( 1 6) a .  * He' s  not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his 
wife is  cooking. 
(cf. He' s  not going out for dinner because his wife is cooking 
Japanese food. (Hooper and Thompson ( 1 973  :494))) 
b. I think we have more or less solved the problem for 
donkeys here, because those we haven' t  got, we know 
about. (Guardian [ online]) 
In ( l 6 a  ) ,  the topicalization in the because-clause is  not allowed. As the 
parenthesized original sentence shows, the because-clause is inside the scope 
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of the matrix negation. This means that sentence ( 1 6a) is an instance of the 
causal construction (cf. Rutherford ( 1 970)) . As in ( 1 6b), topicalization may 
occur in reasoning because-clauses . In the causal construction, the 
because-clause and its main clause need to be understood as a single process, 
and therefore perform one speech act as a whole. In the reasoning because 
construction, the because-clause and its main clause perform two speech acts 
independent of each other . As the very name suggests, "speech act" 
constructions perform speech acts on their own. Thus, because-clauses in 
which a speech act construction appears perform speech acts independent of 
the main clauses.  Hence, speech act constructions are compatible with 
reasonmg because-clauses, whereas they cannot occur m causal 
because-clauses . 
Lastly, causal because-clauses can be clefted, whereas reasoning ones 
cannot (Nakau ( 1 994)) .  Compare the following examples : 
( 1 7) a .  It ' s  because he ' s  sick that he' s  not coming to class .  
b .  * It' s  because h i s  wife told me that he' s  not coming to  
class .  
(Nakau ( 1 994 : 1 62))  
In ( l  7a) ,  the causal because-clause is clefted. In contrast, the 
unacceptability of sentence ( 1 7b) indicates that clefting a reasonmg 
because-clause yields an unacceptable sentence. In the reasonmg 
construction, the main clause and subordinate clause form separate 
information units, and each should be asserted independently . However, 
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clefting reasoning because-clauses results in the backgrounded main clause, 
because the element in the that-clause of cleft constructions is understood as 
being backgrounded. Thus, reasoning because-clauses may not be clefted. 
A causal because-clause, on the other hand, may be clefted, as in ( l  7a) ,  
because it is  merely a part of larger infonnation unit. 
6.3.2 Comparison 
From the observations so far, we may say that the 
E-because!ISE-because constructions are similar to the causal construction in 
terms of the nominalization of the because-clause and its focalization by 
exclusives (cf. ( 1 1 b, c )) .  Indeed, the E-because!ISE-because constructions 
convey a causal meaning, rather than a reasoning one, i .e . ,  they express the 
reason why the speaker used a certain expression in the preceding context. 
Then, the main clause and the subordinate clause of these constructions 
should be understood as forming one information unit as a whole. In this 
connection, H irose ( 1 992) argues that the main clause of the E-because 
construction, as a word or phrase that is contextually presupposed, cannot 
perform a speech act on its own: The construction performs one speech act 
as a whole. I assume that the !SE-because construction, as being 
semantically synonymous with the E-because construction (see fn.3 ), forms 
its information unit in the same way.  Then, their s imilarities to  the causal 
construction may straightforwardly be accounted for. 
If, as argued above, the metalinguistic reason constructions are similar 
to the causal construction, the following two questions arise :  ( i )  Why can 
the because-clause of the E-because construction not be clefted (cf. ( 1 1  e) )? 
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(i i) Why can speech act constructions occur in the because-clause of the 
metalinguistic reason constructions (cf. ( 1 1  d) )? In addition, we need to 
consider whether there are any functional differences between the E-because 
construction and the !SE-because construction. In sections 6 .4 through 6 .6 ,  
I wil l  give answers to these questions . 
6 .4  Reason fo r  the Because-Clause Not Being Clefted 
Let us first consider why the because-clause of the E-because 
construction cannot be clefted. The relevant examples are repeated below: 
( 1 8) a .  * . . .  It is  because of this "gripping," this  "holding onto," 
that "behold ! "  (= ( 1  Oa)) 
b. * I currently l ive m Hanover Pennsylvania and why 
currently is because I have l ived in 5 different places 
around the US mostly on the east coast though. ( = ( I  Ob)) 
S ince this  is  an opposite behavior to the causal construction, one may be 
skeptical of viewing the E-because construction as being similar to the causal 
construction. However, j ust because these cleft constructions are not 
acceptable does not necessarily mean that the E-because construction i s  not 
s imilar to the causal construction. The unacceptability of sentences ( l 8a, 
b) is simply due to the unusual syntactic form of the E-because construction, 
not due to its semantic/pragmatic factors. That is ,  the complementizers that 
and why used in the above examples must be followed by a finite clause, not 
a word or phrase.5 Nevertheless, in ( l  8a, b ) , the simple words behold and 
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currently follow that and why, respectively . Hence, the sentences are not 
acceptable. As observed in section 6 .2, the because-clause of the 
corresponding !SE-because construction can be clefted with no problem (e.g. 
(9a, b )) .  This is because that and why are correctly followed by finite 
clauses . Thus, unacceptable E-because constructions with clefted 
because-clauses (e.g. ( l 8a, b)) are not problematic for asserting the s imilarity 
between the E-because construction and the causal construction . 
What is problematic is the second issue, i .e .  why speech act 
constructions may occur in the because-clause of the E-because!ISE-because 
constructions .  Before answering this question, I wil l  investigate in the 
following subsection what, if any, difference exists between the E-because 
construction and the ISE-because construction . 
6.5 The E-Because Construction and the ISE-Because Construction 
So far, I have treated the E-because construction and the ISE-because 
construction as semantic equivalents, and ignored the difference between 
them even if there is any. It is generally assumed in construction grammar 
that if two constructions are syntactically distinct, their (semantic/pragmatic) 
functions are also distinct, and each construction is considered as existing 
independently (cf. Bolinger ( 1 977), Haiman ( 1 9 85) ,  Lakoff ( 1 987), Goldberg 
( 1 995)) .  Thus, the question is not whether a difference exists between th�m 
- for it does - but rather, what it is like. 
Despite being semantically synonymous, the E-because construction is 
more restricted in its use than the corresponding !SE-because construction. 
Compare the following examples : 
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( 1 9) a. Unfortunately, a person in some cases can be HIV 
positive for several years without having AIDS.  ( I  say) 
unfortunately only because those diseases that are readily 
visible get treatment quicker. 
b .  Unfortunately, perhaps, a person in  some cases can be  
HIV positive for several years without having AIDS .  
When they finally get AIDS they are often able to work 
for some time, and with treatment live a fairly normal life 
for several years . * (I say) unfortunately only because 
those diseases that are readily visible get treatment 
quicker. ( enzi . senate.gov/aidsaf2.htm) 
In ( l  9a) ,  both the E-because construction and the !SE-because construction 
may be used, whereas in ( l 9b ), only the I SE-because construction can be 
used. Crucially, in ( l  9a),  the speaker expresses the reason why he used the 
word unfortunately right after the word is used, while in ( 1 9b ), because of the 
intervened sentence, there is a considerable distance between the use of the 
word and the expression of its reason. From this, I tentatively assume that 
the E-because construction can be used right after the expression in question 
is used. 
In this connection, consider the following quote from Lambrecht 
( 1 994 :93 ) :  
In order for  an addressee to  be  able to  process the presupposition 
evoked by an utterance it is not only necessary that she be aware of 
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the relevant set of presupposed propositions but that she have easy 
access to these propositions and to the elements of which they are 
composed. 
Along with this line, we may say that even though the expression in question 
is presupposed, the speaker needs to activate it in the hearer' s  mind if it is 
assumed not to be active. It seems plausible to assume that the phrase I say 
in the !SE-because construction contributes to this activation, since the only 
formal difference between the two constructions is the presence or absence of 
this phrase. By saying I say E, the activation may occur in the following 
way : The speaker reasserts that he has used the expression E in the 
preceding sentence, and accordingly, it is activated in the hearer' s mind. 
Thus, when the speaker needs to activate the expression in the hearer' s mind, 
as in ( 1 9b ),  the E-because construction cannot be used. By contrast, when 
such activation is not necessary, as in ( 1 9a) ,  either construction may be used . 
In sum, although the E-because construction and the !SE-because 
construction convey the same meaning, the former can be used only when the 
expression E is assumed to be active enough in the hearer' s  mind. In terms 
of inheritance l inks ,  a subpart l ink (S-l ink) is posited between them, as 
i llustrated in (20) : 
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(20) ISE-Because Construction 
Sem: "P 1 is a cause of my saying E" 
I 
Syn : I say E because C 1 t S-l ink 
E-Because Construction 
Sem:  "P 1 is a cause of my saying E" 
Syn: I E because C 1 
I 
I-S . :  active i n  the hearer' s  mind 
S ince, as mentioned in section 6 .3 .2 ,  these constructions express some kind 
of causal relation, their semantic specifications are defined as "P(roposition) 1 
is  a cause of my saying E."6 As discussed in section 3 .3 .2,  an S-l ink is 
posited when one construction is a proper subpart of another construction 
(Goldberg ( 1 995  : 78 )) .  As represented in (20), while sharing the semantic 
properties with the !SE-because construction, the E-because construction, 
having the more marked form, is more restricted in its use. 7 That is, the 
syntactic and information-structural specifications of the E-because 
construction are subsumed under those of the !SE-because construction. By 
viewing the E-because construction as a proper subpart of the ISE-because 
construction, we may safely say that what holds in the latter also holds in the 
former (as far as information-structural and syntactic  conditions are met) . 
6.6 Reason for the Occurrence of Speech Act Constructions in the 
Because-Clause 
This subsection gives an answer to the last question raised in section 
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6 .3 .2 ,  i .e .  why speech act constructions may occur in metalinguistic reason 
because-clauses . As I have discussed in chapter 4, the occurrence of speech 
act constructions in a because-clause reflects the fact that the because-clause 
and its main clause form two separate information units, and hence is 
characteristic to the reasoning construction. By contrast, the nominal ization, 
focalization, and clefting of a because-clause are all accounted for by the fact 
that the because-clause and its main clause form one information unit as a 
whole .  Thus, the question to be answered in this subsection may be 
rephrased as follows : Why do the E-because construction and the 
ISE-because construction have such bilateral, or contradictory, 
characteristics? 
In order to answer the question, we need to revise the information 
structure of the metalinguistic constructions, taking into consideration the 
nature of metalinguistic reasons and metacognition in general ( i .e .  cognition 
about cognition). Using metalinguistic reason constructions like the 
E-because!ISE-because constructions, one connects the content being 
d iscussed with a proper l inguistic form available within the context of the 
speech for referring to that content (cf. Dancygier and Sweetser (2000)). 
The mapping of the content onto the linguistic form i s  not an obj ective causal 
relation such as the one observed in a sentence l ike the ground is wet because 
it has rained, but rather a subj ective process, in which the speaker chooses a 
particular l inguistic form from a possible set of linguistic forms . This 
process may be i llustrated as follows : 
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(2 1 )  "content" { l inguistic forms I F i ,  F1, F3, . . .  Fn } 
mapping _I 
In (2 1 ) ,  the speaker connects the content being discussed with linguistic form 
F i ,  an element of the set defined as { linguistic forms I F 1 ,  F 2, F 3, . . . F n } .  
Here, it is the speaker that relates the l inguistic form with its content. 
Therefore, like a reasoning process, the reason for the choice of the word is 
does not have any necessary causal relation in the real world. As I have 
argued in chapter 4, in such a case, the main clause and the subordinate 
clause are understood as forming separate information units . Then, it 
follows that speech act constructions may occur in the because-clause of the 
E-because/ISE-because constructions . 
However, considering the nature of metacognition in general, we may 
say that expressing metalinguistic reasons is  somewhat more "obj ective" in a 
sense to be discussed below. Metacognition is  a second or higher level of 
cognitive process, i . e . a level of cognition which enables the speaker (which 
may be called ' metacognitive agent' )  to monitor, control, and/or regulate his 
cognitive processes (cf. Flavell ( 1 97 1 ), Brown ( 1 978)) .  That is ,  the speaker 
(as a metacognitive agent) sees himself mapping the content onto a certain 
l inguistic form as if another person saw him doing it. This is i l lustrated in 
(22) : 
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(22) I speaker (as the 'metacognitive agent ' )! 
monitor/ control/regulate 
�, 
speaker (as the user of the expression) 
"content" { l inguistic forms I F i ,  F2, F3 . . .  , Fn } _I ma pp mg 
Although the mapping process, which occurs inside the speaker' s  mind, i s  
arbitrary and there is no  necessary causal relation, the higher-leveled speaker 
obj ectively monitors the mapping as if he saw it happening outside of him. 
Thus, postulating the two levels of speakers accounts for the bilateral 
characteristics of the E-because/lSE-because constructions . That is, which 
characteristic the construction shows depends on which viewpoint of the 
two-tiered speaker is taken : The viewpoint of the speaker that subj ectively 
connects the content and a certain linguistic form based on his knowledge; 
the viewpoint of the speaker that obj ectively monitors this mapping process . 8 
It is worthwhile considering what part of the metalinguistic reason 
construction allows such two types of speakers to exist. In order to answer 
this question, Langacker' s  ( 1 98 5 ,  1 997) argument about performative 
sentences is helpful (cf. Austin ( 1 962)  ). Langacker claims that in 
performative sentences l ike the one exemplified in (23 ) ,  both the speech 
event and the participants involved therein are obj ectified. 
(23) I say to you that this wasteful government spending must stop ! 
(Langacker ( 1 98 5 :  1 3 1 )) 
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In (23 ), the very utterance of the sentence accomplishes the speech act of 
statement. Langacker observes that in performative sentences, the speech 
act itself is placed on stage as the focus of interest, and the speaker I, a 
participant of the speech event, is also an object of conceptualization. That 
is ,  the speaker is obj ectively seen l ike an actor in a play on stage. Thus, 
performative clauses, e .g .  I say to you in (23), make the speaker (normally a 
subj ectively construed entity) go on stage, i .e .  obj ectified. 
Turning to the !SE-because construction, we may say by analogy with 
Langacker' s  observation of performative sentences that the speaker 
objectifies his use of the word by saying I say E; accordingly, the speaker, as 
a participant of the obj ectified speech event, is also seen as an objective 
entity. 9 As a result, the speaker can see himself as if another person saw 
him. Therefore, the phrase I say in the !SE-because construction does not 
only reassert that he has used the expression in question but also obj ectifies 
the speech act of reassertion and the speaker himself. 
Lastly, in order to account for the bilateral characteristics of the 
E-because construction, recall the argument in the previous subsection. I 
have argued that what holds in the !SE-because construction also holds in the 
E-because construction, s ince the latter is a proper subpart of the former. 
Therefore, even with no trigger of the objectification such as I say, the 
E-because construction, l ike the corresponding !SE-because construction, 
has the bilateral characteristics . That is, there exist two types of speakers ' 
viewpoints in the E-because construction as wel l : One that subj ectively 
connects the content and a certain l inguistic form, and the other that 
obj ectively monitors the mapping process . 
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6.  7 Another Type of Metalinguistic Reason Construction 
Hirose ( 1 992) points out that the speaker of the £-because construction 
is not necessarily identical with the speaker of the expression in question, as 
exemplified in (24 ) :  
(24) Their [Ross and Lakoff s] famous example was "Floyd broke 
the glass", of which they said the deep structure was "It 
happened that Floyd did Floyd caused that the glass became 
broken."  "Did" because all action verbs have embedded in 
them the verb "do". (Hirose ( 1 992 : 83  f. )) 
In this example, it is Ross and Lakoff that has used the word did, not the 
speaker of the sentence. Thus, the E-because construction in (24) 
corresponds to a sentence like the following: 
(25)  They say "did" because all action verbs have embedded m 
them the verb "do". 
S entence (25 )  i s  not an instance of the !SE-because construction, as the 
subj ect of the main clause is not I. I call a sentence l ike this  the 
XSE-because construction, in which X is a variab le .  In the XSE-because 
construction and its E-because counterpart, the speaker of the sentence sees 
others ( i .e .  the speaker of the word) mapping the content onto a certain 
linguistic form. In accordance with the convention used in (22), this 
process in sentences (24) and (25) ,  for example, may be represented as 
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follows : 
(26) I speaker of the sentence : I I 
observe 
speaker of the word : Ross and Lakojf 
"content" { l inguistic forms I did, F2, f3 . . .  , Fn } 
I mapping 
As il lustrated above, the speaker of the sentence merely sees Ross and Lakoff 
connecting the content with the l inguistic form did. 
Recall that in the !SE-because construction, the higher-leveled speaker 
is the same person as the lower-leveled speaker (cf. (22)), which accounts for 
i ts b ilateral characteristics .  Thus, the speaker of the !SE-because 
construction monitors, controls, and/or regulates his own use of the word, 
whereas the speaker of the XSE-because construction merely observes 
another person 's use of the word. This difference poses a question of 
whether the XSE-because construction and the corresponding E-because 
construction, unlike the !SE-because construction and its E-because 
counterpart, cannot express a subj ective mapping process .  
The answer, quite obviously, is that it can .  Observe the following 
sentence : 
(27) They were all saymg "no way". (They said) "no way" 
because who in their right mind would do such a thing ! l O, 1 1  
1 72 
In this sentence, the rhetorical question, a kind of speech act construction 
conveying a statement, appears in the because-clause. As noted above, this 
may not be predictable. However, the construction grammar analysis,  in 
particular the notion of inheritance links, provides the solution to this 
problem. That is ,  considering the relations among constructions may 
account for what is not predictable from the constituents of a construction or 
the construction itself. In the following subsection, I will describe how the 
constructions at issue are related to each other while explaining why sentence 
(27) is acceptable .  
6.8 Relations a mong Constructions 
From the arguments so far, the inheritance relations between the 
relevant constructions may be i l lustrated as follows : 
(28)  j causal construction 
i I- link 
jxsE-because construction f-, 
I-link 
ISE-because construction 
S-link 
I £-because construction ! <E--
S-l ink 
First, as argued in section 6 . 5 ,  the E-because construction is a proper subpart 
of the !SE-because construction, and thus an S-l ink is posited between them. 
I have argued in section 6 .6  that the !SE-because construction by nature may 
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represent both the speaker' s  subj ective mapping process and the objective 
causal relation. Such bilateral characteristics are inherited by the 
corresponding E-because construction, as being a proper subpart. Seeing 
the E-because construction as being a proper subpart of the !SE-because 
construction may not only account for their similarities but also their 
differences : As argued in section 6 . 5 ,  the E-because construction, with the 
more marked grammatical form, is more restricted in its use than the 
corresponding !SE-because construction . 
Second, as discussed in section 6 .7,  some E-because constructions (e.g. 
(24 ), (27)) are related to the XSE-because construction, not to the 
!SE-because construction, via an S-link.  These E-because constructions 
have all the properties that the corresponding XSE-because constructions 
have. 
Third, the ! SE-because construction 1s a special instance of the 
XSE-because construction. That is, the former can be seen as the variab le 
X in the latter being substituted for the first person s ingular pronoun I. 
Hence, an I-link is  posited between them. The XSE-because construction, 
in tum, is  an instance of the causal construction, whose main clause is 
substituted for the specific clause "X say E," and thus an I-l ink is posited 
between them. By positing I-links in this way, the causal sense of the 
XSE-because/ISE-because constructions may be accounted for. 
Seeing the inheritance relations described in (28) ,  one may wonder 
how we can account for the speech act constructions occurring in the 
because-clause of the XSE-because construction . If i t  i s  merely an instance 
of the causal construction, it predicts that speech act constructions may not 
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occur m the because-clause. Crucially, positing an I-link between the 
XSE-because construction and the !SE-because construction entails that the 
former is viewed as a proper subpart of the latter. Goldberg ( 1 995 : 80f.) 
argues that an I-link always entails an inverse S-link in the way that every 
construction C i ,  which is an instance of another construction C2 and is 
dominated by C2 via an I-link, simultaneously, dominates C2 by an S-link . 1 2 
That is ,  the XSE-because construction and the !SE-because construction 
mutually motivate each other, and therefore the former inherits its 
information from the latter as wel l .  
More specifically, the !SE-because construction has the following 
three properties, of which the XSE-because construction has the first two but 
not the last one : (i) It represents the objective causal relation (when the 
higher-leveled speaker' s  v iewpoint is  taken), (i i) it also expresses the 
subj ective mapping of the content and the l inguistic form (when the 
lower-leveled speaker' s  viewpoint is taken), and (iii) the lower-leveled 
speaker is  identical with the higher-leveled speaker. In short, the 
XSE-because construction is subsumed within the !SE-because construction, 
and what holds in the !SE-because construction also holds m the 
XSE-because construction. Hence, the bilateral characteristics of the 
XSE-because construction . 
Incidentally, it follows that the causal construction is a proper subpart 
of the XSE-because construction, because the latter is an instance of the 
former. The causal construction has only the first one of the three 
properties  that the !SE-because construction has . 
1 75 
6.9 Summary 
In this chapter, following the comparison of the metalinguistic reason 
constructions with the causal and reasoning constructions, I have mainly 
argued three issues . First, the E-because construction, with a marked 
grammatical form, is more restricted than the corresponding !SE-because 
construction in its use. The former can be used only when the word in 
question is assumed to be active in the hearer' s mind, while the latter does 
not have such a restriction . The pragmatic difference is captured by 
postulat ing an S-link between them. That is, the E-because construction is 
subsumed under the ISE-because construction both formally and 
information-structurally. 
Second, the metalinguistic reason constructions have bilateral 
characteristics, i . e . ,  they behave as if they form one information unit as a 
whole in some respect, while they also behave as if they consist of two 
different information units . However, j ust because they behave like the 
reasoning construction in some respect does not mean that they inherit 
information from the reasoning construction. Considering their meanings, I 
conclude that metalinguistic reason constructions are related only with the 
causal construction (section 6 .5 ) . 1 3  As for the ISE-because construction, its 
bilateral characteristics are accounted for by postulating two levels of 
speakers ' viewpoints ( i .e .  either the viewpoint of the user of the expression in 
question or the viewpoint of the metacognitive agent) . The nature of 
metalinguistic reasons and the phrase I say in the main clause j ointly make it 
possib le to postulate such two types of speakers' v iewpoints . As for the 
E-because construction, viewing it as a proper subpart of the ISE-because 
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construction, we may account for the fact that the E-because construction 
also has the bilateral characteristics, just like the !SE-because construction . 
Lastly, like the E-because/ISE-because constructions, the 
XSE-because construction and its E-because counterpart also have the 
bilateral characteristics . This fact is not predictable from the constructions 
themselves .  The notion of inheritance links provides a solution to the 
problem. Seeing the !SE-because construction as an instance of the 
XSE-because construction, and thus positing an I-link between them entails 
the inverse S-link. That is, the XSE-because construction is a proper 
subpart of the !SE-because construction (section 6 .8 ) .  Therefore, the 
XSE-because construction, as a proper subpart of the !SE-because 
construction, has such bilateral characteristics as the !SE-because 
construction has . 
The arguments m this  chapter show that considering how a 
construction is  related with its neighbors may even explain its unpredictable 
behaviors, e.g. the b ilateral characteristics of the E-because construction and 
the XSE-because construction . This suggests that constructions exist in 
relation with other constructions, with their information being transferred 
between them, rather than stand alone. I thus conclude this chapter by 
pointing out that the notion of inheritance links plays a particularly important 
role in understanding constructions . 
Appendix B:  A Possible Alternative 
In section 6 .6 ,  I have accounted for the bilateral characteristics of the 
metalinguistic reason constructions by postulating two types of speakers ' 
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viewpoints . A possible alternative to the analysis  may be given by 
comparing the metal inguistic reason constructions with sentences like the 
one exemplified in (29) : 1 4 
(29) My father l ikes animals, but he doesn' t  like dogs so much. 
Perhaps it is because he got bitten by a dog when he was a 
little boy. 
(Sawada (2004 : 1 79)  [ italics are mine] ) 
Note that the italicized sentence in (29) (which I call the it is because 
construction) is distinguished from the cleft construction, since the sentence 
is not followed by a that-clause.  Sawada argues that it  is because 
constructions are most naturally used when certain skepticism emerges from 
the preceding context. In (29), for example, the hearer may as well wonder 
why the speaker' s  father does not l ike dogs . The italicized sentence gives 
an answer to this question. Because of this  function, while expressing a 
causal relation (not a reasoning process), the it is because construction only 
asserts what the cause s ituation is .  The result s ituation is  presupposed by 
the preceding sentence and it is not explicitly mentioned. In other words, 
the it is because construction is used to identify the cause .  To this extent, 
the construction is s imilar to the metalinguistic reason constructions which 
only assert the reasons why the speaker used a certain expression in the 
preceding sentence with backgrounding the speech event itself. 1 5  
Interestingly, the because-clause of  the it is because construction, 
despite being a causal one, allows speech act constructions to occur in it, as 
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exemplified in (30) : 
(30)  I t  is rare that an individual with highly specialised knowledge 
can communicate it to a general audience . If Susan 
Greenfield [=Director of the Royal Institution] is a ubiquitous 
media figure it 's because not only does she talk about the brain 
so clearly but she also passes on some of the excitement of 
working with scientific ideas . 
( www . bri tishcouncil . org/ sci ence-testim onials-baroness-greenfi 
eld.htm [ italics are mine]) 
In the second sentence of the above example, the negative constituent 
preposing, a kind of speech act construction of statement, occurs in the 
because-clause. As discussed above, the it is because construction merely 
gives an answer to the skepticism that naturally emerges from the preceding 
context: Why is Susan Greenfield a ubiquitous media figure despite a 
person with highly specialised knowledge? That is ,  the it is because 
construction may be analyzed as having a semantically (or pragmatically) 
independent clause structure despite its syntact ically subordinate structure (cf. 
Culicover and Jackendoff ( 1 997), Yuasa (2005), etc . ) .  
If, as  speculated here,· the metalinguistic reason constructions are 
s imilar to the it is because construction, the occurrence of speech act 
constructions in the because-clause will not be surprising. The relevant 
examples are repeated below: 
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(3 1 )  a .  (I say) surprisingly, because who would think one could 
tum the big, fat American (instead of the slim, English 
variety) into anything one would want a lot more of. 
(cf. ( 8 a, b)) 
b. They were all saying "no way". (They said) "no way" 
because who in their right mind would do such a thing ! 
(= (27)) 
As I have observed in sections 6 .2 and 6 .  7,  speech act constructions may 
occur in the because-clause of the E-because!ISE-because!XSE-because 
constructions. These constructions express the reason why the speaker used 
a certain expression (i .e .  surprisingly and no way) in the preceding context. 
Suppose that these constructions, l ike the it is because construction, have 
semantically/pragmatically independent clause structures,  while they have 
syntactically subordinate structures . Then, the occurrence of speech act 
constructions in their because-clauses may be accounted for in the same way 
as the it is because construction. 
In order to verify this analysis, a more detailed research on the 
syntactic and semantic  structures of the relevant constructions is necessary, 
but I cannot present it in this thesis .  As a theoretical problem, it is not clear 
what kind of relation may be described in terms of inheritance links between 
the it is because construction and the metalinguistic reason constructions 
(even if metalinguistic reason constructions inherit their information from the 
it is because construction) . Which one of the three types of metalinguistic 
reason constructions should be related to the it is because construction is also 
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not clear. Therefore, without going into any further detail, I only speculate 
on the possibility of the analysis  here, and leave it an open question whether 
this possibil ity is plausible or not. 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
* This chapter is a radically revised version of Kanetani (2005b, 
2006b ) .  I am indebted especially to  reviewers for Tsukuba English Studies 
24 and audience at the ICCG4 for their insightful comments . For useful 
comments on an earlier draft, I thank Yukio Hirose, Nobuhiro Kaga, and 
Naoaki Wada. I appreciate Patrick Farrell, who has kindly acted as an 
informant. 
1 .  Leech ( 1 97 4) argues that since, but not because, can introduce a 
metalinguistic reason, pointing out that sentence (ib) is "abnormal" while 
sentence (ia) is  "normal" :  
( i )  a .  What' s the answer to this  problem - s ince you' re so 
clever. 
b .  What ' s the answer to this problem - because you' re so 
clever. 
(Leech ( 1 97 4 :3 5 9))  
However, these sentences are what we call reasonmg constructions, or 
involve conjunctions used in the speech-act domain in Sweetser' s  ( 1 990) 
terms (for details, see section 2 .4  and chapter 4 ) .  In addition, in contrast to 
Leech ' s  observation, Sweetser observes that there do exist sentences l ike (ib ) . 
At any rate, what I call metalinguitic reasons in the present chapter is  
different from what Leech calls so.  Leech ' s  metalinguistic analysis is  based 
on a performative analysis (e .g.  Ross ( 1 970)) ,  and "metalinguitic reasons" in 
Leech' s  terms seem to include reasons for performing any speech act. As I 
have pointed out above, this definition encompasses what I call reasoning 
conjunctions as well (cf. Schourup and Waida ( 1 988)), and thus is  misleading. 
In this thesis, the word "metalignustic reasons" is restricted to referring to the 
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reasons for the use of a certain expression . 
2 .  Technically, a simple word or phrase, e .g .  reputed in ( 1 ), i s  not a 
clause .  Thus, i t  may sound strange to refer to such an expression as "main 
clause," but in the present chapter, I use this term to refer to the syntactic 
position that corresponds to the main clause .  
3 .  As  a working hypothesis, I take these constructions as  semantic 
equivalents, i .e .  (semantical ly) synonymous constructions . 
4 .  The difference between cleft constructions, as m (9a), and 
pseudo-cleft constructions, as in (9b ), is not crucial for the purpose of this 
paper. Henceforth, I will use the term "cleft constructions" as a cover term. 
5 .  In terms of generative grammar, a finite clause also counts as a 
phrase whose head is  assumed to be the category "tense," i . e .  a tense phrase. 
In this thesis, the word "phrase" is meant to exclude tense phrases (and 
complementizer phrases) .  Tense phrases are called "clauses ." 
6 .  From this  semantic specification, one may consider the 
!SE-because construction as an instance of the causal construction, whose 
main clause is substituted for the specific clause "I say E," and hence an 
I-l ink may be posited between them. Indeed, I posited an I-link between 
them in my earlier works (Kanetani (2005b, 2006b )) . However, as I shall 
argue in sections 6 .6  through 6 . 8 ,  the !SE-because construction cannot be 
related directly to the causal construction because of the nature of 
metalinguistic reasons . We need to postulate an intermediate level of 
construction, which will be called the XSE-because construction (cf. Hirose 
( 1 992)) . I shall closely investigate in section 6 . 8  how the constructions are 
related to each other. 
7 .  Note in passing that this  observation is compatible with a general 
pragmatic principle. Konno (2005)  proposes the following generalization 
about the correlation between formal markedness and functional 
specialization : 
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(i) If a grammatical form is  marked with reference to the 
grammatical convention of a given language, then the function 
of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding 
unmarked form( s) .  
(Konno (2005 :2)) 
S ince the conjunction because typically connects two clauses, we may 
say that the grammatical form of the E-because construction is marked with 
reference to the grammatical convention of English. As I have argued 
through this subsection, such a formally marked construction is restricted in 
its use than its formally unmarked counterpart, i . e . the !SE-because 
construction. Thus, the argument in this subsection is supported by 
Konno ' s generalization above. 
8 .  A possible alternative will b e  considered i n  appendix B .  
9 .  Unlike performative sentences, however, the focus of interest i n  the 
I SE-because construction is not the speech act itself, because the primal 
function of the construction is to express the reason why the speaker has used 
a certain expression. 
1 0 . I thank Patrick Farrell for providing me with this example. 
1 1 . Strictly speaking, this example could not be called an instance of 
the XSE-because construction, since the past tense verb said is  used. What 
i s  important here is ,  however, that the rhetorical question appears in the 
because-clause of the corresponding E-because construction. 
1 2 .  Goldberg ( 1 995 :234) notes,  "an S-link does not necessarily entail 
the existence of an I-link; there exist S-links between certain constructions 
which do not involve one construction being an instance of another 
construction." Thus, needless to say, we do not have to see the 
XSE-because construction as an instance of the E-because construction . 
1 3 .  In my earlier works (Kanetani (2005b, 2006b)), I argued that the 
!SE-because construction is related to the reasoning construction as well as 
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the causal construction. However, as I argue in this thesis, such an analysis 
does not seem plausible. For pointing out the inadequacies in my earlier 
analyses, I thank especially Nobuhiro Kaga. 
1 4 . I thank Yukio Hirose for suggesting this possibil ity .  
1 5 . The phrase it is in sentence (29) may be analyzed as serving to 
activate in the hearer' s  mind what the result situation is ,  j ust like I say in the 
!SE-because construction activates the expression used in the preceding 
context. 
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Chapter 7 
Towards Contrastive Construction Grammars : 
Because Constructions in English and 
Kara Constructions in Japanese* 
7. 1 Introduction 
So far, I have proposed a construction grammar approach to 
conj unctions of reason in English (chapter 4 ) , and have shown its validity by 
applying it to the argument of the focalizability of because and since (chapter 
5 )  and the constructions of metalinguistic reasons in English (chapter 6) .  In 
this chapter, I show the validity of the proposed analysis from a 
cross-linguistic perspective; namely, I carry out a contrastive analysis of 
constructions of causation and reasoning in English and Japanese .  
Over the last two decades, various approaches have been proposed 
under the name of construction grammar (e.g. Lakoff ( 1 9 87), Fillmore et al . 
( 1 988) ,  Goldberg ( 1 995), Michaelis and Lambrecht ( 1 996), Hirose ( 1 999) ,  
Kay and Fillmore ( 1 999), Croft (200 1 ) ,  and many others) .  Against this 
background, while researches of language-specific constructions have been 
fruitful, l ittle attention has been paid to comparing constructions across 
l anguages (cf. Weilbacher and Boas (2006)) . In want of contrastive 
analyses in construction grammar, Ostman and Fried (2005 : 9) point out, "a 
great amount of detailed and cross-linguistically oriented work needs to be 
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carried out in order to determine what, if any, types of meaning-form patterns 
may have universal validity ."  
In  response to  the need of cross-linguistic researches in  construction 
grammar, this chapter presents a contrastive analysis of constructions of 
causation and reasoning in English and Japanese. Comparing the 
constructions in these two languages, I argue that similar mechanisms lie in 
understanding causal relations and reasoning processes in English and 
Japanese. Examples of constructions to be discussed are given in ( 1 )-(2) : 1 
( 1 )  a. John came back because he loved her. 
b. John loved her, because he came back. 
(2) a .  
b .  
( Sweetser ( 1 990 :77)) 
Taro wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekita. 
Taro Top Hanako Ace love because came.back2 
'Taro came back because he loved Hanako. '  
(Higashiizumi (2006 : 1 1  7)) 
Taro wa modottekita kara Hanako o aishiteiru 
Taro Top came.back because Hanako Ace love 
nodaro. 
I .think 
'Taro loved Hanako, because he came back . ' 
(Higashiizumi (2006 : 1 1 8))  
Sentences ( 1 a, b) show that the conjunction because introduces either a cause 
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or a premise.  Sentence ( l a) expresses the causal relation between John ' s  
love o f  her and his coming back, while sentence ( 1 b) denotes the reasoning 
process in which the speaker draws the conclusion that John loved her from 
the premise that John came back. Likewise, sentences (2a, b) show that the 
Japanese conjunctive particle kara also introduces either a cause or a 
premise .  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 7 .2 explains 
some basic concepts of contrastive construction grammars, with reviewing 
Weilbacher and Boas ' (2006) contrastive construction grammar approach to 
some constructions in English and German. Sections 7 .3 and 7 .4 
investigate syntactic and semantic properties of because constructions in 
English and kara constructions in Japanese, respectively. Lastly, section 
7 .5 summarizes the arguments . 
7.2 Contrastive Construction Grammars 
Although, as I have mentioned in the previous subsection, little attention 
has been paid to contrasting constructions across languages, the importance 
of such analyses has been emphasized recently (e.g. Weilbacher and B oas 
(2006) ) . In order to explain how and in what respects constructions in 
English and German are similar or different, Weilbacher and Boas compare 
three constructions in the two languages :  Resultative constructions (cf. 
B oas (2003)), tag question constructions (cf. Kay (2002)), andjust because X 
doesn 't mean Y (JB-X DM-Y) constructions (cf. Hirose ( 1 99 1 ,  1 999), 
B ender and Kathol (to appear)) . Of these three constructions, I briefly 
overview Weilbacher and Boas ' observations of the JB-X DM-Y 
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constructions and the resultative constructions in English and their German 
counterparts . 
First, the JB-X DM-Y construction m English, e .g. (3a), and its 
German counterpart (the NW-X HDN-Y construction), e.g. (3b), are very 
s imilar both in their forms and in their meanings . Consider the following 
examples : 
(3 ) a. 
b .  
Just because John i s  rich doesn 't mean that he ' s  happy. 
(Hirose ( 1 99 1 :  1 9) [ italics are mine] ) 
Nur weil ich aus Deutschland komme heisst 
Just because I from Germany come mean 
das nicht, <lass Ich Sauerkraut esse .  
i t  not that I sauerkraut eat 
' Just because I come from Germany doesn't mean that I 
eat sauerkraut. '  
(Weilbacher and Boas (2006) [ italics are mine]) 
Weilbacher and Boas observe that these two constructions have very similar 
syntactic structures .  In  both constructions, both clauses are headed by  the 
comparable lexical items just because/nur weil and doesn 't mean/heisst das 
nicht.3 Not only are their syntactic forms similar but also their semantic 
properties are identical . They roughly describe the meaning of the JB-X 
DM-Y construction as "DM-Y cannot automatically be  inferred from JB-X," 
and argues that its German counterpart exhibits the identical meaning. Thus, 
in the JB-X DM-Y construction and the NW-X HDN-Y construction, the 
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i dentical meaning is expressed in very similar ways at the syntactic level .  
Next, let us consider resultative constructions in English and German. 
Weilbacher and Boas observe that resultative constructions in the two 
languages,  despite their similar functions, differ with respect to the types of 
restrictions on verbs and postverbal constituents (cf. B oas (2003)) . 
Consider the following resultative constructions with the verb beat (each of 
which i s  called "mini-constructions" in Boas ' (2003 ) terms) :  
(4) a. They beat the olives out of the tree. 
b .  They beat the eggs creamy. 
c .  They beat the pebbles to  a fine dust. 
d .  They beat some sense into these people. 
e. The mob beat them to death. 
(adapted from B oas (2003 : 353 )  [ italics are mine] ) 
B oas (2003 ) describes the sense of each mini-construction ( 4a-e) as follows : 
(5 )  a. ( 4a)= "To hit repeatedly in order to knock something off 
or out." 
b .  ( 4b  )= "To bring about fronting by mixing with air by 
means of repeated strong turning, whirling, or agitating." 
c .  (4c)= "To pound into a powder paste, or pulp ."  
d .  ( 4d)= "To force or  drive home by repeated strong 
admonition or injunction." 
e .  (4e)= " [To b]ring or make by hard or crushing blows."  
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(adapted from Boas (2003 : 3 5 3 )) 
What is important here is that in order to represent senses (5a-e), German 
resultatives, as shown in ( 6a-e ), use such different syntactic patterns from 
those of their English counterparts : 
(6) a. Sie schlugen die Oliven vom Baum. 
b .  S ie schlugen die Eier schaumig. 
c .  S ie zemahlten die Steine zu Staub. 
d .  Sie uberzeugten diese Leute . 
e .  Der Mob schlug s ie  tot . 
(adapted from B oas (2003 : 353 )  [ italics are mine] ) 
The italicized words or phrases in ( 4) and ( 6)  indicate how different the 
expressions are that are used to represent the same meaning in English and 
German.4 For example, in order to express the meanings listed in (5a-e), 
English uses the same verb beat, while German uses different verbs .  That i s ,  
although there do exist resultaive constructions of the same meanings in both 
English and German, as Weilbacher and B oas argue, English resultatives 
based on the verb beat and their German counterparts use such different 
expressions that more language-specific information is needed to make a 
cross-linguistic generalization (cf. fn.4 ) . 
From the observations of these constructions, Weilbacher and Boas 
(2006) argue that it i s  possible to posit the "contrastive JB-X DM-Y 
construction" and the "contrastive resultative construction" that are inherited 
1 9 1  
by the grammars of both English and German. The former contrastive 
construction exhibits similar syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties, 
and thus few language-specific specifications are necessary for a 
cross- linguistic generalization. By contrast, the latter reqmres a lot of 
language-specific information for a cross-linguistic generalization, because 
different verbs and postverbal elements ( i .e .  resultative phrases) are used to 
represent the same meaning from a language to another. Crucially, they 
suggest that "in contrastive construction grammar, there is a continuum of 
restrictions placed on the application of contrastive constructions [ italics are 
mine] ." That is, the degree of contrast varies from very similar 
constructions (e.g. the JB-X DM-Y /NW-X HDN-Y constructions) to very 
different constructions (e.g. the resultative constructions based on the verb 
beat) . Just because the corresponding constructions in the two languages 
are different, however, does not mean that they are not comparable. The 
degree of contrast reflects how much language-specific information is needed 
for cross-l inguistic generalizations . In this regard, we may safely say that 
the less language-specific information the generalization needs, the more 
universal the constructions are. As seen in chapter 3 ,  constructions should 
be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction (cf. 
F il lmore ( 1 988) Fillmore et al . ( 1 988),  Kay and Fi llmore ( 1 999), among 
many others; see chapter 3 for detail ) .  Thus, if  comparable constructions in 
given two languages are very similar, it means that people construe the things 
in a s imilar way in the two languages . 
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7.3 Because Constructions in  English 
Now that the basic concepts of contrastive construction grammars are 
given, let us compare and contrast constructions of causation and reasoning 
in English and Japanese. F irst, I observe in this subsection the English 
constructions in which the conjunction because is used. 
As is well known, the conjunction because introduces either a cause of 
another situation or the premise from which to draw a conclusion, as 
exempl ified in (7a, b ) : 
(7) a .  
b .  
John came back because he loved her. 
John loved her, because he came back. 
(= ( l a))  
(= ( l b))  
The because-clause in (7a) is the reason for his  coming back, while that in 
(7b) i s  understood as providing the premise from which the speaker draws 
the conclusion that he loved her. I have argued in chapter 4 that the 
conjunction itself is not poloysemous but the conjunction because is used in 
two constructions, i .e .  the causal because construction and the reasoning 
because construction (cf. Hirose ( 1 999), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c )) .5  That is ,  
sentence (7  a) is an instance of the causal because construction, and sentence 
(7b) one of the reasoning because construction. In the causal because 
construction, a causal relation between P(roposition) 1 and P2 is mapped onto 
the syntactic form [C2 because C1 ] ,  where C(lause) 1 and C2 denote P1 and P2, 
respectively . In the reasoning because construction, the reasoning process 
in which the speaker draws the conclusion (expressed by the main clause) 
from the premise, i .e. the s ituation described in the subordinate clause, is 
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mapped onto [C2, because C 1 ] .  Thus, their form-meaning correspondences 
can be represented as follows : 
(8 )  a. causal because construction 
sem: "P 1 is  a cause of P2" 
syn: [C2 because C i ]  
b .  reasoning because construction 
sem: "P 1 is  a premise from which to conclude that P2" 
syn: [C2, because C i ]  
What i s  important i s  that i n  causal relations, the cause situation and the result 
s ituation need to be understood as a s ingle process, while in reasoning 
processes, the premise and the conclusion are understood separately. These 
facts reflect the generalization that constructions should be consistent with 
what we know about cognition and social interaction (cf. Fillmore et al . 
( 1 9 8 8) ,  Kay and Fillmore ( 1 999)) .  For example, when we see a causal 
relation, the cause and the result are perceived at once . In contrast, in an 
inferential process, we perceive the two s ituations or propositions (expressed 
in the main clause and the because-clause) separately, and relate them based 
on our common knowledge of the world.  
As I have argued in chapters 4 and 5 ,  a lot of phenomena observed in 
the l iterature should be attributed to the properties of the constructions . Let 
us review how the constructional approach can explain different behaviors of 
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causal and reasoning because-clauses. First, causal because-clauses can be 
inside the scope of matrix question or negation, while reasoning ones cannot 
(cf. Rutherford ( 1 970),  Hirose ( 1 99 1  )) . Compare the following sentences : 
(9) a. 
b .  
c .  
Is the ground wet because i t  has rainedV 
* Has it rained, because the ground is  we? 
Has it rained,'because the ground is  � 
The arrows indicate intonation patterns. In (9a), the rising intonation is 
used at the end of the sentence. This suggests that both the main clause and 
because-clause are within the scope of the matrix question. By uttering this 
sentence, the speaker does not simply ask whether the ground is wet or not, 
but asks whether the rain has caused the ground to become wet or not. Thus, 
sentence (9a) performs one speech act as a whole . In contrast, as 
exemplified in (9b ), interrogative sentences of the reasoning because 
construction will be unacceptable if they are read in the same intonation 
pattern as that of sentence (9a) .  A s  shown i n  (9c ) ,  the rising intonation is 
used at the end of the main clause, and the sentence-final because-clause is 
read with a fall ing intonation. Note also that a period, rather than a question 
mark, is used. These facts show that in the reasoning because construction, 
the because-clause is not within the scope of matrix question. Thus, in 
causal because constructions, the matrix question can range over the whole 
sentence, while in reasoning because constructions, only the main clause can 
be within its scope, as shown in ( 1 Oa-c) : 
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( 1 0) a .  Q [the ground is  wet because it has rained] 
b .  * Q ( i t  has rained, because the ground is wet] 
c .  Q [it has rained] because the ground is wet 
From these facts, we may say that the causal because construction describes 
a causal relation as a single process and the whole process of causal relation 
can be subj ect to question. By contrast, the reasoning because construction 
describes two separate situations, i . e .  the speaker' s  conclusion and its 
premise, of which only the former can be subj ect to question. 
Second, speech act constructions that convey statements, e .g. 
topicalizations, rhetorical questions , etc. ,  can appear in reasoning 
because-clauses, but not in causal because-clauses (cf. Hooper and 
Thompson ( 1 973) ,  Lakoff ( 1 987)) .  Consider the following sentences :  
( 1 1 ) a .  * He's not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his 
wife is  cooking. 
(cf. He' s  not going out for dinner because his wife is  cooking 
Japanese food. (Hooper and Thompson ( 1 973 :494))) 
b. I think we have more or less solved the problem for 
donkeys here, because those we haven' t  got, we know 
about. (Guardian [ onl ine]) 
In ( 1 1 a), the topicalization in the because-clause is  not allowed. As the 
parenthesized original sentence shows, the because-clause is inside the scope 
of the matrix negation. This means that sentence ( l l a) is an instance of the 
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causal because construction (cf. Rutherford ( 1 970)) . As in ( 1 1 b), 
topicalization may occur in reasoning because-clauses . Given the 
properties of the constructions, this contrast can be accounted for 
straightforwardly . In the causal because construction, the because-clause 
and its main clause need to be understood as a single process, and therefore 
perform one speech act as a whole. In the reasoning because construction 
the because-clause and its main clause perform two speech acts independent 
of each other, because they are understood separately. As the very name 
suggests, "speech act" constructions perform a speech act on their own. 
Thus, because-clauses in which a speech act construction occurs perform 
speech acts independent of the main clauses (and therefore, Lakoff refers to 
subordinate clauses with speech act constructions in them as "performative 
subordinate clauses") . Hence, speech act constructions are incompatible 
with causal because-clauses, but they can occur m reasoning 
because-clauses . 
Third, causal because-clauses can be nominalized into because of NP, 
while reasoning ones cannot (Rutherford ( 1 970)) . Observe the following 
sentences : 
( 1 2) a .  He' s  not coming to class because of (his) s ickness .  
b .  * He' s not coming to  class, because of  h i s  having just 
called from San Diego. (Rutherford ( 1 970 :  1 05 )) 
If  because-clauses are nominalized as m ( l 2a, b ), they may no longer 
perform speech acts on their own. As a result, such nominalized 
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because-clauses are regarded as merely a part, or a constituent, of larger 
speech act. Hence, the nominalization of a because-clause is incompatible 
with the reasoning because construction, whereas it is compatible with the 
causal because construction. 
Fourth, causal because-clauses can be clefted, whereas reasoning ones 
cannot (Nakau ( 1 994)) .  Compare the following examples : 
( 1 3 ) a .  It' s because he' s  s ick that he' s  not coming to class .  
b .  * It' s  because his  wife told me that he' s  not coming to 
class .  
(Nakau ( 1 994 : 1 62)) 
In the reasonmg because construction, both the mam clause and the 
because-clause have to be asserted as performing their own speech acts . 
The main clause expresses the logical conclusion that the speaker draws from 
the premise given in the because-clause. As the nature of the logical 
conclusion, it is newly introduced in the discourse. The because-clause, on 
the other hand, introduces the premise from which the speaker has drawn the 
conclusion. As seen above, this is also asserted as an independent speech 
act. Thus, the main clause and the because-clause need to be focused 
equally. In other words, neither can be backgrounded. Clefting a 
because-clause makes it focused; accordingly, the main clause i s  
backgrounded. Hence, clefting is incompatible with the reasoning because 
construction. 
Fifth, as argued in chapter 5 ,  exclusives, e.g. merely, just, simply, and 
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the l ike, may focalize causal because-clauses, as in ( l  4a), but not reasoning 
because-clauses, as in ( l  4b) (Kanetani (in press)) : 
( 1 4) a .  He went to college simply because his parents asked him 
to. (Schourup and Waida ( 1 98 8 :9 5 )) 
b .  * I t  has rained, just because the ground is  wet. 
As I have mentioned earlier in this subsection, in a reasoning process, it is the 
speaker that relates two situations expressed in the main clause and the 
because-clause (cf. chapter 4 ) . That is ,  the s ituations in question do not 
necessarily have any causal relation in the real world .  Thus, even if one 
says, "it has rained, because the ground is wet," logically, the cause of the 
wet ground does not have to be the rain. However, the speaker sees the wet 
ground, and then concludes that it has rained based on his common 
knowledge of the world or experience .  In other words, it may not have 
rained, and even if it has,  there need not be a necessary causal relation 
between the rain and the wet ground. B esides, there may be other possible 
reasons for the speaker to conclude that it has rained, say, to see a rainbow in 
the sky, to see someone get home wet, to hear the news about the rain, etc . 
Thus, the proposed analysis  correctly and comprehensively accounts 
for a lot of facts pointed out in the literature. What is important is that we 
understand a causal relation as a single process of cause and result s ituations, 
whereas in a reasoning process, the speaker relates two s ituations perceived 
separately. It is these different ways of understanding causal relations and 
reasoning processes that are reflected in different behaviors between causal 
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and reasoning because-clauses . 
7.4 Kara Constructions in Japanese 
In order to account for typological variation in a construction grammar 
framework, Croft (200 1 : 5 1 )  notes that "constructions may be compared 
across languages according to their function. "6 The functions of the 
Japanese constructions to be investigated in this subsection are, of course, 
equivalent to those of their English counterparts . The Japanese counterpart 
of because is the conjunctive particle kara (cf. fn. 1 ) .  Like because-clauses, 
kara-clauses either express the cause of another s ituation or provide the 
premise from which to draw a conclusion. Consider the following 
examples : 
( 1 5 ) a. 
b .  
Taro w a  Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekita. 
Taro Top Hanako Ace love because came. back 
'Taro came back because he loved Hanako. '  
(= (2a))) 
Taro wa modottekita kara Hanako o aishiteiru 
Taro Top came.back because Hanako Ace love 
nodaro. 
I .think 
'Taro loved Hanako, because he came back . ' 
(= (2b )) 
The kara-clause in (I S a) is  understood as the cause of Taro' s  coming back, 
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and the sentence expresses the causal relation between Taro' s  love of Hanako 
and his coming back. The kara-clause in ( 1 5b) provides the premise from 
which the speaker draws the conclusion that Taro loved Hanako. 
In the previous subsection, I have shown the validity of the 
construction grammar approach to the English conj unction because. In this 
subsection, I extend the constructional view to the kara constructions in 
Japanese, and compare them with their English counterparts . For the sake 
of convenience, I refer to sentences l ike ( 1 5a) as the causal kara construction, 
and sentences l ike ( l 5b) as the reasoning kara construction. Their 
form-meaning correspondences may be formalized as follows : 
( 1 6) a. causal kara construction 
sem:  "P 1 is  a cause of P2" 
b .  reasoning kara construction 
sem: "P 1 is  a premise from which to conclude that P2 ' 
In the causal kara construction, a causal relation between P 1  and P2 is 
mapped onto the syntactic form [C 1 kara C2] .  In the reasoning kara 
construction, the reasoning process in which the speaker draws the 
conclusion from the premise is mapped onto [C 1 kara, C2] .  
Now that the constructions o f  causation and reasoning i n  Japanese are 
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defined, let us observe more c losely the causal and reasoning kara 
constructions . Specifically, I investigate the behaviors of kara-clauses and 
compare them with those of because-clauses . First, the causal kara-clauses 
can be within the scope of matrix question, whi le the reasoning kara-clauses 
cannot. Consider the following dialogue: 
( 1 7) A:  
B :  
Taro wa kaze o hiita kara JUgyo m 
Taro Top cold Ace got because c lass to 
konai no? 
not.come Q 
' Isn' t  Taro coming to class because he got cold? ' 
Uun, Taro wa kaze o hiita kara J Ugyo 
No Taro Top cold Ace got because class 
konai nodewanaku, infuruenza ill kakatta 
not.come not.but the flu Dat got 
kara Jugyo m konai noda yo. 
because class to not.come it. i s  I .tell .you 
ill 
to 
'No, it ' s  not because Taro got a cold but because he got a 
flu that he' s  not coming to class . '  
Speaker B ' s  answer negates the causal relation between Taro ' s cold and his 
not coming to class .  This suggests that speaker A asks whether the causal 
relation holds or not, rather than merely whether Taro is not coming to c lass, 
as shown in ( 1 8) :  
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( 1 8) Q [Taro wa kaze o hi ita kara jugyo ni konai] 
By contrast, as the unacceptable answer by speaker D in ( 1 9) below indicates, 
this kind of relational negation is an inappropriate answer to a question of the 
reasoning kara construction . The answer by speaker D' ,  which only 
negates the statement that Taro is not coming to class, is appropriate . 
( 1 9) C :  Taro w a  sakki Osaka kara denwa o 
Taro Top a . l ittle .while .ago Osaka from phone Ace 
kaketekita kara, jugyo ni  konai no (kana)? 
called because class to not .come Q (I.wonder) 
' Isn' t  Taro coming to class, because he has j ust called 
from Osaka. ' 
D :  * Uun, Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa 
No Taro Top a . l ittle.while.ago Osaka from phone 
o kaketekita kara dewanaku, kare no okasan 
Ace called because not. but 3 sg. Gen mother 
ga so itteita kara j ugyo ni konai noda 
Norn so was .saying because class to not.come it. is 
yo. 
I .tell .you 
' (Lit . )  No, it' s  not because Taro has just called from 
Osaka but because his mother told me so that (I conclude 
that) he' s  not coming to class . '  
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D' : Uun, Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa 
No Taro Top a. little.while .ago Osaka from phone 
0 kaketekita kedo, JUgyO Ill wa kuru 
Ace called but class to Cont come 
yo. 
I .tell .you 
'No, Taro has j ust called from Osaka, but he' s  coming to 
class . '  
Thus, speaker C ,  judging from the fact that Taro has called from Osaka, 
simply asks whether Taro is  not coming to class; he cannot ask whether the 
reason for asking the question is Taro' s  phone-call from Osaka or not, as 
shown below: 
(20) a. * Q [Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara 
jugyo ni konai] 
b .  Taro wa  sakki Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara, Q 
[Jugyo ni  konai] 
The contrast of the scope of question is parallel to the one observed in 
English: The causal subordinate clauses may be ins ide the scope of matrix 
question, while the reasoning ones may not. 
Second, topicalization, i . e .  a kind of speech act construction of 
statement, cannot occur in causal kara-clauses, whereas it may occur m 
reasonmg kara-clauses (cf. Maki et al . ( 1 999), Haegeman (2002)) . 
204 
Consider the following contrast : 
(2 1 )  a. ?? Taro no shukudai wai Hanako ga ti yatta kara 
Taro Gen homework Top Hanako Norn did because 
Taro wa sense1 m okorareta. 
Taro Top teacher by was .scolded 
' (Lit .)  Taro was scolded by the teacher because Taro' s  
home worki, Hanako did ti . '  
b .  Kimi no shukudai wai boku ga ti yatta kara, 
2sg. Gen homework Top 1 sg. 
isshoni asobo yo. 
together let ' s'.hang.out I .tell .you 
Norn did because 
'Let' s  hang out together, because your homework, I have 
done for you . '  
In Japanese, sentence-initial topics are marked by  the particle wa, In (2 1 a, 
b ) , Taro no shukudai 'Taro ' s  homework' and Kimi no shukudai ' your 
homework' are topicalized, respectively. Causal kara-clause (2 l a) does not 
allow the topicalization in it, while reasoning kara-clause (2 1 b) does . 7 
Note in passing that the unacceptability of sentence (2 1 a) does not 
result from the anomalous OSV word-order, but from the topicalization. To 
see this ,  observe the following sentence : 
(22) Taro no shukudai oi Hanako ga 
Taro Gen homework Acc Hanako Norn 
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t i  yatta kara 
did because 
Taro wa sense1 m okorareta. 
Taro Top teacher by was .scolded 
'Taro was scolded because Hanako did his homework . '  
In  (22), the sentence-initial object Taro no shukudai 'Taro ' s  homework ' is 
marked by the accusative case marker o, not by the topic marker wa, and the 
sentence is acceptable. That is, the OSV word-order in this kara-clause is 
the result of scrambl ing, not topicalization. Saito ( 1 989) claims that 
scrambling does not change the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, it is 
not prevented from occurring in causal kara-clauses . By contrast, as shown 
in (2 1 a, b) above, topicalization is compatible only with reasoning 
kara-clauses . That is, although Japanese is a relatively free word-order 
language, topicalization, a kind of speech-act construction, is compatible 
only with reasoning kara-clauses . This is also parallel to the topicalization 
in English acceptable in reasoning because-clauses, but not in causal ones . 
Third, causal kara-clauses can be nominalized into NP notame, while 
reasoning kara-clauses cannot.8 Observe the following examples : 
(23 ) a. Taro wa kaze o hiita kara j ugyo m 
Taro Top cold Ace got because class to 
konai . 
not.come 
'Taro is not coming to class because he got a cold . '  
b .  Taroo wa  kaze notame j ugyo m konai . 
Taro Top cold because.of class to not.come 
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(24) a. 
b .  
'Taro is  not coming to class because of  a cold . '  
Taro w a  Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara 
Taro Top Osaka from phone Ace cal led 
(Tsukuba deno) jugyo m konai daro . 
(Tsukuba in) class to not.come I .guess 
because 
'Taro is not coming to class (in Tsukuba), because he just 
called from Osaka. ' 
?? Taro wa Osaka kara no denwa notame, 
Taro Top Osaka from Gen cal l because .of 
(Tsukuba den·o) 3ugyo ni konai daro . 
(Tsukuba in) class to not.come I .guess 
' (Lit . )  Taro is not coming to class ( in Tsukuba) because of 
his  call from Osaka . '  
The causal kara-clause in (23 a) can be  nominalized into kaze notame 
' because of his cold' as in (23 b ) ,  while such nominalization of reasoning 
kara-clause in (24a) is not acceptable, as shown in (24b ) .  Thus, both in 
English and in Japanese, causal subordinate clauses may be nominalized, 
whereas reasoning ones may not. 
Fourth, causal kara-clauses can be clefted, as in (25a), while reasoning 
kara-clauses cannot, as in (25b ) :  
(25 )  a. Taro ga j ugyo ni  konai no wa 
Taro Norn class to not.come Nomi Top 
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kaze o hi ita kara 
cold Ace got because 
da. 
Cop 
' It ' s  because Taro got cold that he ' s  not coming to class . '  
(cf. Taro wa kaze o hiita kara jugyo n i  konai . (= (23a))) 
b .  ?? Taro ga JUgyo m konai no wa 
Taro Norn class to not. come Nomi Top 
sakki Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita 
a. little .while .ago Osaka from phone Ace called 
kara da. 
because Cop 
' (Lit .) It' s  because he just called from Osaka that he' s not 
coming to class . '  
(cf. Taro wa Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara jugyo n i  konai 
daro . (= (23a))) 
Again, this contrast is also parallel to the clefting of causal/reasoning 
because-clauses in Engli sh .  
Lastly, the adverb tada can focalize causal kara-clauses, as  in  (26a ) , 
while  it cannot focalize reasoning kara-clauses, as in (26b) : 
(26) a. Taro wa tada Hanako o aishiteiru kara 
Taro Top only Hanako Ace love because 
modottekita. 
came.back 
' Taro came back only because he loved Hanako. '  
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b .  * Taro wa tada modottekita kara, Hanako o 
Taro Top only came.back because Hanako Ace 
aishiteiru nodaro . 
Love I .guess 
' (Lit . )  Taro loves Hanako, only because he came back. ' 
Here, I assume that the adverb tada is an exclusive in Japanese. Kenkyusha 
Shin Waei Chu Jiten [Kenkyusha' s  New College Japanese-English 
Dictionary (5th edition)] gives the following translations to tada: 
(27) tada : merely, s imply, only, solely 
S ince the English words l isted in (27) all belong to exclusives, it may be said 
that tada covers the same range of meaning as English exclusives .  Then, 
the focalizability of causal/reasoning kara-clauses shows the same contrast as 
the focalizabi lity pattern of causal/reasoning because-clauses in English . 
Thus, the observations in sections 7 .3  and 7 .4 can be summarized as 
follows : 
(28) causal reasonmg 
because/kara because/kara 
wide-scope reading OK * 
topicalization * OK 
nominalization OK * 
clefting OK * 
focalizati on OK * 
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From table (28),  we learn that causal because- and kara-clauses behave just 
alike, and that reasoning because- and kara-clauses show similar behaviors . 
I have argued in section 7 .3  that these behaviors of because-clauses are 
reflections of the following properties of the causal and reasoning because 
constructions : The causal because-clause and its main clause form one 
information unit as a whole, while the reasoning because-clause and its main 
clause are understood as forming separate information units . Then, we may 
say that the causal and reasoning kara constructions also have the same 
properties as the English counterparts . That is, in both languages, a causal 
relation is understood as a combined process of the cause s ituation and the 
result situation; reasoning is a process in which the speaker relates two 
s ituations perceived separately based on his common knowledge of the 
world .  
7.5  Summa ry 
In the last two subsections, I have observed that the functionally 
equivalent constructions in English and Japanese also show parallel syntactic 
behaviors of their subordinate clauses with respect to (i) the possibility of the 
wide-scope reading of question, (ii) the (non)occurrence of topicalization in 
them, ( i i i) their nominalizability, (iv) the possibil ity of their clefting, and (v) 
their focalizability by exclusives . As I have argued in chapter 4, these 
behaviors of because-clauses are attributed to the properties of the causal 
because and reasoning because constructions (Kanetani (2005 ,  2006c)) . By 
the same token, . such behaviors of kara-clauses may be attributed to the 
causal kara and reasoning kara constructions . 
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These similarities lead us to posit the "contrastive causal construction" 
and the "contrastive reasoning construction" in English and Japanese . 
These contrastive constructions need very little language-specific 
information for arriving at cross-linguistic generalizations . That is, in 
Engl ish and Japanese, people construe causal relations and reasoning 
processes in very similar ways. In a causal relation, the cause and result 
s ituations are perceived as a s ingle process, while in a reasoning process, the 
s ituations expressed in the main clause and the subordinate clause are 
perceived separately and the speaker relates them based on his common 
knowledge of the world.  It  is these similarities that many parallelisms in 
English and Japanese result from. 
Thus, I have shown in this chapter that similar cognitive mechanisms 
are observed cross-linguistically (at least, in English and Japanese) in 
understanding causal relations and reasoning processes . That is ,  the 
proposed construction grammar approach not only explains a lot of 
phenomena in English but also provides generalizations across languages in 
combination with language-specific restrictions, such as different lexical 
items,  d ifferent word-orders, etc. 
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Notes to Chapter 7 
* For useful comments on an earlier version of this chapter, I am 
indebted to Yukio Hirose and Naoaki Wada. My deep gratitude goes to 
Patrick Farrell , who has kindly acted as an informant. I also thank the 
following people for sharing their intuitions on Japanese sentences :  Shoichi 
Yamada, Ken-ichi Kitahara, Mai Osawa, and Tetsuya Kogusri . 
1 .  Other conjunctive particles than kara, such as node, may be used 
to introduce a reason in Japanese, as exempl ified in (i) : 
(i) Atsui node tui mizu o nom1sug1ru 
hot because can ' t.help .but water ACC drink.too .much 
' Because it is hot, we can ' t  help but drink water too much . ' 
(Koj ien5) 
The difference between kara and node has been a topic of heated debate 
(e .g .  Nagano ( 1 952, 1 988), Kyogoku ( 1 986),  Tio ( 1 9 88) ,  Takeuchi ( 1 997), 
among others) .  Although it would be interesting to examine their 
behaviors, i t  seems too complicated to deal with in this thesis .  I leave it 
for future research, and here, I compare because and kara, assuming that 
they are comparable elements in English and Japanese (cf. Higashiizumi 
(2006)) . 
Higashiizumi presents a detailed observation of the historical 
development of because and kara, and argues that because- and 
kara-clauses have developed in the same way .  That is ,  their syntactic 
extension is  from more to less integrated clause-combining constructions, 
and semantic/pragmatic extension shows subjectification (cf. Traugott and 
Dasher (2002)) . Roughly speaking, in both languages ,  the reasoning uses, 
as in b-sentences, have been developed from the causal uses, as m 
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a-sentences .  Although their historical developments are beyond the scope 
of thi s  thesis, Higashiizumi ' s comparative historical analysis  of because 
and kara leads us to assume that they are comparable elements in English 
and Japanese .  
2 .  The abbreviations used in the glosses of examples are as follows : 
l /2/3 sg.=first/second/third person singular pronoun, Acc=accusative case 
marker, Cop=copula, Gen=genitive case marker, Nom=nominative case 
marker, Nomi=nominalizer, Q=question morpheme, and Top=topic marker. 
3 .  The German example provided Weilbacher and Boas (2006) has a 
complex sentence structure. That is ,  if  l iterally translated, sentence (3 b) 
will be: Just because I 'm from Germany, it doesn 't mean I eat sauerkraut. 
Indeed they consider the constructions in question as having complex 
sentence structures .  In contrast, H irose ( 1 999) points out that the German 
language does have the same structure as English JB-X DM-Y 
constructions, as in (i) ,  and considers the because-clause or the weil-clause 
as serving the subj ect. 
( i) Nur weil ich L inguist bin, bedeutet nicht, dass ich 
only because I l inguist am means not that I 
viele Spachen spreche 
many languages speak 
' Just because I ' m  a l inguist doesn't  mean I speak many 
languages . '  
(Hirose ( 1 999 :  6 0 6  f. )) 
Whether or not the because-clauses or the we if-clauses are the subj ect of the 
sentence, however, is not a point here . See Matsuyama (200 1 )  and B ender 
and Kathol (to appear) for detail arguments on this  issue. 
4. Wei lbacher and Boas (2006) do not argue that all resultative 
constructions in English and German entirely have no one-to-one 
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correspondences (cf. Boas (2003 )) . They observe that resultatives based 
on the verb wipe and their German counterparts, for example, show roughly 
the same meaning extensions, and thus, need less language-specific 
information for a cross-linguistic generalization, compared with resultatives 
based on the verb beat. 
5 .  The causal because construction has been s imply called the causal 
construction in chapter 4. In order to avoid confusion with the Japanese 
counterpart to be dealt with in section 7 .4, I use this term in the present 
chapter. 
6 .  Note, however, that Croft (200 1 )  argues that there are no 
universal constructions . 
7 .  One may argue that the kara-clause used in (2 1 b) belongs to 
speech-act conj unction in Sweetser' s ( 1 990) terms and that the sentence 
does not express a reasoning process .  For the reasons mentioned in 
chapter 4, I do not distinguish Sweetser '  s epistemic and speech-act domains 
and consider sentences like (2 1 b) as instances of the reasoning kara 
construction (see chapter 4 for detai ls) .  
8 .  Whether n o  tame i s  the counterpart of because of or not may be an 
issue that needs to be discussed . Note that kara by itself can follow a 
noun phrase .  Of more note is  that when it affixes to a noun phrase, as in 
(i) , it functions as an ablative case marker, and the string "NP kara" does 
not express causal meaning (cf. Higashiizumi (2006 : 1 1 9f. ) ) : 
(i) Eki kara uchi made aruite 
station from my.house to on.foot 
JUppun desu 
ten.minutes COP 
' It is a ten minutes ' walk from the station to my house. '  
(Higashiizumi (2006 : 1 1 9))  
Thus, "NP kara" cannot be considered to be the counterpart of "because of 
NP." Then, we need another lexical item that affixes to a noun phrase and 
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functions as a cause marker; notame can be a possible candidate for such a 
lexical item. 
One may further argue that while because and because of seem 
morphologically and historically related, notame seems to have no such 
relations with kara. However, it is possible to consider that because and 
because of (as well as kara and no tame) are totally different lexical items in 
Present Day English (cf. Matsuyama (200 I )) ,  whatever relation they have 
had before . Thus, despite the unrelated morphological status of kara and 
notame, I assume that the latter is the Japanese counterpart of because of, 
based on their semantic and syntactic s imilarities . 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
B efore concluding the thesis, let us briefly review what we discussed 
m chapters 4 through 7. In chapter 4, in order to give an integrated 
account of because, since, and for, I proposed a construction grammar 
analysis of these conj unctions . Postulating two construction schemas, i .e. 
the causal construction and the reasoning construction, I claimed that both 
similar and different behaviors of the conj unctions at issue are best 
accounted for not by focusing only on the conjunctions themselves but by 
considering what constructions they participate in. The conjunction 
because participates both in the causal construction and in the reasoning 
construction, whereas since and for are used in the reasoning construction, 
but not in the causal construction. Thus, the form-meaning 
correspondences of causal and reasoning constructions are roughly 
represented as follows : 1 
( 1 )  a. causal constructions 
Sem :  
Syn: C2  because C 1 Because C 1 , C2 
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b.  reasoning constructions 
Crucial ly, in a causal relation, the cause situation and the result s ituation are 
understood as a combined process as a whole, whereas in a reasoning 
process, the speaker subj ectively connects two s ituations perceived 
separately (as represented with the brackets in ( 1 a, b) ) .  This common 
knowledge about causation and reasoning is reflected in various phenomena 
such as the nominalization of causal because-clauses, the (non-)occurrence 
of speech act constructions of statement in subordinate clauses, etc . In 
other words, it is  the characteristics of the constructions that account for 
these phenomena. 
Then, I showed the validity of the above proposal by applying it to 
the arguments of focalizabi lity of because and since, and of metal inguistic 
reason constructions in English. The validity of the proposed analysis  was 
also shown by contrasting because constructions in English with kara 
constructions in Japanese .  First, chapter 5 discussed the focalizabi lity of 
because and since . Desp ite the widely accepted view that because-clauses 
can be focalized by focusing adverbs whereas since-clauses cannot, there 
are many counterexamples, as in (2a, b ) : 
(2) a. * It has rained, just because the ground is  wet. 
(Kanetani (to appear)) 
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b .  Wearing a different one every t ime she went out would 
be only natural, particularly since a sari does not have to 
be washed as frequently as a dress .  (BNC) 
I proposed the following general ization as to when because- and 
since-clauses can be focal ized by focusing adverbs : Causal because­
clauses can be focalized both by exclusives (e.g. just, simply, only, and the 
l ike) and by particularizers (e.g. especially, particularly, partly, and the 
like), whereas reasonmg because-clauses and since-clauses (i .e .  
conj unctions used in the reasoning construction) can be focalized by 
particularizers but not  by exclusives .2 This generalization i s  derived by 
considering ( i)  characteristics of the causal and reasoning constructions and 
( i i) the meanings of relevant focusing adverbs .  Thus, the d istinction 
between the causal construction and the reasoning construction, as proposed 
in chapter 4, plays a particularly important role in explaining the 
focalizabi l ity of reason subordinate clauses. 
Next, chapter 6 dealt with metalinguistic reason constructions m 
English, as in (3 ) :  
(3 ) The B lackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable 
private collection in the world.  Reputed, because no one 
outside of invited guests was permitted to see it . 
(Hirose ( 1 992 : 82)) 
The E-because construction (e.g. (3 )) is  similar to the causal construction in 
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some sense while it is  similar to the reasoning construction in another. In 
order to account for the bilateral characteristics, it is necessary to consider a 
subpart relation between the E-because construction, as in (3 ) , and the 
corresponding I SE-because construction, as in ( 4 ) : 
( 4) I say "reputed," because no one outside of invited guests was 
permitted to see it. 
In the ISE-because construction, which also exhibits the bilateral 
characteristics, the nature of metalinguistic reasons and the phrase I say in 
the main clause jointly make it possible to postulate the two levels of 
speakers ' viewpoints, i .e .  the viewpoint of the user of the expression E and 
the viewpoint of the metacognitive agent. Which characteristic the 
construction shows depends on which viewpoint of the two levels of 
speakers is taken. Because of the lack of the phrase I say, the E-because 
construction is not expected to take such two levels of speakers ' viewpoints . 
However, the E-because construction, being subsumed under the 
!SE-because construction, inherits its characteristics (cf. Goldberg ( 1 995) ,  
Hirose ( 1 998 ,  1 999)) .  Likewise, unpredictable behaviors of the 
XSE-because construction and its E-because counterpart (e .g.  ( 5 )) may be 
accounted for, as well .  
( 5 )  They were all saymg "no way". (They said) "no way" 
because who in their right mind would do such a thing ! 
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From these observations, I claimed that considering relations between 
constructions may even elucidate their unpredictable behaviors, and 
emphasized that constructions exist in relation with other constructions, 
rather than stand alone . That is, in order to understand a certain 
construction, not only the construction under investigation but also its 
neighboring, or related, constructions are necessary to be considered (cf. 
Kanetani (2006b) ) .  Therefore, the analysis of  the causal and reasoning 
constructions proposed in chapter 4 i s  essential to the analysis of 
metalinguistic reason constructions.  
Finally, chapter 7,  contrasting because constructions in Engl ish and 
kara constructions in Japanese, showed that the construction grammar 
analysis of conjunctions of reason is valid not only in English but also in 
other languages (at least in Japanese) . Causal and reasoning subordinate 
clauses in Engli sh and Japanese behave alike with respect to ( i )  their 
inclusion within the scope of matrix question, (i i) the (non-)occurrence of 
speech act constructions in them, (iii) their nominalizability, ( iv) the 
applicability of clefting, and (v) their focalizability by exclusives . I 
c laimed in chapters 4 and 5 that these behaviors of because-clauses are 
accounted for in terms of the characteristics of the causal construction and 
reasoning construction. From the fact that kara constructions show similar 
behaviors to their English counterparts,  I argued that in these languages, 
s imilar mechanisms lie in understanding causal relations and reasoning 
processes . That is ,  causal constructions and reasoning constructions may 
be generalized cross-l inguistically with very few language-specific 
• . 3 restrictions . 
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In conclusion, I emphasized that causation is a combined process of 
cause and result s ituations, while reasoning is a process in which the 
speaker subj ectively connects two situations perceived separately .  Based 
on the widely accepted assumption that our grammar should be consistent 
with what we know about cognition and social interaction (e.g.  F i l lmore 
( 1 988) ,  Fi l lmore et al . ( 1 988) ,  Goldberg ( 1 995 ), Ostman and Fried (2005) ,  
among many others), I argued that this common knowledge about causation 
and reasoning is reflected in our grammar; i . e . ,  causal constructions and 
reasoning constructions exhibit the general properties of causation and 
reasoning. In addition, I showed that the proposed analysis is both 
language-specifically and cross-linguistical ly valid .  
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Notes to Chapter 8 
1 .  The representations given in ( 1  a, b) are simplified (for detai ls,  see 
chapter 4) .  
2 .  In discussing focalizations, for is not relevant and thus was 
excluded from the analysis, since, as I argued in chapter 4, it is not a 
subordinator. 
3 .  However, language-specific information is stil l  necessary to 
determine, for example, what lexical items are used (e .g.  because vs. kara ), 
how the constituents are aligned (e.g.  because-C vs . C-kara ) , etc .  (cf. 
Weilbacher and Boas (2006) ) . 
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